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During the past 25 years, household bankruptcy filings have quadrupled and the level of
credit card debt has doubled. I try to explain both of these facts as a result of a more
informative credit rating technology. I consider an environment where borrowers are het-
erogeneous with respect to their cost of default. Lenders have access to a rating technology
which provides an exogenous signal about borrowers’ default costs. As the signal becomes
more informative, the credit market will provide a higher credit limit for borrowers with a
high cost of default, hence allowing them to borrow more, which makes them more likely to
default, while decreasing borrowing and default by those with a low cost of default. Using
SMM, I estimate the model to match data on the averages of credit limit and debt as well as
the increase in the spread of the credit limit distribution from the SCF 1992 and 1998. The
model accounts for about one third of the increase in the number of bankruptcy filings.
vi
In the second chapter we address Hotelling’s venerable question about where shops
endogenously locate in variety space in an environment that shares certain features of search
models of money. Specifically, households are anonymous, have heterogeneous tastes,
search is directed, and multilateral matching is possible. We solve for optimal incentive fea-
sible allocations. We implement the solution as a trading post economy. In certain regions
of the parameter space, the implementation shares features of a representative agent, cash-
in-advance model while in other regions implementation of the optimum involves cross-
sectional heterogeneity in consumption and production.
In the third chapter we use a computational methodology to incorporate endoge-
nous horizontal differentiation into a dynamic stochastic model of quality investment under
duopolistic competition. We analyze the effects on the industry’s long-run innovation rate
of changes in: (a) consumer transport costs, and (b) the costs of horizontal differentiation.
More competition in the form of lower transport costs may have a U-shaped effect on in-
novation, rather than the inverse-U reported in earlier studies. The effect of less costly hor-
izontal differentiation depends on the degree of consumer taste heterogeneity. Less costly
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Information Technology and the Rise
of Household Bankruptcy
Household bankruptcy filings have been increasing in the US for the past quarter of a cen-
tury. In 1984, 0.33% of American households filed for bankruptcy. The number of filers
rose to 0.93% of households in 1991 and continued to increase up to 1.41% in 2004.1
This trend can also be spotted in the number of Canadian bankruptcy filers (Livshits et al.
(2005)), suggesting that the increase should not be solely attributed to legal changes in the
US.
During this period, households’ access to unsecured credit (mainly through credit
cards) flourished. While in 1989, 56% of households had access to credit cards and 29%
of households carried a positive balance on their accounts. Fifteen years later credit card
access rose to 72% and 40% of American households were carrying debt on their accounts
(the latter are called revolvers in the literature).2 Moreover, the average credit card debt of
1Just before the sweeping changes to America’s bankruptcy code took effect in 2005, the number of bank-
ruptcy filers jumped to 1.55% of American households. Unsurprisingly, the number of filers plummeted after
the change went into effect. Recent data suggest the number of filers is picking up again.
220% of households (69 percentage of revolvers) were carrying more than $500 debt in 1989. This fraction
rose to 30% of households (75 percentage of revolvers) in 2004.
1
revolvers increased from $1, 830 in 1989 to $3, 300 in 2004.3 But households were not just
borrowing more subject to the same credit limits. During this period the average credit card
limit available for an American household more than doubled; they rose from $7, 100 in
1989 to $15, 200 in 2004.4
The importance of credit card debt on a household’s decision to file for bankruptcy
has been well documented (see for example Domowitz and Sartain [22] as well as Sullivan,
Warren and Westbrook [52].) Therefore, understanding the dynamics behind the expan-
sion of credit card availability and its usage is critical for studying the rise of household
bankruptcies.
Barron and Staten [8] document that expansion of the credit card industry would
not be possible without rapid improvements in information technology and credit rating
technologies. In 1997 credit bureaus issued some 600 million reports about credit seek-
ers, (Padilla and Pagano [45]), and in the following decade credit scores produced by the
Fair Isaac and Company, known as FICO scores, became the industry’s standard tool for
assessing borrowers’ credit worthiness.
This paper tries to explain the rise in the number of bankruptcy filings as a result of
improvement in the credit rating technology which allows the credit market to better screen
borrowers’ riskiness. This might sound counter intuitive at first. When creditors separate
borrowers according to their riskiness, they will tighten the credit supply for the riskier
borrowers, which will make them less likely to default. However, the safer borrowers will
receive a higher borrowing limit which allows them to borrow more and, in turn, can result
in more default. This is because even safer borrowers, ceteris paribus, are more likely to
default when their debt level is higher. The net change of the debt level and the default rate
is ambiguous.
Suppose the rating technology does not work well, so the credit market lacks in-
formation on borrowers riskiness and cannot differentiate them, which I call the “pooling
3All dollar amounts are in 1989 constant prices.
4A household’s credit card limit is the sum of limits on all of the household’s credit cards.
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case”. The equilibrium supply of credit will be so tight that the safer borrowers do not find it
optimal to borrow much, and therefore are not paying much for the losses of the credit mar-
ket from lending to the riskier borrowers.5 Now, suppose the rating technology improves,
so the credit market obtains information on the riskiness of borrowers and can differentiate
them, which I call the “separating case”. In this case, the market will cut back the supply of
credit for the riskier borrowers only slightly. Hence the default rate by these borrowers does
not fall very much. On the other hand, creditors will extend the supply of credit for the now
distinguished safer borrowers extensively, encouraging them to borrow and hence default
more.6 I will call this the informational explanation for the rise of household bankruptcy.
The literature provides other explanations for the rise of household bankruptcies.
The common explanation attributes it to the fall of “stigma” attached to bankruptcy. Gross
and Souleles [25] report that ceteris paribus, a credit card holder in 1997 was almost 1
percentage point more likely to declare bankruptcy than a card holder with identical risk
characteristics in 1995. Fay, Hurst and White [24] report that even after controlling for
state and time fixed effects, households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in
districts with higher aggregate bankruptcy filings rates.
The stigma explanation, however, has counterfactual implications for credit avail-
ability and equilibrium debt levels. If borrowers become less reluctant to default on their
debt, then shouldn’t creditors restrain the supply of credit? and wouldn’t this result in
less borrowing rather than more? Athreya [4] and Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt [41] have
noted that the decline in stigma alone would lead to a counterfactual decline in the ratio of
unsecured debt to income. To account for the rise of consumer debt level they suggest a
reduction in the transaction costs of lending.7 Livhshits et al. [41] use a combination of
decline in stigma and fall in transaction costs to explain the changes in filings and the ratio
5For example when the riskier borrowers are much more risky than the safer ones and there are enough of
them in the pool of borrowers, borrowing and default will be mostly done by the riskier ones.
6Borrowers’ responsiveness to the terms of credit contracts, and specifically credit limits, are well docu-
mented by Gross and Souleles [26].
7Athreya [4] also uses the same reduction to generate the rise in filings, which leads to a significantly higher
debt to income ratio than that observed in the data.
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of unsecured debt to income.8
But a fall in credit transaction costs cannot explain the increase in the spread of
households credit card limits. While from 1992 to 1998, when bankruptcy filings rose
significantly, the average American household’s credit card limit increased from $7, 200
to $12, 800, the standard deviation of the cross sectional distribution of credit limits rose
from $8, 200 in 1989 to $15, 700 in 2004.9. That is, the distribution of credit card limits
did not just shift rightward, its spread also increased (the increase of credit limit for some
households has been larger than the increase of limits for others). Gross and Souleles [25]
report that creditors extended the larger lines to less risky accounts, suggesting that the
spread of credit supply is mostly associated with the improvement in risk assessment.
Using a combination of the rise of stigma and fall of transaction costs to address
different trends of the consumer credit industry ignores an important innovation of this
industry; improvements of credit risk rating. This paper studies the implication of an im-
provement on the trends of the consumer credit industry.10 Specifically, I examine how the
credit limit and debt distribution as well as the number of bankruptcy filings differ in a mar-
ket where creditors have information about the their borrowers’ types from a credit market
where they do not.
Section (2) provides some facts from the data on the trend of household bankrupt-
cies, the distributions of credit card limits and debt as well as changes in these distributions
across time. Section (3) describes a model of households’ demand for credit, the respon-
siveness of their demand to credit contracts, in particular credit limits, and the response of
propensity of default to an increase of credit supply. Then the model is used to show how a
more informed credit market on average supplies more credit, but the distribution of credit
8Another possible explanation for more bankruptcy filings could be the rise of “uncertainty” in households’
income and emergency expenses. This explanation implies a similar counterfactual decline in credit provision.
Moreover, Livshits et al. [41] find its effect on the rise of filing numbers insignificant.
9Credit limits are reported in 1989 dollars
10Chatterjee et al. [16] provide a model with dynamic updating of creditors’ beliefs about borrowers’ cred-
itworthiness that they associate with credit scores. Their paper does not, however, have anything to say about
trends, which is the main point of my paper.
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supply will also spread. Section (4) provides a simple quantitative example and shows the
model does well in explaining the rise of credit supply, consumer debt level and the number
of household bankruptcies. Section (5) concludes.
1.1 Data and Motivation
Households can file for bankruptcy under chapter 7 or 13. Under chapter 7 their unsecured
debt such as credit card debt, installment loans, medical bills and damage claims are dis-
charged, and filers lose all of their assets above an exemption level.11 Under chapter 13,
filers must propose a plan to repay a portion of their debts from future income without
losing their assets. Since households have the right to choose between the chapters, they
are only obliged to use future earnings to repay debt to the extent they would repay under
chapter 7. Those who file under chapter 13 are allowed to file again under chapter 7, but
the chapter 7 filers cannot file for another 6 years. The bankruptcy flag remains in a filer’s
credit history for 10 years (see Musto [44].)
Approximately 70% of those who seek bankruptcy protection file under chapter 7
and two third of those who file under chapter 13 ended up filing again under chapter 7.12
This paper, however, does not distinguish between filing under the two chapters and studies
a notion of bankruptcy similar to filing under chapter 7.
Figure(1.1) shows the number of bankruptcy filings by American households in the
past two decades.13 Except three short periods of 1992-94, 1997-2000 and 2003-04, bank-
ruptcy filings have been increasing. From 1994 to 1997 bankruptcy filings increased by
63% during a period of robust economic expansion.14 From the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nance (SCF), I find 11% of American households had at least one time filed for bankruptcy
11Exemption levels differ across states.
12See Li and Sarte [40] for an elaborated study of bankruptcy filers’ choice of chapter.
13The percentage of filers for the 1984-95 period are reported from Fay et al. [24]. The number of filings
for the 1995-2005 period are from www.uscourts.gov and the number of households for this period are from
www.census.gov.
14Gross and Souleles [25] study bankruptcy and delinquency of credit card holders during this period.
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in their lives by 2004, and from those who had filed 69.4% of them had filed in the past 10
years. That is, more than 7% of American households had a bankruptcy flag on their credit
history.
Figure 1.1: US Household Bankruptcies
Availability of credit cards and their usage has also been on the rise in the past
two decades. Figure(1.2) and table (1.1) report the average credit limit for those who had
access to credit cards and the fraction of population with credit card access from the SCF
1989-2004. The fraction of the population with positive credit card limit, which I call
the extensive margin of credit supply, rose almost 17%. The average credit limit for card
holders, which I call the intensive margin of credit supply, more than doubled.15 Just from
1992 to 1998, the intensive margin of credit supply increased by a factor of 79%.
Households also borrowed more on their credit cards. In 1989, 29% of households
were revolvers (carrying positive debt on their credit cards). By 2004 the fraction of re-
volvers rose to 40%. Revolvers’ average credit card debt almost doubled in this period
15Limits are given in 1989 dollars.
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Figure 1.2: Rise Of Credit Availability
and went from $1, 828 in 1989 to $3, 295 in 2004. Just from 1992 to 1998, revolvers’
debt increased by a factor of 59%. Table (1.1) reports the average debt level of revolvers
and households with access to credit cards. The average debt level of revolvers remains
almost two times as large as the average debt level of general card holders, revolvers and
non-revolvers combined.
But the increase of average credit limits and debt levels does not thoroughly sum-
marize the changes in the distributions of these two variables. The standard deviation of
the cross section of credit limits and debt levels also doubled from 1989 to 2004. This
observation is critical for the approach of the paper.
Figure (1.3) depicts the empirical distributions of credit limits (in 1989 dollars) in
1992 and 1998. As it can be easily noted, the distribution shifted rightward. But the shift
was not caused by uniformed extension of credit supply to all card holders. The increase
of credit limits for some households was larger than the increase of limits for others. To
illuminate this point, figure(1.3) also depicts a counterfactual distribution, which is made
7
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Cred. Lim Mean 7,092 7,157 10,390 12,802 13,548 15,223
Debt > 0 7,125 6,579 9,832 11,505 11,964 13,643
Cred. Lim Std. 11,296 8,223 13,151 17,861 22,055 20,911
Debt > 0 9,624 7,204 11,233 15,696 21,645 18,066
Cred. Debt Mean 954 1,025 1,346 1,696 1,453 1,851
(Card Holders) Debt> 0 1,828 1,947 2,404 3,098 2,707 3,295
Cred. Debt Std. 2,120 2,303 3,076 3,979 4,172 4,246
(Card Holders) Debt> 0 2,648 2,878 3,788 4,958 5,390 5,228
Interest Rate Mean – – 14.51 14.45 14.36 11.49
Debt > 0 – – 14.14 14.48 14.20 11.81
Interest Rate Std. – – 4.29 4.63 5.24 6.42
Debt > 0 – – 4.46 5.04 5.62 6.63
Card Holders 55.91% 62.32% 66.45% 67.54% 72.72% 71.46%
Revolvers(Debt> 0) 29.18% 32.83% 37.21% 36.97% 39.01% 40.14%
Table 1.1: Summary of US Households’ Credit Cards
by uniformly increasing the credit limits in 1992 to match the average credit limit of 1998.
Although the credit limit distribution of 1998 and the counterfactual distribution both have
the same average, the 1998 distribution is more spread. The uneven extension of credit
limits is also documented by Gross and Souleles ([25]). More interestingly they report that
creditors extended the larger lines to less risky accounts and provided less extension to the
riskier accounts.
Credit card contracts usually consist of a credit limit and an interest rate. Table
(1.1) reports the average and standard deviation of credit card interest rates for 1995-
2004.16 From 1995 to 2001, when the Bank Prime Loan Rate (MPRIME) fluctuated be-
tween 8.00% − 9.50%, the average of credit card interest rate remained around 14.5%,
and its standard deviation rose almost one percentage point from 4.29% in 1995 to 5.24%
in 2001.17 The average of credit card interest rates in 2004 decreased to 11.49% while
MPRIME dropped to 4.00% − 5.00%. The variation of credit card interest rates across
16SCF did not collect the credit card interest rates prior to 1995.
17MPRIME is reported from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
8
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Credit Limits
households also rose; specifically the standard deviation increased to 6.42%.
The simultaneous increase in the spreads of credit limits and interest rates indicates
that creditors have started to offer more differentiated credit terms to their borrowers. Vari-
ation in credit limits, however, has increased far more than that of interest rates, especially
prior to 2004. While the standard deviation of limits rose by a factor of 68% from 1995
to 2001, the standard deviation of interest rates increased by a factor of 22%.18. This facts
motivates why I focus on changes in credit limits rather than variation in interest rates.
Gross and Souleles [26] study borrowers’ response to credit supply and report an
average “marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of liquidity” (dDebt/dLimit) in the
range of 10−14%. Their study finds that MPC is significant even for borrowers well below
their limits. Average MPC of 14% implies a $790 increase in the average credit debt for the
$5, 645 increase of the average credit limit from 1992 to 1998. The actual average increase
18Stickiness of credit card interest rates have been studied by Ausubel [5] and Calem and Mester [13]
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of debt level is $671 for this period, suggesting that the rise of debt levels can be mostly
attributed to the increase of credit supply.
According to Gross and Souleles [26] the long-term elasticity of debt to the interest
rate is approximately −1.3. Although the SCF does not report interest rates for 1992, the
implied change of the average debt level due to the change of interest rates from 1995 to
1998 is $56, while the actual average debt level increased $2, 412. This fact again confirms
the paper’s approach of focusing on the quantity side of the supply of credit, namely credit
limits, rather than the price of credit, namely interest rates.19
So far, I have reported the credit card limit and debt for an average household. But
how about the credit card limit and debt level of those who file for bankruptcy? The house-
holds who report bankruptcy filing in the SCF, have usually finished their legal processes
and their debt levels are discharged. Moreover, after filing for bankruptcy credit cards are
cancelled so no information is available from the SCF on the filers’ limit. Not being a panel
dataset, the SCF does not allow me to observe the credit card limit and debt of households
just before filing for bankruptcy.20 Therefore, this paper uses the financial description of
bankruptcy filers from Sullivan et al. [52].
Credit card debt(Ratio to income) 1991 1997
Mean $10,193(.531) $12,608(.767)
s.d. $13,751(.755) $15,380(1.154)
25th percentile $2,702(.122) $3,864(.167)
median $6,112(.310) $8,262(.469)
75th percentile $12,807(.645) $14,188(.874)
Table 1.2: Credit Card Debt Listed in Bankruptcy (in 1989 dollars) From Sullivan et al.
Table (1.2) reports the distribution of credit card debt listed in bankruptcy in 1991
and 1997 from Sullivan et al. [52]. Since the SCF data collection and report takes approx-
19Another challenge for studying the effect of interest rate on debt level lies in the fact that credit card prices
contain other dimensions like cash back rates, flyer mileages and other point programs on which no data is
available from the SCF.
20I tried to use the PSID, but credit limits are not reported in that dataset.
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imately one year, the data on filers’ credit card debt corresponds to 1992 and 1998 data
from the SCF. The table also reports the ratio of credit card debt to income for bankruptcy
filers. The average credit card debt of filers increased by a factor of 24%, and the median
increased by a factor of 35%, suggesting that the distribution not only shifted rightward but
also spread. The increase in the ratio of credit card debt to income is even higher. The aver-
age of the ratio of credit card debt to income for filers rose 44% while the median increased
by 51%.
This data suggests those who were filing for bankruptcy in 1997 were defaulting
on much higher levels of credit card debt. I will study how those who filed for bankruptcy
could get access to more credit through higher limits and accumulate larger amounts of debt
before defaulting on it.
The next section provides a framework to study the data facts I described in this
section.
1.2 Model
Credit rating agencies usually use a borrower’s credit history to assess her creditworthiness.
Hence borrowers should potentially take into account the effect of their borrowing/payment
decisions on their future terms of credit contracts. The natural method of modeling the
credit market would be employing dynamic signaling models; these models, however, are
very difficult to analyze.21 This paper takes a simple approach to model the improvement
of credit risk rating. Creditors receive a public signal about borrowers’ types when credit
contracts are made. I use more informative signals as a proxy for the improvement of the
credit rating technology. This paper abstracts away from how credit scores are developed
and just focuses on the information content of signals when a household starts borrowing
21For an example of a model with dynamic updating of creditors’ beliefs about borrowers’ creditworthiness
see Chatterjee et al. [16]. Extension of credit over time in their model depends on the evolution of household
credit scores (or Bayesian posteriors of household type). Effectively their contracts ration through price rather
than quantity limits (which is the focus of my paper). As documented in the previous section, credit limits are
an important part of the contract and have experienced the greater part of variation over time.
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on its credit cards.
Musto [44] documents that creditors change their supply of credit as they lose in-
formation on the creditworthiness of borrowers due to the removal of the bankruptcy flag
from their credit history ten years after the filing date. This paper tries to study what hap-
pens when creditors become more informed about the creditworthiness of borrowers due to
a better credit rating technology.
It is important to notice the notion of safe and risky are relative. If a safe borrower
(a borrower with a high cost of default) accumulates a large amount of debt, she may be
more likely to default than a risky borrower (a borrower with a low cost of default) who has
accumulated a small debt. The nature of costs associated with default are not the focus of
this paper. These costs can have different pecuniary and non-pecuniary forms. An essen-
tial assumption of the paper is the heterogeneity of these costs across borrowers. That is
different households with the same level of debt make different decisions on bankruptcy fil-
ings. Obviously as the level of the debt rises all households become more likely to default.
This paper tries to study the implication of this heterogeneity for the supply of credit and
bankruptcy filings.
As noted by Calem, Gorday and Mester [12] credit card balances show high persis-
tence with yearly autocorrelation of 0.90. That is, households use credit cards for medium-
or long-term financing rather than for short-term or unanticipated liquidity shocks. This
fact is exploited by this paper in modeling households’ motives for borrowing on their
credit cards. Instead of using a Markovian income process with high persistence, I assume
households start with an initial income, then at a random time they switch to their perma-
nent income level, which is likely to be higher. In this framework, households are not using
their credit lines to smooth their consumption whenever they receive a short-term income
or liquidity shock. Instead, credit lines are used for long-term financing, an implication
consistent with the data.22 Moreover, this setup allows for a very simple link between the
22For an elaborate model of credit card usage with Markovian income process, see Chatterjee, Corbae,
Nakajima and Rios-Rull [17]
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supply of credit and households’ debt level.
An average American household has about four credit cards, with usually different
terms of contract (i.e. different credit limits and interest rates.) However, they tend to carry
their debt on a single one which offers them the lowest interest rate. I assume each agent
is only allowed to make credit contract with a single creditor she chooses. Without this
assumption, the agent could be offered a continuum of contracts with incremental credit
limits and increasing interest rates. In that case, the agent would start borrowing from the
contract with the lowest interest rate and as her debt level increased she would use the
contracts with higher interest rates. This approach is identical with offering the agent a
menu of interest rates for different levels of debt.23 In order to simplify the model and
focus on the credit limit dimension of credit cards, I assume each agent can only choose
one contract from the contract offers she receives from creditors.
The model is general in allowing the credit contracts to vary in both credit limit
as well as interest rate. For the quantitative exercise provided afterward, however, I will
assume all contracts have a fixed interest rate, and they only vary in the credit limit.
In the following subsections, first I describe the environment. Then the household’s
problem will be studied. The creditor’s problem and existence of equilibrium will conclude
the section.
1.2.1 Environment
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. The economy starts with a unit measure of
agents denoted by i ∈ (0, 1). Agents discount the future at rate β and their instantaneous
utility from consumption is given by a strictly increasing and strictly concave function u (·).
There is also a competitive market of risk neutral creditors with access to funds at rate
r ≥ β.
There is a Rating Technology which sends a public signal θ̃(i) about each agent’s
23Chatterjee et al. [17] uses this approach.
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risk type θ(i) at the beginning of the economy. Then each agent i realizes her type θ(i) ∈
[0, 1] which is private information. The joint distribution of types and signals, denoted by
ψ(θ, θ̃) is public information.
Agents receive two streams of incomes. First, type θ agents draw their initial stream
of income, yI , from a type dependent distribution F Iθ (·). A type θ agent i continues with
this stream of yI(i) units of income till a random switching time governed by a Poisson
process with a type dependent parameter δθ. Once the switching time arrives, she will draw
her permanent income, yP , from a type dependent distribution FPθ (·), and she will receive
a certain stream of yP units of income for the rest of her life. We assume the support of
yI and yP are uniformly bounded away from zero for all types.24 Moreover, assume FPθ (·)
does not have any mass point. Agent’s incomes are publicly observable.
Agents can borrow from the credit market, but cannot save. Lending contracts can
only be made at the beginning of the economy after receiving the public signals about agents
types and before the agents realize their initial incomes. Agents are only allowed to contract
with a single creditor from the pool of competitive creditors. Creditors are committed to
their contracts with each agent till she realizes her permanent income at which point the
contracts can be renegotiated in the competitive market. Lending contracts are constrained
to have a fixed interest rate ρ and a credit limit L; that is their debt will accumulate at
interest rate ρ and can increase up to L. After realization of yP agents can make new credit
contracts.
At any point in time, agents are allowed to exercise their option of bankruptcy. If
an agent files for bankruptcy, all of her debt will be forgiven but she cannot borrow from
the credit market anymore. Moreover, after filing for bankruptcy, agent i can only consume
θ(i) ∈ [0, 1] fraction of her income from that time on.
To summarize, at the beginning of the economy a competitive credit market receives
24That is ∃ε > 0 such that F Iθ (ε) = F Pθ (ε) = 0 ∀θ.
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a signal about each agent’s type, and offers a credit contract which consists of a fixed interest
rate and a credit limit. Then, the agents realize their type and initial income and start using
their credit line until they realize their permanent income. At any point agents can default
on their debt which will cause them to lose a fraction of their income for the rest of their
life.
1.2.2 Agent’s Problem
Given the offered credit contract, which we denote by the pair of credit limit and interest
rate (L, ρ) and after realizing type, θ, and initial income, yI , agents decide on how much to
borrow/pay on their credit lines, and whether to file for bankruptcy or not. In particular, at
the beginning of time an agent can choose b(t), the amount of borrowing/payment on her
credit line if she doesn’t switch to her permanent income by time t, and whether to default
on her debt at time t if she has not realized yP by that time. Since agents can only default
once, we can denote the time of filing for bankruptcy by T ∗. That is, if the agent’s income
does not switch to yP by time T ∗ she defaults at that time. Obviously agents can choose to
not default on their debt before switching to permanent income, in which case T ∗ is set to
infinity.
The sequential problem for a type θ agent who has realized income yI and is offered
contract (L, ρ) is given by:

























eρ(t−τ)b(τ)dτ ≤ L (1.2)
V P (D; θ) is the expected value of realizing the permanent income for a type θ agent with
debt level D, and V D(θ) is the expected value of realizing the permanent income for a
type θ agent who has defaulted on her debt and filed for bankruptcy before realizing her
permanent income.







When a type θ agent with D units of debt realizes her permanent income yP , which
is observable by the credit market, since r ≥ β she has no incentive to borrow from the
credit market without the intention of defaulting on it. Hence the creditors will not allow
her to use the remaining of her credit line after realizing her permanent income. Thus
the agent has to decide on paying back her debt or to default on it. If the agent files for





If the agent decides to pay back her debt, since there is no uncertainty about her future
income for the competitive credit market, the charged interest rate will be set at r. Then her








subject to Ḋ = rD − p. The Hamiltonian for this problem is given by:
H = e−βtu(yP − p) + λ(rD − p)
which yields the solution ṗ = (r − β) u
′(yP−p))
u′′(yP−p)) . In the case of r = β, the solution is given




In this case, if yP − rD ≥ θyP the agent will choose to consolidate her debt at interest rate
r and pay it back, otherwise she will default on her debt and consume θyP for the rest of
her life. Therefore for r = β we have:











u(yP − rD)dFPθ (yP )
]
. (1.4)
Agents have three decision to make: (i) whether to default or pay back their debt
after realizing their permanent income, (ii) whether to default or not before realizing the
permanent income, that is to set T ∗ < ∞ or T ∗ = ∞, and (iii) the sequence of borrow-
ing/payment b(t).
If agent decides to default before realizing her permanent income, she does not do
so before using all of her available credit limit, or otherwise she can continue borrowing
and default later.25 Let’s denote the time of reaching the credit limit by T . Then if the agent
defaults before realizing her permanent income, that is T ∗ < ∞, then T = T ∗. Later we
will show under certain conditions that T is finite, that is even if T ∗ = ∞ and the agent
does not default before switching to the permanent income, she will reach her credit limit
in finite time if she does not realize her permanent income for that long.
25Notice that even if she realizes her permanent income the option of default is still available for her.
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Let’s denote the agent’s borrowing at the time of reaching her credit limit by b∗ =
b(T ). If the agent does not default at the limit, she has to pay the interest charge of her debt
to satisfy the credit limit, that is b∗ = −ρL. So if the agent does not default after reaching
the credit limit the continuation value from (1.1) is equal to
1
δθ + β
[u(yI − ρL) + δθV P (L; θ)].
But if she defaults the continuation value will be
1
δθ + β
[u(θyI) + δθV D(θ)].
So the agent defaults at the credit limit only if:
[u(θyI) + δθV D(θ)] > [u(yI − ρL) + δθV P (L; θ)] (1.5)
Now if (1.5) holds and the agent defaults at the limit, then b∗ = b(T ) = b(T ∗) ≥
−ρL. In general:
Lemma 1 Agent’s borrowing/payment at the credit limit, b∗ = b(T ) ≥ −ρL, satisfies:
u′(yI + b∗) ≤ [u(y
I + b∗) + δθV P (L; θ)]− [u(θyI) + δθV D(θ)]
ρL+ b∗
(1.6)
with equality if b∗ > −ρL. Moreover, if (1.5) holds then (1.6) uniquely determines b∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In short, the left hand side of (1.6) is the marginal benefit of consumption for an
agent just before she reaches her credit limit. The numerator of the right hand side is the
difference between the stream of utility before and after default, and the denominator is
the rate of debt increase (or equivalently the rate of approaching the limit as the time of
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default.) Overall the right hand side of (1.6) is the marginal cost of approaching the event
of default due to increasing consumption.
Now knowing the agents decision at her credit limit and whether she defaults or not
at the limit let’s study her borrowing decision before reaching the limit. The Hamiltonian
for the agent’s problem (1.1) before reaching the limit is given by:
L = e−(δθ+β)t[u(yI + b) + δθV P (D; θ)] + λ[ρD + b], (1.7)
and the optimal solution must satisfy:
∂L
∂λ
= ρD + b = Ḋ (1.8)
∂L
∂D
= e−(δθ+β)tδθV P (D; θ) + ρλ = −λ̇ (1.9)
∂L
∂b
= e−(δθ+β)tu′(yI + b) + λ = 0 (1.10)
We have the solution for b(T ) from (1.6) which implies the λ(T ) from (1.10). Now
solving for λ backward from (1.9) and then substituting it in (1.10) for t < T we have:





−(δθ+β−ρ)(τ−t)V PD (D(τ); θ)dτ. (1.11)
The left hand side of (1.11) is the marginal utility from increasing debt level at time
t. The right hand side gives us the two marginal costs associated with increasing debt level.
The first expression is the marginal cost associated with getting closer to the limit, hence
being credit constrained, and the second expression is the marginal cost of debt level if the
agent realizes her permanent income before reaching the limit.
Figure (1.4) helps to see the marginal costs. If the agent increases her borrowing
for a small period of time but does not alter it for the rest, then she will reach the credit
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limit sooner. This is depicted by the altered debt level reaching the credit limit sooner
than the original debt level. The agent’s consumption for the period of time just before
when she used to reach the credit limit declines. On the other hand if the agent realizes
her permanent income before reaching the limit, with the altered borrowing, she will carry
more debt which is more costly to pay back.
Figure 1.4: Change of Borrowing Decision
Notice that we can also consider the borrowing/payment amount, b, as a function
of the outstanding debt, D, and the credit contract (L, ρ). That is b(t) = b(D(t); (L, ρ)).








(δθ + β − ρ)u′(yI + b) + δθV PD (D; θ)
u′′(yI + b)(ρD + b)
(1.12)
Using b(L; (L, ρ)) = b∗ from (1.6) as the boundary condition, we can find b(D; (L, ρ))
for ∀D < L by solving the differential equation (1.12). Moreover, we can use this approach
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to state some properties of the borrowing/payment function.
Lemma 2 b(D; (L, ρ)) is continuous in debt level, D, credit line, L, and interest rate ρ.
Proof. By construction b(L; (L, ρ)) = b∗ is continuous from (1.6). The continuity of
b(D; (L, ρ)) for D < L follows from continuity of the solution for the differential equation
(1.12).
Lemma 3 For L1 < L2, if the agent’s solution for (1.1) finds it optimal to increase the debt
level up to the limit then:
b(L1; (L1, ρ)) < b(L1; (L2, ρ)).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 4 If the agent’s solution for (1.1) finds it optimal to increase the debt level up to
the limit then b(D; (L, ρ)) is strictly increasing in L.
Proof. Suppose not, then ∃D∗ and L1 < L2, such that
b(D∗; (L1, ρ)) ≥ b(D∗; (L2, ρ)).
Since b(L1; (L1, ρ)) < b(L1; (L2, ρ)) then by continuity ∃ D∗∗ such that
b(D∗∗; (L1, ρ)) = b(D∗∗; (L2, ρ))
. But in that case (1.12) implies
b(D; (L1, ρ)) = b(D; (L2, ρ)) ∀D ≥ D∗∗
which contradicts b(L1; (L1, ρ)) < b(L1; (L2, ρ)).
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The theorem state that when agents are offered higher credit limits they will accu-
mulate more debt. This point can be seen in figure(1.5). With the credit limits depicted
in this figure, agents do not default after reaching the credit limit and pay back the inter-
est charge of their debt, waiting for the realization of their permanent income. Notice that
with higher credit limit it takes longer for the agent to reach the limit. Moreover, as time
passes and agents accumulate debt, their borrowing declines. Following (1.11) there are
two factors contributing to the curbing of borrowing. First as the debt level goes up agents
get closer to the credit limit which makes her borrowing constrained. Second as debt accu-
mulates the marginal cost of debt after switching to the permanent income increases, hence
making it more costly to borrow. Although the first factor is always in place, the second
one may not.
Figure 1.5: Borrowing with Different Credit Limits
Figure (1.6) shows the borrowing schedule for two close credit limits where with
the lower one the agent does not default after reaching the limit but with the higher limit
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she finds the default option optimal once her debt level equals the credit limit.26 This figure
also depicts another important fact. Although eventually as the agent approaches her credit
limit she curbs her borrowing due to the first factor described above, at the beginning as
time passes and the debt level increase, the agent might actually increases her borrowing.
This is because the second factor explained above is not in place. That is the marginal cost
of debt after switching to the permanent income is actually shrinking.
Notice that as the debt level goes up, as long as the agent is not going to default
on the debt after switching to her permanent income, the marginal cost of paying back also
increases due to concavity of the utility function. But if the agent defaults after switching
to the permanent income, then as the debt level rises the probability of paying back falls.
Denote the lower bound for the support of yP ’s distribution by yP . We can summarize this
fact in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If r = β, then V PD (D; θ) is decreasing in D forD ∈ [0,
yP (1−θ)




Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that so far we have simply assumed that the agent continues to accumulate
debt untill reaching the credit limit. But what if the charged interest rate ρ is so high, or the
agent does not expect very high permanent income, such that she does not find increasing
the debt level up to the credit limit optimal? In particular if the solution for (1.12) is such
that ∃D < L where b(D; (L, ρ)) = −ρD, then the agent stops borrowing after reaching
to the debt level D. The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for optimality of
borrowing up the credit limit.
Lemma 6 For r = β, if (δθ + β − ρ)u′(yI) + δθV PD (
yP (1−θ)
r ; θ) > 0 then the agent does
26The figure shows that there are times when the agent borrows more with the lower credit limit. This is
because the agent has accumulated much more debt by that time when she has a higher limit, and for L1 < L2
we still have
b(D; (L1, ρ)) < b(D; (L2, ρ))
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Figure 1.6: Borrowing and Default with Different Credit Limits
not stop increasing her debt before getting to the credit limit.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that this condition is independent of the credit limit, L. However, it depends
on the contract’s interest rate, ρ. Obviously it also depends on the initial income as well
as the agent’s expectation of the time of realizing the future income, δθ, the distribution of
permanent income, FPθ (·), and the cost of default (1 − θ). Although the previous lemma
provides a sufficient condition for the agent to continue borrowing, it doesn’t say that the
agent actually reaches the limit or not, which is the subject of the next theorem.
Theorem 7 For r = β, if (δθ + β − ρ)u′(yI) + δθV PD (
yP (1−θ)
r ; θ) > 0 then there exists
a time T such that for t ≥ T we have D(t) = L. That is, if agents do not realize their
permanent income for a long enough time, then they reach the credit limit.
Proof. Suppose the agent does not reach the credit limit, then for a large enough t such that
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D(t) ≈ L and b(t) ≈ −ρL, (1.11) implies:




−(δθ+β−ρ)(τ−t)V PD (D(τ); θ)dτ
≈ −δθ
δθ + β − ρ
V PD (L; θ)
which contradicts (δθ + β − ρ)u′(yI − ρL) + δθV PD (L; θ) > 0.
So far, we have studied the effect of the credit limit on borrowing and debt levels, but
not the default rate. From (1.5) the probability of default after switching to the permanent





When the agent is offered a higher credit limit (as for example depicted in figure
(1.5)) she will accumulated more debt. Since the time of switching to the permanent income
is exogenous and independent of the debt level, after switching, the probability of having
higher debt level and therefore the probability of default is higher with a higher credit limit.
Agents might also default when they reach their credit limit before switching to
their permanent income. This is depicted in figure (1.6). In this comparison the higher
credit limit not only causes the agent to accumulate more debt by the time of switching, but
also makes the agent reach the credit limit sooner and then default after reaching the limit.
In summary, a larger credit limit induces agents to borrow more, and hence more
likely to default. Ceteris paribus, an agent with low cost of default responds more to increase
of credit limit and less to rise of interest rate, than an agent with high cost of default.
1.2.3 Creditors’ Problem
In the previous subsection we studied decision rules of a type θ agent who has realized initial
income yI and is offered (L, ρ) credit contract. Creditors take agents’ decision rules as
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given. Given the agents’ decision rule as a function of the offered credit contract, creditors’
expected profit from offering contract (L, ρ) to a type θ agent with initial income yI is given
by:
Π((θ, yI); (L, ρ)) =
∫ T ∗
0





where b(t) and T ∗ are the borrowing and default time decisions which solve (1.1) for a
type θ agent with initial income yI who is offered credit contract (L, ρ). Moreover D(t) is
the implied debt amount from (1.2). Notice that when the agent switches to her permanent




When a creditor in the competitive credit market offers a credit contract, the only
available information is the public signal θ̃ from the Rating Technology. Agents have not
realized their types nor their initial incomes yet. Denoting the conditional probability of
drawing type θ given the signal θ̃ by ψ(θ|θ̃), a creditor’s expected profit from offering
credit contract (L, ρ) to an agent with rating signal θ̃ is:
Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) =
∫ ∫
Π((θ, yI); (L, ρ))dF Iθ (y
I)dψ(θ|θ̃). (1.15)
Recall that when agents are offered the credit contract, they have not realized their
type and income yet, however, they are also aware of the rating signal. Expected utility of
an agent with the rating signal θ̃ from contract (L, ρ) is given by:
V I((L, ρ); θ̃) =
∫ ∫
V I((L, ρ); (θ, yI))dF Iθ (y
I)dψ(θ|θ̃). (1.16)
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Since we assumed there is no asymmetry of information between agents and credi-
tors when credit contracts are made, the only contract offered and accepted will be the one
which delivers the highest expected utility subject to zero profit. That is the offered contract
for an agent with rating signal θ̃ must solve the following creditors’ problem:
max(L,ρ) V I((L, ρ); θ̃) (1.17)
s.t.
Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) = 0.
Notice that when the signals are not very informative and hence agents with differ-
ent types and incomes are lucked into the same contract, then some types generate positive
profit which is used to compensate the losses made on other types. Moreover, lack of infor-
mation causes another inefficiency: there are several pairs of (L, ρ) which can generate zero
profit from a type θ agent with initial income yI , but when agents with different character-
istics are pooled and offered the same contract, they do not receive the efficient contracts.
Figure(1.7) shows how a creditor’s profit changes as she increases the offered credit
limit for a fix interest rate ρ > r. The figure depicts profit from two different types with
the same initial income. For illustrative purpose I have assumed the two types have an
identical distribution of permanent incomes and the same switching process, so their only
difference is with respect to their default costs. As the limit increases the creditor’s profit
rises, since agents can borrow more but yet do not find it optimal to default on their debt,
hence for ρ > r the creditor’s expected profit rises. For a large enough credit limit, the
riskier agent accumulates enough debt to find it optimal to default, and creditors’ profit
from her falls. However, the safer agent still generates more profit. By increasing the credit
limit eventually the safer agent also accumulates enough debt to find the default option
optimal. This makes the expected profit from her to fall as well. Next section provides
sufficient conditions under which solution for the creditor’s problem (1.17) exists.
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Figure 1.7: Creditors’ Profit
1.2.4 Equilibrium Existence
In this part we show the existence of equilibrium, which is characterized by the solution for
creditors’ problem (1.17) of offering credit contract (L, ρ) to an agent with rating signal θ̃.
Lemma 8 Π((θ, yI); (L, ρ)) is continuous in L and ρ.
Proof follows from the continuity of the decision rule b and lack of mass points in
FPθ (·)27.
Lemma 9 If the support of ψ(·|θ̃) is bounded away from zero, the utility function u(·) is
unbounded from above and the expected present value of all future income for an agent with
signal θ̃ is bounded then:
lim
L→∞
Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) < 0 ∀ρ.
27When the supplied credit limit is such that the agent is indifferent between default or staying at the limit
after reaching the credit limit, then creditor’s profit depends on the fraction of agents who default after reaching
the limit. Therefore Π((θ, yI); (L, ρ)) is a correspondence of L, however, a continuous one.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof first shows for any ρ ≥ r we have limL→∞ V I((L, ρ); θ̃) → ∞. Then
uses the fact that with Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) ≥ 0 the expected utility V I((L, ρ); θ̃) is bounded from
above.
Theorem 10 If the support of ψ(·|θ̃) is bounded away from zero, the utility function u(·)
is unbounded from above and the expected present value of all future income for an agent
with signal θ̃ is bounded then creditors’ problem (1.17) has solution.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The idea of proof follows from definingL∗(θ̃; ρ) as the largestL such that Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) =
0. Then showing V I((L∗(θ̃; ρ), ρ); θ̃) attains its maximum.
1.3 Discussion and Quantitative Example
As stated in the previous section, when a contract is offered, neither the agent nor the
creditor know the agent’s true type. The only available information upon which a contract
can be made contingent is the exogenous signal from the Rating technology. Therefore,
contracts in my environment are only conditional on rating signals. That is, agents with
identical signals will receive contracts with identical terms. However, after realization of
types and initial incomes, agents with the same contract may choose different borrowing
patterns. Moreover, the heterogeneous arrival and level of realized permanent incomes lead
agents with identical contracts, type and initial income to accumulate different levels of
debt and make different default decisions.
Although the model is general enough to allow both the credit limit and interest rate
to be signal dependent, for the purpose of this discussion and the quantitative example, I
make an assumption which is consistent with data. I assume credit contracts are all subject
to a fixed interest rate ρ > r, and the only difference among types is in their cost of default.
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In this case the only variation across contracts for different signals will be in their credit
limits. Suppose different types are pooled together by the Rating technology, which is
possible if the signals are not very informative about agents’ types. In equilibrium agents
will receive a credit limit which makes creditors’ expected profit from the pooling contract
equal to zero. The agents with a low cost of default will generate negative profit which
will be compensated by the positive profit generated by the agents with high cost of default.
Notice that since agents do not know their type at the time they choose from the offered
contracts, and are not allowed to change their contract after realization of their type and
initial income, at the time contracts are offered they have the same preference over the set
of offered contracts. Therefore creditors cannot separate different types of agents within
the pool of agents with identical Rating signals by offering different contracts.
Moreover, since the agents with high cost of default are more likely to pay back
their debt, the marginal cost of borrowing is higher for them relative to the agents with
a low cost of default. Therefore, with the same credit limit the high default cost agents
accumulate lower levels of debt, and the responsiveness of their debt level to an increase of
their credit limit is also smaller. This prevents creditors from raising the credit limit in the
pooling case. Because if the credit limit is increased, then loans taken by low default cost
agents which make negative expected profits will increase more than loans taken by high
default cost agents which make positive expected profits.
Now suppose different types are separated by the Rating technology, which is pos-
sible if the signals are informative about agents’ types. While in the pooling case there
is cross subsidization across types, in the separating case the profit gain from high default
cost type cannot be used to subsidize the loss made on low default cost type. In that case,
the equilibrium supply of credit will increase significantly for the high default cost agents.
Since the interest rate is assumed to be fixed, competitive creditors extend the credit limit
for high default cost agents until a level where some of them increase their debt level high
enough to find it optimal to default.
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In the next subsection, I provide a quantitative example of the model to account for
the increase in the average credit limit and credit card debt, as well as the rise in the number
of bankruptcies observed from 1992 to 1998. In this quantitative example the mechanism
which matches the data can be thought of as an increase in the intensive margin and not
the extensive margin. Afterward, I will provide an explanation for the increase of extensive
margin of credit supply.
1.3.1 Quantitative Example
Most of the households with positive credit limits do not borrow on their credit cards (see
the last row of table (1.1)). Therefore I restrict my attention to revolvers, who have positive
debt on their credit cards. The model predicts that households first increase their credit
card debt before realizing their permanent income, then either default on their debt or pay
it back. The SCF is not a panel data set so I could not use it to observe the dynamics of
households’ credit card debt accumulation or de-accumulation. The SCF, however, reports
households’ answer to the following question:
Thinking only about Visa, Mastercard, Discover, Optima and store cards,
do you almost always, sometimes, or hardly ever pay off the total balance owed
on the account each month?
Roughly speaking, half of the revolvers answer “they hardly ever pay off the total
balance.” This group of households are those who are accumulating credit card debt and I
call them A-revolvers. The last row of table (1.3) reports the fraction of A-revolvers from
all households in the SCF 1992 and 1998. The first and third rows report average ratios
of credit limit and credit card debt of A-revolvers to their annual income.28 The standard
deviations of the distributions of ratios of credit limits and credit card debt of A-revolvers
28This figures are reported after dropping less than half percentage of the subsample who report zero or
negative income. I also tried the exercise with the average credit limit and credit card debt of A-revolvers
divided by their average annual income. The results are very similar
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to their incomes are also reported. The next row reports the fraction of A-revolvers who
filed for bankruptcy, assuming all filers are also A-revolvers.
Since the fraction of A-revolvers in the population increased, looking at the ratio of
defaulters to A-revolvers underestimates the rise of bankruptcy filings. However, the result
of this quantitative exercise is not sensitive to using the ratio of defaulters to the average
number of A-revolvers across two years.
A-revolvers 1992 1998
Av. (Cred Lim/Income) 25.97 % 42.48%
Std. (Cred Lim/Income) 41.38 % 77.50%
Av. (Cred Card Debt/Income) 10.66% 16.95%
Std. (Cred Card Debt/Income) 17.61% 35.46%
Default Rate 5.86% 7.39%
A-revolvers/Population 16.05% 17.31%
Table 1.3: Target Moments
For this exercise I assume the utility function to have constant relative risk aversion,
that is u(c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ . The switching process from the initial income to permanent income
follows a Poisson process with parameter δ for all types. The initial income is fixed for all
types and the permanent income is drawn from a truncated exponential distribution:
F (yP ) = 1− e−η(yP−yP )
for all types. Finally I assume there are two types 0 < θL < θH < 1 with distribution
µ(θL) = 1− µ(θH).
In order to highlight the role of changes in the information technology, I will con-
sider two cases. In the first one the signal from the Rating technology contains no informa-
tion on agents’ types so we have complete pooling of the two types. In the second case, I
assume the signal is fully informative so we have complete separation and each type will
receive a different contract.
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I try to match the moments generated by the model in the pooling case to the data
moments from 1992, and the moments generated by the model in the separating case to
the data moments from 1998. Clearly the Rating technology provided some information
on households’ type in 1992, and did not provide full information in 1998. In particular,
households were not offered a single credit card contract in 1992 as the model suggests in
the pooling case. Instead, a distribution of credit card limits were supplied by the creditors
in 1992. However, the spread of the distribution of credit limits increased from 1992 to
1998. In this quantitative exercise I try to account for the increase of the spread of the
distribution of credit limits as a result of a more informative Rating technology29.
In the pooling case, both types are offered a single credit limit LP , while in the
separating case two credit limits, LθLS and L
θH
S , are offered. The 1992 data provides a
distribution of credit limits. To study the increase of the spread of the credit limit distrib-
ution from 1992 to 1998, suppose any credit limit L from the distribution of credit limits








L with weights µ(θL) and µ(θH)
for the distribution of credit limits for 1998. In this case, the following would hold for the
coefficients of variation for these three distributions:
CV (L1998)2 + 1 = (CV (L1992)2 + 1)(CV (LS)2 + 1) (1.18)
where L1992 and L1998 are the distribution of credit limits in 1992 and 1998, LS is the
distribution of credit limits in the separating case, and CV (·) = σ(·)µ(·) is the coefficient of
variation.
Taking the time unit to be 3 months, I calibrate β = r = ln(.01) to be consistent
with the 4% average annual growth rate. I set ρ = ln(.03) to be consistent with a 12%
29If the Rating technology sent signals about certain risk characteristics of borrowers in 1992, by 1998 the
signals still contained the information about those characteristics. However, as the Rating technology became
more informative, it could provide some additional information about the risk characteristics of borrowers. We
can interpret the switch from the pooling case (uninformative signal) to the separating case (fully informative
signal) as the provision of additional information by the Rating technology on borrowers.
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interest charge on credit lines.30 I set the coefficient of risk aversion to be equal to 1. I set
yI to be the average quarterly income of A-revolvers from the SCF which is $10, 000.31
β ρ σ yI
ln(0.01) ln(0.03) 1 $10, 000
I estimate the three parameters related to permanent income plus the three parame-
ters related to the default cost and its distribution to match six target moments. Four of the
moments are the average ratios of credit limits to income and credit card debt to income for
1992 and 1998. The fifth target moment is the default rate of the A-revolvers in 1992. The
last moment to match is the coefficient of variation of the credit limits in the separating case
implied from 1992 and 1998 data by (1.18). The last target moment captures the increase in
the spread of the credit limit distribution from 1992 to 1998. Notice that the exercise does
not target the default rate of the A-revolvers in 1998.
An identity weight matrix is used to minimize the percentage deviation of the mo-
ments generated from the model from the targeted moments, which provides us with a
consistent estimator. The estimated values are as follows and the moments generated from
the model are reported in table (1.4) (the targeted values are inside the parentheses).
δ yP η θH θL µ(θH)
0.1607 4.9635 0.0760 0.9893 0.9749 0.4251
The estimated parameters for permanent income implies on average households’
permanent income is about 81% larger than their initial income, and on average it takes
around one and a half years before switching to permanent income. Generally speaking this
is consistent with the characteristics of the income process of households during financial
30Notice that the average credit card interest rate in this period is around 14.50 − 15.00%. However, since
the model generates the equilibrium credit limits by equalizing creditors’ profit to zero, we should consider
creditors operational costs. I approximate this cost to be 3% from the difference between the Bank Prime Loan
Rate and the Federal Fund Rate.
31Since I use log utility and the target moments are ratios relative to income, this variable is not important.
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distress.
Pooling (1992) Separating (1998)
Target Av. (Cred Lim/Income) 25.87% (25.97 %) 42.92% (42.48%)
Moments Av. (CC Debt/Income) 10.65% (10.66%) 16.74% (16.95%)
Default Rate 5.90% (5.86%)
Coefficient of Variation 42.78% (47.25%)
OverID Default Rate 6.40% (7.39%)
Moments CC Debt/Income 10.51% (53.10%) 40.40% (76.70%)
of Defaulter
Table 1.4: Generated Moments
I estimate six parameters to match six moments from the data. The default rate of
1998, however, is not amongst the target moments of this exercise and hence can be used
to test for consistency of the model. According to data the default rate by A-revolvers rose
from 5.86% in 1992 to 7.39% in 1998. The model generates an increase of default rate
from 5.90% to 6.40%, which can account for about one third of the increase in bankruptcy
filings in the data. Given the simple structure of the model and the fact that the exercise did
not target the increase in the bankruptcy filings the result is quite appealing.
The ratio of credit card debt to income generated by the model and reported from
data are provided in the last row of table(1.4) (Data moments are from Sullivan et al. [52]).
The average credit card debt of a defaulter generated by the model is far less than the
defaulters’ credit card debt reported in the data. Moreover, although the model qualitatively
matches the increase in the debt level of bankruptcy filers, it generates a far bigger increase
than in the data.
Table(1.5) reports limits, debt, default rates and average debt level of a defaulter
for both types in both cases. In the pooling case agents with high default costs (i.e. the
safe type) borrow very little and do not default at all. Due to their small debt level they
do not compensate the creditor a lot for the loss made on the riskier agents. Hence when
they are separated borrowing and default by the riskier agents does not change significantly.
However, in the separating case, the safer types are offered a much larger credit limit so they
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accumulate larger debts and this results in more frequent default.
Pooling Separating
Low Default Cost Lim/Income 25.87% 21.57%
θH (Risky) Debt/Income 15.58% 11.68%
Def Rate 13.89% 7.62%
Def Debt/Income 24.72% 20.88%
High Default Cost Lim/Income 25.87% 58.71%
θL (Safe) Debt/Income 7.01% 20.48%
Def Rate 0.00% 5.50%
Def Debt/Income – 54.84%
Table 1.5: Generated Moments for Different Types
Although the model does relatively well in accounting for the rise of the default
rate, it fails to quantitatively to match the increase of credit card debt levels of filers. This
is because the safer types only default when their debt level is really high; therefore in the
separating case the model generates a high level of credit card debt for the filers with the
high cost of default.
Finally I use the estimated parameters to generate a counterfactual motivated by the
stigma explanation of the rise of bankruptcy. Instead of changing the information structure
from pooling to separation, I keep the pooling information structure but increase the fraction
of high risk types to generate the increase of bankruptcy filings equal to the separating
case. This goal is attained by changing the fraction of type θH from µ(θH) = 42% to
µ(θH) = 90%. However, this decreases the equilibrium credit limit to 21.98% of income
and the average debt level increases only slightly to 11.53% of income, both contradicting
the significant increasing trends observed in the data32.
32To generate an increase in the default rate similar to the increase generated by the informational explana-
tion, which is half of the increase observed in the data, µ(θH) = 42% should increase to µ(θH) = 55.4%.
In this case the equilibrium credit limit decreases to 24.28% of income, and the average debt level slightly
increases to 10.92% of income, again contradicting the data trends.
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1.3.2 Rise of Extensive Margin
The model can also explain the rise of the extensive margin of credit supply. As we noted
earlier, the fraction of households with access to credit cards rose from 56% in 1989 to 72%
in 2004. Assume there is a type who incurs no cost after default, that is θ = 1. Supply of
credit to this type only generates a loss for creditors and the loss is increasing in the credit
limit. Now suppose a small fraction of another type θ∗ < 1, who incurs some cost from
default and hence does not default on a low level of debt, is pooled together with type θ = 1
by the Rating technology. In this pooling case, no credit will be supplied to the type θ∗
agents who are pooled with type θ = 1 agents. But when the Rating technology separates
the two types, these type θ∗ agents will receive a positive credit limit.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter is a first attempt at providing an informational explanation for the rise of house-
hold bankruptcy. I simultaneously account for the increase of credit supply and the corre-
sponding increase in average credit card debt. The extension of credit supply follows from
the separation of revolvers with different degrees of riskiness. The rise of bankruptcy is
explained by the increase in the availability of credit for the revolvers with high costs of
default, which allows them to accumulate more credit card debt. While these revolvers
are less likely to default on a low amount of debt, they default more frequently when they
accumulate larger amounts of debt.
Using simulated method of moments I provide a simple quantitative example of
matching the average credit limit and debt levels, as well as the increase in the spread of
the credit limit distribution. The model accounts for about one third of the increase in the
default rate, which is quite appealing given the simple structure of the model.
The model can be enriched by relaxing certain strong assumptions and can address
other interesting questions. In particular it can be used to study why creditors find it optimal
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to vary the credit limit more than the interest rate. This may be informative about revolvers’
income processes.
Understanding the rise of household bankruptcy has important policy implications.
If the rise of bankruptcy filings is due to the decline of stigma, the policy response should
be tightening the bankruptcy code to increase the cost of bankruptcy, similar to what the
2005 change of bankruptcy code tries to do. But if the rise of bankruptcy filings results
from a more informed credit market, then tightening of bankruptcy code is not necessarily
required.
Finally, Huggett [30] and Aiyagari [6] pointed out the importance of credit limits
for households’ precautionary saving motives and therefore the aggregate price of capital.
This paper does not address household saving decisions, but tackles the question of how
credit limits are allocated, which has an important role in household saving decisions and
hence the aggregate capital stock. In that way, it can be used to complement the study of
Chatterjee, et. al. [17] who study how bankruptcy affects the capital rate of return.
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1.5 Appendix
Lemma 1 Agent’s borrowing/payment at the credit limit, b∗ = b(T ) ≥ −ρL, satisfies:
u′(yI + b∗) ≤ [u(y
I + b∗) + δθV P (L; θ)]− [u(θyI) + δθV D(θ)]
ρL+ b∗
with equality if b∗ > −ρL. Moreover, if (1.5) holds then (1.6) uniquely determines b∗.
Proof. If (1.5) does not hold, i.e. the agent does not find it optimal to default at the credit
limit, then b∗ = −ρL which satisfies (1.6). If (1.5) holds and the agent defaults at the limit,
then (1.6) uniquely determines b∗. To see this point note that (1.6) can be rearranged as:
u′(yI + b∗)(ρL+ b∗)− [u(yI + b∗) + δθV P (L; θ)] + [u(θyI) + δθV D(θ)] = 0. (1.19)
If (1.6) holds, then left hand side of (1.19), which is decreasing in b∗ due to concavity of
u(·), is positive for b∗ = −ρL. Moreover, since u(·) is strictly concave as b∗ → ∞, left
hand side approaches −∞. Then by continuity (1.6) has a unique solution.
The optimality of solution for (1.19) follows from using calculus of variation for
borrowing amount b when D = L − ε for a very small ε. Suppose the agent wants to
maximize her utility for the next 4t periods, where 4t is small enough, after which she
will for sure default. If the agent borrows a constant stream of b before reaching the credit
limit, when she will default, then it approximately takes 4t = L−DρD+b periods to reach the
limit. So the agent will approximately receive utility
4t[u(yI + b∗) + δθV P (L; θ)] + (4t−4t)[u(θyI) + δθV D(θ)].
Taking first order condition with respect to b and then letting ε→ 0, yields (1.19).
Lemma 3 For L1 < L2, if the agent’s solution for (1.1) finds it optimal to increase
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the debt level up to the limit then:
b(L1; (L1, ρ)) < b(L1; (L2, ρ)).
Proof. If b(L1; (L1, ρ)) = −ρL1, that is the agent does not default at the limit, then since
the agent increases her debt level up to the limit we should have b(L1; (L2, ρ)) > −ρL1.
If b(L1; (L1, ρ)) = −ρL1, that is the agent defaults at credit limit L1, then from
(1.5) it follows that she also defaults at credit limitL2, therefore b(L1; (L1, ρ)) and b(L2; (L2, ρ))




−ρu′(yI + b) + δθV PD (D; θ)
u′′(yI + b)(ρD + b)
. (1.20)








hence by continuity of b∗ and b(D; (L, ρ) it follows
b(L1; (L1, ρ)) < b(L1; (L2, ρ)).
Lemma 5 If r = β, then V PD (D; θ) is decreasing in D for D ∈ [0,
yP (1−θ)
r ] and
increasing for D >
yP (1−θ)
r .
Proof. For D ∈ [0, y
P (1−θ)
r ], concavity of V
P (D; θ) follows from concavity of u(·) since




r ≤ D1 < D2 we have:














u′(yP − rD1)dFPθ (yP )
= V PD (D1; (y
I , θ))
where the inequality follows from D2 > D1 and u′(·) > 0.
Lemma 6 For r = β, if (δθ +β− ρ)u′(yI) + δθV PD (
yP (1−θ)
r ; θ) > 0 then the agent
does not stop increasing her debt before getting to the credit limit.
Proof. The previous lemma guarantees that δθ+β−ρδθ u
′(yI) + V PD (D; θ) > 0 for ∀D > 0.
Suppose the agent stops increasing her debt level above D, that is ρD + b(D) = 0,
while D < L. In this case the marginal benefit from increasing the borrowing amount is
(δθ +β)u′(yI + b(D)) and the marginal cost is ρu′(yI + b(D))− δV PD (D; θ). Concavity of
u(·) guarantees (δθ +β−ρ)u′(yI + b(D))+δV PD (D; θ) > 0 hence it is optimal to increase
b(D) and therefore the debt level.
Lemma 9 If the support of ψ(·|θ̃) is bounded away from zero, the utility function
u(·) is unbounded from above and the expected present value of all future income for an
agent with signal θ̃ is bounded then:
lim
L→∞
Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) < 0 ∀ρ.
Proof. First we show for any ρ ≥ r we have limL→∞ V I((L, ρ); θ̃) → ∞. Next we show
if Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) ≥ 0 then V I((L, ρ); θ̃) is bounded from above.
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For any credit limit L, consider the plan of borrowing b = ρLeρ−1 during t ∈ [0, 1],
and then defaulting. Also always defaulting after realizing the permanent income. This





(1− e−(δθ+β))u(yI + ρL
eρ − 1




This is a lower bound for V I((L, ρ); θ̃), and If the support of ψ(·|θ̃) is bounded
away from zero, this lower bound goes to infinity as L → ∞, due to unboundedness of
u(·). Hence V I((L, ρ); θ̃)) is unbounded as L→∞.
Let’s yθ̃ denotes the stream of income which has the same present value as the






(ryI + δθyP )dFPθ (y
P )dF Iθ (y
I)dψ(θ|θ̃).
Due to the concavity of u(·), if Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) ≥ 0 then V I((L, ρ); θ̃) ≤ 1βu(yθ̃).
Since V I((L, ρ); θ̃) is bounded from above when Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) ≥ 0 and is unbounded when
L→∞, we conclude limL→∞ Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) < 0
Theorem 10 If the support of ψ(·|θ̃) is bounded away from zero, the utility function
u(·) is unbounded from above and the expected present value of all future income for an
agent with signal θ̃ is bounded then creditors’ problem (1.17) has solution.
Proof. By definition, for a given interest rate ρ, agent’s expected utility Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) is
increasing, as agents can opt out and do not use credit limit. Let’s L∗(θ̃; ρ) denotes the
largest L such that Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) = 0. Since Π(θ̃; (0, ρ)) = 0 and Π(θ̃; (L, ρ)) is continuous
in L, the previous lemma guarantees the existence and uniqueness of L∗(θ̃; ρ). Creditors’
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problem (1.17) can be rewritten as:
max
ρ
V I((L∗(θ̃; ρ), ρ); θ̃) (1.21)
Notice that V I((L∗(θ̃; ρ), ρ); θ̃) is continuous in ρ.
Following the proof of the previous lemma we know V I((L∗(θ̃; ρ), ρ); θ̃) ≤ 1βu(yθ̃)
for ∀ρ. Since the support of yI and yP are uniformly bounded away from zero, the support
of ψ(·|θ̃) is bounded away from zero and yθ̃ is finite, ∃ρ such that for ρ > ρ no agent
increases her debt level above zero if she is offered a contract with interest rate ρ, that is
V I((L∗(θ̃; ρ), ρ); θ̃) = V I(0, r); θ̃) ∀ρ > ρ.




A Hotelling Model with Money
2.1 Introduction
One question we address in this chapter is whether monetary exchange promotes product
variety. The framework we use to answer this question is a dynamic version of a Hotelling
[28] model. Hotelling’s paper was the first to consider where firms would choose to locate in
the product space given that consumers have heterogeneous preferences over a continuum
of differentiated goods. Here we consider how the exchange mechanism interacts with
preferences and technology to determine product variety.
Besides the relation to Hotelling’s work, our paper is related to several other strands
of literature. Starting with the insights of Kiyotaki and Wright [35] about the essentiality
of fiat money in bilateral matching environments with double coincidence problems, there
is a literature which studies agents’ choices over which goods they specialize in produc-
tion (see also Shi [50] and Camera, Reed, and Waller [14]). These papers show that the
introduction of money can lead to more specialization relative to barter and can increase
welfare in a bilateral random matching environments. There are many differences between
our work and theirs. One difference, at the level of the environment, is that we allow mul-
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tilateral matching and directed search.1 Another difference, in terms of outcomes, is that
despite increased specialization with money, the entire exogenous set of varieties of goods
are produced in their framework while in our paper, since it is costly to set up a shop to
exchange goods, there is a finite set of active shops and where they decide to locate in the
variety space is endogenously determined. Another closely related paper is by Burdett and
Shevchenko [11]. They endogenously determine the product space in a bilateral random
matching framework with indivisible money. The indivisibility of money in their model
means that product variety is not neutral with respect to the level of the money supply; a
lump sum doubling of the level of money affects matching probabilities and product variety
in their model rather than a simple doubling of prices (as in our framework).
We analyse this question by studying a planner’s problem as in Kocherlakota [36]
and then implement the allocation as a trading post economy. Shapley and Shubik [49] was
one of the first papers to study exchange in a trading post economy. Recently, Howitt [30]
extended this framework to one with possibilities of both barter and monetary trading posts
and established conditions under which monetary exchange was preferred to barter.2 Our
paper differs from other trading post models by starting from the planner’s problem and
then considering implementation. This allows us to focus on the “optimal” product variety
allocation and avoids all the problems associated with arbitrary beliefs and trading rules
as well as coordination issues which have come up in the previous trading post models.
Beliefs re-enter at the implementation stage and we show how differences in beliefs can
lead to multiple equilibria with a pareto dominated outcome that can be eliminated through
monetary policy.
We proceed as follows. Section II outlines the environment. Section III states the
planner’s problem and characterizes its solution. Section IV provides three illuminating ex-
1In this sense, our paper is closer to that of Laing, Li, and Wang [38]. However, there are big differences
in our approach relative to theirs. At the level of the environment, for instance, all agents have identical “love
of variety” preferences in their framework, which is quite different from the Hotelling or Kiyotaki-Wright
environments with heterogeneous preferences.
2Another related paper which deals with endogenizing the exchange pattern in a trading post environment
is Starr and Stinchcombe [51].
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amples: how money may increase product variety, how the costs of operating trading posts
may affect the choice of medium of exchange, and that there is a complementarity asso-
ciated with opening money trading posts (specifically that there can be positive feedback
from opening money shops while there is negative feedback from opening barter shops).
Section V shows how to implement the allocation as a monetary trading post economy and
studies implications of variations in the money growth rate for existence of equilibrium.
We show that if the cost of operating shops is sufficiently low, households have sufficiently
specialized preferences and are patient, and the money growth rate is not too high, the
implementation shares features of a representative agent, cash-in-advance economy. In par-
ticular, while there is heterogeneity in the varieties of goods produced and consumed across
households, households are symmetric with respect to the quantities of goods produced and
consumed as well as money holdings. If these conditions do not hold, the planner’s solu-
tion (and implementation) may entail cross-sectional variation in production, consumption,
and money holdings. We end with an example where there are multiple pareto ranked
equilibria due to beliefs about which trading posts will be opened. We show that positive
money growth with linear prices may actually eliminate the inferior equilibrium while the
implementation of the planner’s allocation continues to exist.
2.2 Environment
Time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, .... The economy is composed of a unit measure of infinitely-
lived households indexed by h ∈ [0, 1] and a countably infinite number of infinitely-lived
shopkeepers indexed by k ∈ N. A household is composed of a shopper-worker pair.
Each good is indexed by its variety ν ∈ [0, 1].We let good 0 denote fiat money. Fiat
money is storable, divisible, and generates no direct utility to households or shopkeepers.
The quantity of money held by a household at the beginning of period t is denoted m(t) ∈
R+ and the quantity held by shopkeeper k is denoted Mk(t) ∈ R+. The money stock per
capita at period t is given by m(t) = (1 + γ)tm(0) where γ ≥ 0. Money is distributed to
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households via lump sum transfers η(t).3
All goods other than money are nonstorable and consumable. Let V = (0, 1] be
the set of such consumable goods, which are also divisible. Households are heterogeneous
with respect to their tastes in much the same way as Kiyotaki and Wright [35]. Specifically,
a household of type θ ∈ Θ = {(τc, τp) ∈ V × V} derives utility from consuming goods
of variety νc in the interval |νc − τc|mod1 ≤ x2 and can produce goods of variety νp in the
interval |νp − τp|mod1 ≤ x2 where | · |mod1 is a function which is min{| · |, 1 − | · |}. As
in Kiyotaki and Wright [35], we make the assumption that a household cannot consume
its own output. The unit measure of households are uniformly distributed over the type
space Θ. We assume the per period utility function for a type θ household associated with
consuming c ≥ 0 units of good νc and producing ` ∈ {0, 1} units of good νp can be written4
Uθ((c, νc) , (`, νp)) = Wθ(c, νc) +Wθ (`, νp)
where
Wθ(c, νc) =




−ε if ` = 1 and |νp − τp|mod1 ≤ x2
−∞ if ` = 1 and |νp − τp|mod1 > x2
0 if ` = 0
.
If the shopper stays home, Wθ(c, νc) = 0 and if the worker stays home, Wθ(`, νp) = 0.
These preferences are simply a “donut” (two-dimensional) version of the (one-dimensional)
consumption taste arc length x of the unit circle in Kiyotaki and Wright [35]. Households
discount the future at rate β < 1.
3We do not consider γ < 0 since lump sum taxes could exceed household money balances on and off-the-
equilibrium path.
4Caplin and Nalebuff [15] posit a more general form of a utility function where χ corresponds to v in our
model, α corresponds to (τc, τp) in our model, and z is related to our good 0.
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Each shopkeeper k has access to an exchange technology that allows him to set up
a trading post in any pair of goods (νk, ν̂k) ∈ (V∪{0})2 , where we assume without loss
of generality νk ≤ ν̂k. Shopkeepers cannot produce goods and trading posts are in separate
locations. All shopkeepers have identical linear preferences over all consumable goods and
incur a fixed disutility cost κ (per capita) each period that their shop is open. Our convention
is to name a shopkeeper who does not open (0, 0), one that trades in money by (0, νk), and
a barter post by
(
νk > 0, ν̂k > 0
)
. Let Ck(t) denote shopkeeper k’s consumption of good
νk, and Ĉk(t) denote shopkeeper k’s consumption of good ν̂k in period t. Shopkeepers also
discount the future at rate β. We assume that there is free entry by shopkeepers.
We assume that households are anonymous (their identity (h) and history of past
actions are unobservable), while tastes and money holdings (θ,m (t)) are observable. Our
assumption about anonymity is consistent with shopkeepers keeping track of the distrib-
ution of household money holdings and tastes, but not specific identities as in Jovanovic
and Rosenthal [32]. Shopkeeper identity, the varieties of goods at their shop, consumption,
and cash (k, (νk, ν̂k), (Ck(t), Ĉk(t)),Mk(t)) are publicly observable. Furthermore, there
is no cross location communication during a period. Hence, consumption at one trading
post cannot be conditioned on production at a different trading post during the period.
The timing in any period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, agents
receive lump sum transfers. In stage 1 (which can possibly be an infinite number of rounds),
shopkeepers choose whether to open a trading post (thereby incurring cost κ). At this
stage, any trading post k specializing in goods (νk, ν̂k) announces a (possibly) taste and
money contingent allocation of the quantity of variety νk (or ν̂k) good for variety ν̂k (or
νk) good. In stage 2, each household member directs his or her search to one (and only
one) trading post or stays home.5 Then production, exchange, and consumption decisions
simultaneously take place at each post according to the announced allocation rule, after
5In this sense, the environment shares some similarity to the directed search model of Corbae, Temzelides,
and Wright [19]. While that paper restricted matches to bilateral meetings between households, here we restrict
matches to be between a household member and a shopkeeper where the shopkeeper can be in many such
matches (which is why we call it multilateral matching) but the household cannot.
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which workers and shoppers return home.6
2.3 Planner’s Problem
In each period, the planner chooses where to locate trading posts in variety space {(νk, ν̂k)}(M ;t),
which trading post(s) to direct the household (if at all) {(kp, kc, νp, νc)}(θ,m;t), and the allo-
cation of goods and money among households {(`, c, δp, δc)}(θ,m;t)and shopkeepers at each
post {(Ck, Ĉk, Dk)}(M ;t).7 In particular the planner chooses {(kp, kc, νp, νc, `, c, δp, δc)}(θ,m;t),






 ∫hc(k,νk;t)∪hc(k,bνk;t) c(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)
−ε
∫
hp(k,νk;t)∪hp(k,bνk;t) `(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)
 (2.1)
where µ(θ,m; t) is the distribution of money holdings across households of type θ and







(θ,m) : kc(θ,m; t) = k, νc(θ,m; t) = νk
}
and
hp(k, νk; t) =
{
(θ,m) : kp(θ,m; t) = k, νp(θ,m; t) = νk
}
are the sets of households directed by the planner to consume νk and produce νk at trading
post k, respectively.8 Since by the assumptions laid out in the environment, the planner
cannot direct a worker and/or a shopper to two different trading posts in any one period, we
6In an earlier version of this paper, we allowed for the possibility that shopkeepers would change their
announced allocation rule when households actually arrived at their shop at stage 2. Such deviations are pun-
ishable and were non-profitable in our environment. In order to keep notation and analysis easy, we maintain
this simple assumption.
7One can think of the planner making proposals which household members and shopkeepers can accept or
reject (where rejection implies that the agent is precluded from exchange that period).
8In writing the objective function this way, we have assumed that if |vc(θ, m; t)− τc| > x2 , then
c(θ, m; t) = 0. This is without loss of generality since such a household is indifferent to this allocation and the
positive consumption could be reallocated to someone who values the consumption.
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.9 Note, in order
to minimize notation, we assume that the planner does not direct a shopper who obtains no
utility from consumption to a trading post.
This objective is maximized subject to the following constraints. First, resource
feasibility at each trading post requires that for all t,
Ck(M ; t) ≤
∫
hp(k,νk;t) `(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)−
∫
hc(k,νk;t) c(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t) (2.2)
Ĉk(M ; t) ≤
∫
hp(k,bνk;t) `(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)−
∫
hc(k,bνk;t) c(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t) (2.3)
Dk(M ; t) ≤
∫
hc(k,νk;t)∪hc(t,k,bνk) δc(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)
−
∫
hp(k,νk;t)∪hp(k,bνk;t) δp(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t) (2.4)









Ck (M ; η) + Ĉk (M ; η)
)
(2.5)
where ι{·} is an indicator function which takes on the value 1 if the argument {·} is true (i.e.
when the shop is open). Third, household participation at two different shops requires that
if kp(θ,m; t) 6= kc(θ,m; t) or ν̂k(M ; t) = 0, then for all t,
ν(θ,m; t) = c(θ,m; t)− ε`(θ,m; t) + βν (θ,m+ η(t+ 1) + δp(θ,m; t)− δc(θ,m; t); t+ 1)
≥ max

c(θ,m; t) + βν (θ,m+ η(t+ 1)− δc(θ,m; t); t+ 1) ,
−ε`(θ,m; t) + βν (θ,m+ η(t+ 1) + δp(θ,m; t); t+ 1)
βν (θ,m+ η(t+ 1); t+ 1)
 (2.6)
9Specifically, for instance,
hc(k, vk; t) ∩ hc(k, bvk; t) = ∅.
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where min{δc, 0}−min{δp, 0} ≤ m. Household participation at a barter shop requires that
if kp(θ,m; t) = kc(θ,m; t) = k and νk(M ; t) 6= 0, then
ν(θ,m; t) = c(θ,m; t)−ε`(θ,m; t)+βν (θ,m+ η(t+ 1); t+ 1) ≥ βν (θ,m+ η(t+ 1); t+ 1)
(2.7)






mdµ (θ,m; t) .
We will show that the solution to the planner’s problem ((2.1) subject to (2.2)-(2.7))
attains a simple upper bound under certain assumptions. We now provide some intuition
for how we generate the result given the complicated nature of the planning problem. The
potentially hard part of the problem, which is the heart of the paper, is to decide which










The first key insight comes from manipulating the objective function using (2.2),
(2.3), and (2.5). Specifically, substituting (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.5) evaluated at t = 0 yields
∞∑
t=0




 ∫hp(k,νk;t)∪hp(k,bνk;t) `(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)
−
∫
hc(k,νk;t)∪hc(k,bνk;t) c(θ,m; t)dµ(θ,m; t)
 .
Since the shopkeeper’s utility doesn’t enter the planner’s objective, the above shopkeeper’s




10Note that if a household is directed to a barter shop then δp = δc = 0.
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ι{(νk(M ;t),bνk(M ;t)) 6=(0,0)}κ
]
(2.8)









Since the utility function is linear, the distribution of consumption does not affect the objec-
tive function and the planner’s objective is to direct workers to open shops (i.e. ∪k
(
hp(k, νk; t) ∪ hp(k, ν̂k; t)
)
)
to maximize economywide output net of the costs of opening trading posts.11
The second key insight is to simplify the complications associated with directing
workers to shops (i.e. ∪k
(
hp(k, νk; t) ∪ hp(k, ν̂k; t)
)
). Instead of focusing on which
worker is directed to a given shop, we focus on the set of workers for whom exchange
















if ν 6= 0{
(τc, τp) ∈ (0, 1]×
[




if ν = 0
∅ if ν̃ = 0
(2.9)
for (ν, ν̃) ∈ (V∪{0})2 denote an “exchange neighborhood” which obeys the mod 1 arith-
metic.12 An exchange neighborhood represents the set of households who could produce
good ν̃ in exchange for goodν. As can be seen from this definition, an exchange neigh-
borhood with ν 6= 0 requires a double coincidence of wants while an exchange neigh-
borhood with ν = 0 does not. For a barter shop k that trades
(
νk (t) , ν̂k (t)
)
∈ V2,
11Note that this is not to say that the distribution of consumption is unimportant for the problem. Obviously,



















we know that if a worker is producing ν̂k, then by definition τp ∈
[




the case of a barter shop, the household participation constraint (2.7) implies the shop-
per from that household should consume good νk (or else c(θ,m; t) − ε`(θ,m; t) ≥ 0
is violated); hence τc ∈
[
νk − x2 , ν
k + x2
]
. Thus hp(k, ν̂k; t) ⊂ S( νk(t), ν̂k(t)). For a
monetary shop k that trades
(
νk (t) , ν̂k (t)
)
∈ {0} × V, we know hp(k, 0; t) = ∅ and
hp(k, ν̂k; t) ⊂ S(0, ν̂k(t)) since workers cannot produce money and if a worker is produc-
ing ν̂k, then τp ∈
[







































k ι{(νk(M ;t),bνk(M ;t)) 6=(0,0)} denotes the number of trading posts opened
at time t. Note that by using exchange neighborhoods, we obtain an upper bound of the
objective (2.8) that is free of the hp decision rule. What we will show below (in Theorem
1) is that the solution of (2.1) subject to (2.2)-(2.7) actually attains this upper bound (2.10)
under certain conditions.
The third key insight comes from understanding how opening trading posts covers
the type space in terms of exchange neighborhoods. Specifically, a planner who proposes
that shopkeeper k opens a barter trading post offering goods of variety (νk, ν̂k) ∈ V2 at time








Figure 1a represents the exchange neighborhoods associated with one barter trading post







. In particular, since with barter both the worker and shop-
per must go to the same trading post in order to satisfy the household participation con-
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Figure 2.1: Barter Exchange Neighborhoods
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who come to his shop to exchange their variety 34 good























come to his shop to exchange their variety 14 good for a variety
3
4 good. By opening this
first trading post, the planner covers two squares with an area of size 2x2 of the type space.
Note that not everyone can produce (and hence consume) with this one shop which “par-







). Figure 1b represents the













. With two barter posts and x > 13 , there is no way for the planner to















6= ∅). At the same time, since x < 12 , it is not possible to
cover the entire taste space with the two shops. By opening the second trading post, the
planner has generated four exchange neighborhoods; however, because of the overlap of
these neighborhoods the coverage is less than 4x2. Given that it is costly to open shops, it
is inefficient to have any overlap. Finally, Figure 1c represents the exchange neighborhoods




















. While opening a third trading post generates six exchange neighborhoods, the
marginal increase in coverage will be lower due to the nonlinear rise in overlap. In sum-
mary, opening n barter trading posts generates 2n exchange neighborhoods and covers 2nx2
minus the area of overlap (where overlap is increasing in n at a (weakly) increasing rate).13
Unlike the two square exchange neighborhoods associated with each barter post (as





is an entire strip centered on the τp = ν̂k line (as evident in the second line of (2.9)). In
particular, Figure (2.2)a represents the exchange neighborhood associated with one money
















are willing to exchange production of their variety 14 good for money








denotes the ceiling of z, which is the smallest integer greater than or equal to z.
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Figure 2.2: Monetary Exchange Neighborhoods
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provided the shopper of the household will be directed to a money post in some future period
to exchange its money for a variety ν̂k
′ ∈
[




good such that the household
participation constraint (2.6) is satisfied. Also pictured in Figure (2.2)a is the set (vertical
strip) of shoppers who if they had money could go to the monetary shop to obtain good
1





shop, then the only households who could conceivably satisfy the participation constraint























(2.2)a (i.e. the intersection of the above two strips). However, a planner could always open
monetary shops in other regions of the variety space in the future and keep others closed.14
Obviously, the period in which the planner opens the future post (and the shopper gets
to consume) will affect the participation constraint and hence β matters for this decision.














, the two monetary exchange neighborhoods (and the associated
vertical strips of shoppers who could go to those monetary posts) do not cover the entire
type space but unlike the barter case, there is no overlap. Finally, Figure (2.2)c graphs


















, the three monetary exchange neighborhoods cover the entire type space (unlike
the case for three barter posts).15 If the same shops are open next period, then since there
is full coverage of the type space, all shoppers have a place to spend their money (and
there is no need for additional shops). It is simplest to see how money resolves the double









































trade between these two households. In summary, we can add up to b 1xc monetary shops




open every period, the planner










, ν̂k + x
2

square would be dominated by one barter trading post (νk, bνk) which generates the two
squares S(νk, ν̂k) and S(ν̂k, vk).
15For this latter assertion, see case 1 of the proof of Theorem 1.
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without generating any overlap of the exchange neighborhoods and each shop covers an area
of size x.16 With d 1xe monetary shops, the entire type space can be covered and there is no
reason to open an additional shop and incur κ.17 Moreover, if b 1xc 6= d
1




shop only adds an area of size 1 − b 1xcx < x. Finally, in order for all workers in a given
monetary exchange neighborhood S(0, ν̂k) to produce, how many periods the shopper must
wait before spending money is critical to satisfying the participation constraint (2.6).
Next we characterize the solution for the planner’s problem (2.1) subject to (2.2)-
(2.7). Specifically,
Theorem 11 The solution for the planner’s problem can be characterized as follows.









− ε ≥ 0, then the unique solution to the planner’s problem involves
opening only d 1xe monetary shops (Full Coverage).









− ε ≥ 0, then the unique solution
involves opening only b 1xc monetary shops (Partial Coverage). If κ ≥ x(1 − ε), then no
shop will be opened (No Coverage).
Case 2. For 12 ≤ x <
2
3 , if κ < 2(1−x)
2(1− ε) and households are patient enough
such that β (1− 2κ) − ε ≥ 0 then the unique solution involves opening two monetary
shops and all workers produce every period (Full Coverage). If 2(1 − x)2(1 − ε) ≤ κ ≤(
1− 2(1− x)2
)





(1 − ε) > κ, then no shop will be opened (No
Coverage).
Case 3. For x ≥ 23 , if κ < 2(1−x)
2(1− ε) then a solution to the planner’s problem
involves opening two barter shops. If households are patient enough such that β (1− 2κ)−
ε ≥ 0, then another solution involves opening two monetary shops. In either case all
16The floor bzc denotes the largest integer less than or equal to z.
17Recall that dze denotes the ceiling of z, which is the smallest integer greater than or equal to z.
18By unique, we mean that the number of shops is uniquely determined. Which varieties are traded and who
produces and consumes them is not unique. One source of this multiplicity is due to the mod arithmetic which
ensures symmetry among households.
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then the unique solution involves opening a single barter shop (Partial Coverage) and if(
1− 2(1− x)2
)
(1− ε) > κ, no shop will be opened (No Coverage).
Proof. See appendix.
We break the characterization into cases depending on households’ specialization
of tastes (x) and the cost of opening shops (κ). Specifically, for each of three regions of x
ranging from very selective to indiscriminate preferences, we then consider three possibili-
ties for κ ranging from low to high costs. When x is small, strips associated with monetary
neighborhoods cover more than two squares associated with barter neighborhoods. Further-
more, the placement of strips by the planner (i.e. location of monetary shops) can easily
occur without overlap, but the placement of squares (i.e. location of barter shops) is prone
to overlap (and figuring the least overlap way to place the shops takes many pages of proof).
If κ is too high (i.e. κ > x(1 − ε) so that the net utility associated with production by all
workers in a monetary exchange neighborhood does not cover the shopkeeper’s participa-





(1 − ε) > κ so that the net utility associated with the additional
production by workers in the monetary exchange neighborhoods covers the cost of the last
monetary shop added) and the sufficient conditions on β are met, the planner opens d 1xe
shops to fully cover the type space. The intermediate case, again provided the sufficient
conditions on β are met, involves opening b 1xc shops partially covering the type space with-
out overlap of monetary exchange neighborhoods.
2.4 Examples
We illustrate several interesting corollaries associated with Theorem 1 via the next set of
examples.
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2.4.1 Monetary exchange can increase product variety
Here we provide an example that shows the introduction of money can increase product




2x2 − (3x− 1)2
)
(1− ε) < κ < (1− 2x)(1− ε) (2.11)
and if money is not available, we show the optimal number of barter shops is 1 (so there
are two varieties of goods in the economy).19 Then we show that for the same parameter
values, if money becomes available, the optimal number of monetary shops is 3 (so there
are three varieties of goods in the economy).
To see this, we begin by noting that since x < 1130 <
1
2 , the two exchange neigh-
borhoods of a single barter shop can be located such that they do not overlap (See Figure
(2.1)a). Hence the planner’s objective function (2.10) with a single barter shop will take
the value of 2x2(1− ε)− κ. Since x > 13 the exchange neighborhoods of two barter shops
overlap (this is evident in Figure (2.1)b). In the appendix (Lemma 1) we show that the size
of the overlap will be at least (3x− 1)2. Hence the planner’s objective function (2.10) with
two barter shops yields the value of
[
4x2 − (3x− 1)2
]
(1 − ε) − 2κ. Now if the lower
inequality in (2.11) holds, in the absence of money, the planner opens a single barter shop
and each period two types of goods are produced in the economy.




2 , provided households are patient enough to satisfy the
participation constraint (2.6), i.e. 1 − κx ≥
ε
β2
as given in case 1 of Theorem (1), two
monetary shops deliver the value of 2x(1 − ε) − 2κ to the planner’s objective function
(2.10) under partial coverage (see Figure (2.2)b) and three monetary shops deliver the value
(1 − ε) − 3κ under full coverage (see Figure (2.2)c). If the upper inequality in (2.11)
holds, then the planners opens three monetary shops and each period three types of goods
are produced in the economy. This example illustrates the basic idea that the inefficiency
19If x < 11
30
it follows (1− 2x) > 2x2 − (3x− 1)2.
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associated with overlap of exchange neighborhoods when adding barter shops limits their
adoption while adding money shops minimizes such inefficiencies.
2.4.2 The adoption of monetary exchange with lower costs of operating shops
In this example we show that as the cost of operating shops falls, the solution for the plan-
ner’s problem changes from operating barter shops to opening monetary shops. Assume
1
2 < x <
2










the optimality of a single barter shop follows from Theorem 1, Case 2 (compare the areas
covered in Figure (2.3)a with Figure (2.3)b). Specifically, the objective function (2.10)




(1−ε)−κ since the area covered
by the barter exchange neighborhood in Figure (2.3)a is simply 1 minus the area not covered
(the 2 squares in the northeast and southwest corners of Figure (2.3)a are of length (1−x)2).




(1−ε), the planner opens at least the one barter shop
(which would dominate one money shop since the upper bound of its objective (2.10) is
given by x(1− ε)−κ). The condition κ ≥ 2(1−x)2(1− ε) guarantees that the cost is high
enough that the additional value from covering the type space with two money shops versus
the one barter shop is just associated with the area not covered above (i.e. 2(1−x)2(1−ε));
hence it is not worthwhile to open two money shops. But, if the cost of operating shops
decreases (i.e. κ < 2(1− x)2(1− ε)), then provided households are sufficiently patient to
satisfy the participation constraint (2.6), that is β (1− 2κ)−ε ≥ 0, the optimal solution for
the planner’s problem will be attained by opening two monetary shops covering the entire
taste space (compare the areas covered in Figure (2.3)d with Figure (2.3)c). In this case, by
decreasing κ we go from a barter economy where some households do not produce and do
not consume, to a monetary economy where all households produce and consume.
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Figure 2.3: Barter to Monetary
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2.4.3 Complementarity between monetary shops
Here we examine the positive feedback associated with opening monetary shops. In regions
of partial coverage, we show that adding a barter shop generates negative feedback due to
overlap, but adding a monetary shop generates positive feedback since it makes it easier to
satisfy the household participation constraint. First we show that while a single barter shop
may be incentive feasible, adding a second barter shop tightens the participation constraint
for the existing shop due to overlap of the barter exchange neighborhoods. Then we show
that while a single monetary shop is not incentive feasible since it is not possible for the
planner to move the one shop around the variety space over time to satisfy the household
participation constraint (in particular it would take at least two periods before consuming),
adding a second monetary shop that covers the taste space (so that it only takes one period
between producing and consuming) loosens the household participation constraint.
Assume x = 12 . Furthermore, assume






(1− ε) < 2κ, (2.13)
β(1− 2κ)− ε > 0. (2.14)
It is possible to show that the set of parameters satisfying (2.12)-(2.14) is not empty.20







, half of the households produce and consume.
From the 12 units of goods produced, κ units is consumed by the shopkeeper in order to sat-
isfy the shopkeeper participation constraint (2.5). The remaining 12 − κ units are consumed









Now if ε is such that






satisfying (2.12), then the second inequality implies ε
β
< 1 − 3
4
(1 − ε). For a κ satisfying ε
β
< 1 − 2κ <
1− 3
4
(1− ε), the first inequality implies (2.14) and (2.13) follows from the second one.
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by the 12 shoppers visiting the shop, each consuming 1 − 2κ. The household participation
constraint (2.7), (1 − 2κ) − ε > 0, is satisfied given (2.14). Due to overlap of their ex-
change neighborhoods, two barter shops cover at most 4x2 − (3x − 1)2 = 34 measure of
the taste space. By (2.13) we know that after paying the least necessary consumption (i.e.
ε) to households in order to satisfy their participation constraint (2.7), since there are only
3
4 units of goods remaining, there will not be enough to satisfy the shopkeeper participation
constraint (2.5). In summary, given (2.13) while it is incentive feasible to set up one barter
shop, opening two of them is incentive infeasible.
A single money shop provides production opportunities to x = 12 measure of work-
ers (the area of the strip). The shoppers of x2 = 14 measure of these households can con-
sume next period, while the shoppers of x2 = 14 measure of them have to wait for at least
two periods before consumption. Denote the set of households whose worker produces in
period t and whose shopper has to wait for at least two periods before consumption by At.
Let #(At) denote the measure of them, in which case #(At) ≤ x = 12 . Moreover, let Ā
denote the supremum of {#(At)}∞t=0. Suppose the participation constraint can be satisfied
for all households (we will derive a contradiction to this). For those who wait for at least
two periods, the participation constraint (2.6) implies the continuation value on the equilib-








ν(θ,m; t+ 2)dµ (θ,m; t) ≤
∫
Θ×R+
ν(θ,m; t+ 2)dµ (θ,m; t)
where the first inequality follows from aggregating household participation constraints and
the second inequality follows since the continuation value cannot be negative for any house-
hold. Every period at most 14 + Ā of workers produce, therefore (2.10) implies∫
Θ×R+

























Since ε > β2, β < 13and κ >
3











which in turn implies Ā > 12 , contradicting #(At) ≤
1
2 for ∀t. On the other hand, two mon-
etary shops cover the type space so that consumption and production can take place every
period. Since κ must be provided to each of the shopkeepers to satisfy their participation
constraint (2.5), the remaining output can be used to satisfy the household participation con-
straint (which follows from the assumption in (2.14)). In summary, given our assumptions
(2.12)-(2.14), while it is not incentive feasible to open a single monetary shop, it is feasible
to open two of them. The positive feedback to the participation constraint comes from the
fact that the measure of the set of households who can produce one period and consume the
next is 14 with one monetary shop while it is a set of measure 1 with two monetary shops.
2.5 Implementation
In this section, we show that we can implement the solution to the planner’s problem given
in Theorem 1 as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Free entry will ensure that allocations yield
zero profits for shopkeepers (who will not accumulate money). With full coverage, the en-
dogenous cash-in-advance constraint yields a unit velocity quantity theory and households
are treated identically. In particular, we consider implementing the planner’s solution with
linear prices rather than nonlinear prices.
Theorem 12 In all cases of Theorem 1 where there is full coverage provided the money






− ε ≥ 0), then the unique solution to the planner’s problem
can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium with d 1xe monetary trading posts
who each pay type independent wages W (t) = m(t) and charge type independent prices
P (t) = m(t)
1−d 1
x
eκ . Along the equilibrium path, shopkeepers earn zero profits and do not
accumulate money. The equilibrium distribution of real money holdings is degenerate at
1− d 1xeκ.
Proof. The public history of any shopkeeper k includes his stage 1 announced prices P (t)
and W (t). Let Ht = 0 iff Ht−1 = 0 (with initial condition H−1 = 0) and by the end of
stage 1 of period t for any i ∈
{
1, . . . , d 1xe
}








, with price P (t) = m(t)
1−d 1
x
eκ and wage W (t) = m(t) and Ht = 1 otherwise.
21





















for i, j ∈
{
1, . . . , d 1xe
}
. In stage two of any period t in history








with the lowest index k.22 At that shop he spends all of his money holdings.









with the lowest index k′. At that shop she produces one unit of the good. If Ht = 1, both
household members stay home.
We consider the following strategy by shopkeepers. In stage one of any period t in










P (t) = m(t)
1−d 1
x
eκ and wage W (t) = m(t), then some shopkeeper enters bearing the cost κ
and announces such prices. Specifically, in the kth round of the first stage, if none of the











announced price P (t) = m(t)
1−d 1
x
eκ and wage W (t) = m(t), then the k
th shopkeeper incurs
21Note that Ht = 0 does not require all shopkeepers to follow the equilibrium strategy, just enough to cover
the type space with equlibrium prices.






e at the same prices, we are simply coordinating directed matching.
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the cost κ and does so.23 If a shopkeeper z < k has opened the monetary shop at those
prices, shopkeeper k does not open thereby avoiding the cost κ. In history Ht−1 = 1, all
shopkeepers do not open.
To see there is not a profitable deviation by a shopkeeper in history Ht−1 = 0,
notice that at the announced prices the shopkeeper receives zero profit net of the cost κ
and accumulates no money. If a shopkeeper deviates and announces different prices/wages,
then according to the above household strategy, no shopper or worker will visit their post
leaving the shop to bear the cost κ without consuming anything or accumulating money.
To see there is not a profitable deviation by a shopkeeper in history Ht−1 = 1, note that
autarky is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
To see there is not a profitable deviation by a household in history Ht = 0, first
note that given that no other household will produce or consume at a monetary shop which
is not following the shopkeeper strategy along the equilibrium path, it is not individually
rational for any household to produce or consume at a deviant shop. In particular, given
that shopkeepers do not start with money balances whenHt = 0, then a deviant shopkeeper
cannot offer higher wages or support lower prices because households will not visit his shop
(as required by the household strategy). Hence, even if a shop announces lower prices or
higher wages, the household strategy does not send the shopper or worker there. In stage
two of any period t in history Ht = 0, the continuation value of a type θ household with



















This follows from the household strategy that they spend all their money and the linearity of
announced prices by shopkeepers along the equilibrium path. Given this, it is easy to verify
23This is only one algorithm to select potential shopkeepers to open trading posts, but there are many other









keepers with index k where modd 1
x
e(k) = i. It ensures that if a shopkeeper doesn’t follow the ascribed strategy,
another shopkeeper down the line will eventually enter with the ascribed strategy.
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− ε ≥ 0.
That the household spends all of its money follows from linearity of the utility function,
discounting, and possible money growth. In a history where Ht = 1, autarky is subgame
perfect.
Notice that given this implementation uses linear prices, increasing the money
growth rate weakens the household participation constraint thereby potentially eliminat-
ing this good equilibrium. While the consumption and production allocation is independent
of the money growth rate, existence of the equilibrium itself is not superneutral. If in-
stead of linear prices we had considered implementing the full coverage planner’s solution
with nonlinear prices, the household’s participation constraint is independent of the money
growth rate.24
In general, however, when there is partial coverage, prices need to be type dependent
and nonlinear. The nonlinear type dependent prices can be inferred from the allocation
described in table A.1 and A.2 of the proof of Theorem 1. Specifically, wages for all types
are given by (2.19):
W (t) = b1
x
























but in each period only b 1xcx of workers can produce while 1 − b
1
xcx of workers produce





















during an even period te, P (θ; te) = ∞ and during






eκ if m(t) ≥ m(t)
∞ otherwise
which amounts to a two part tariff where the shopper pays m(t) to enter the trading post and receive 1− d 1
x
eκ









. These prices induce the following
allocation for the above type θ household: during an even period te, `(θ; te) = 1 and
c(θ; te) = 0 while during an odd period to, `(to) = 0 and c(to) = 1 − κx . Similarly, for






















during an even period te, P (θ; te) =
W (te−1)+W (te−2)+η(te)+η(te−1)
2(1−κx )
and during an odd period to, P (θ; to) = ∞. These prices
induce the following allocation for the above type θ household: during an even period




while during an odd period to, `(θ; to) = 1 and
c(θ; to) = 0. Thus, it is evident that for the case with partial coverage there is cross sectional
variation in household consumption and production across time.
It is possible that we can implement an allocation that delivers the same aggregate
utility as the planners solution (i.e. achieving the same value for the objective (2.1)) using
type independent linear prices provided that γ is low enough and β is high enough (i.e.
higher than that required with nonlinear prices to satisfy the household participation con-
straint). In this case the type independent wage rate is governed by the following difference
equation
W (t) = b1
x



















However, even with linear prices, the resulting allocation will exhibit cross sectional varia-
tion across time.
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2.5.1 Example: Elimination of Pareto Dominated Equilibrium by Money
Growth




(1 − ε) > κ the optimal solution for the
planner’s problem (2.1) is attained by opening d 1xe monetary shops to cover the type space,
provided households are patient enough so their participation constraint is satisfied. In
Theorem 2, we showed that this solution can be implemented with linear prices with zero




− ε ≥ 0). However, for a given set of beliefs, there might





− ε > 0 then with a constant supply
of money, it is possible to endow households with beliefs such that there exists a partial




)2 of the workers produce. The varieties of goods traded for money
in these shops can be given by (i− 12)x for i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , b 1xc
}
and households believe that
no other shops will be opened. Notice that since the variety of goods traded do not change,
although xb 1xcworkers have production opportunities, only
(
xb 1xc
)2 workers produce since





− ε > 0
guarantees the household participation constraint holds for them when the money supply is
constant.
In order to see why more monetary shops don’t open, notice that if all households
believe that the only shops visited by workers and shoppers will be the b 1xc monetary shops
that partially cover the type space, then it is individually rational for each household mem-
ber to stay home since along the equilibrium path there will be no money at the shops and no





− ε > 0, the participa-
tion constraint for all workers producing at the existing shops holds, hence it is individually






















x), but there are no shops under the
assumed beliefs at which they can consume in the current or any future period.
















who spend their initial





shops at time zero, but since their production





x), these households do not work and receive wages in the future.
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rational to produce and consume only at those b 1xc monetary shops. In that case, it is not
optimal for the shopkeepers to bear a cost in stage 1 and open another shop.










Notice (2.15) implies consumption by households whose worker produces in the partial
coverage case (i.e. 1− κ
x2b 1xc
) is less than consumption by all households in the full coverage
case (i.e. 1− d 1xeκ).
If there is positive money growth, the participation constraint for the partial cover-





−ε < 0).27 However,




− ε > 0, Theorem 2 states that the full coverage solution can be














⌋)− ε > 0
which guarantees that with zero money growth and the appropriate beliefs, both full and














want to use both their earned wage

















just use their money transfers to consume since they do not produce. The



























The participation constraint for a worker in period t, can be written as β W (t)
P (t+1)







− ε > 0.
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which guarantees that the pareto dominated partial coverage equilibrium is eliminated with
positive money growth while the full coverage equilibrium is not. It is simple to find regions
of the parameter space (ε, κ, β, x, and γ) such that these constraints are satisfied. For











xe). In short, a mild
money growth eliminates the pareto dominated partial coverage equilibrium in favor of the
optimal full coverage equilibrium.28
2.6 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to integrate aspects of monetary theory familiar from Kiyotaki-
Wright [35] (the idea of specialized tastes and production abilities) and Lagos-Wright [37]
(the inclusion of multilateral matching in competitive markets with divisible money) with
industrial organization along the lines of Hotelling [28]. An earlier version of this paper
considered more general, smooth preferences over variety as in Kiyotaki and Wright [34]
as well as concavity over the quantity of good consumed. These assumptions required
nonlinear, type dependent prices and it was impossible to implement the planner’s solution
with linear prices unless we introduced private information. We solved the problem by
considering the limit of this more general case.
One interesting extension is to consider how international payment systems influ-
ence the varieties of traded goods. Given that there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in re-
gions of the parameter space, the model can generate cross-country variability in prices and
output.
28This result is similar to a result for an overlapping generations economy in Cooper and Corbae [18], where
a mild money growth eliminates the suboptimal equilibrium.
72
2.7 Appendix
Theorem 1. The solution for the planner’s problem can be characterized as follows.




(1 − ε) and households are patient enough
such that 1−d 1xeκ ≥
ε
β , then the unique solution to the planner’s problem involves opening




(1 − ε) and
households are patient enough such that 1 − κx ≥
ε
β2
, then the unique solution involves
opening only b 1xc monetary shops (Partial Coverage). If κ ≥ x(1− ε), then no shop will be
opened (No Coverage).
Case 2. For 12 ≤ x <
2
3 , if κ < 2(1−x)
2(1− ε) and households are patient enough
such that β (1− 2κ) − ε ≥ 0 then the unique solution involves opening two monetary
shops and all workers produce every period (Full Coverage). If 2(1 − x)2(1 − ε) ≤ κ ≤(
1− 2(1− x)2
)





(1 − ε) > κ, then no shop will be opened (No
Coverage).
Case 3. For x ≥ 23 , if κ < 2(1−x)
2(1− ε) then a solution to the planner’s problem
involves opening two barter shops. If households are patient enough such that β (1− 2κ)−
ε ≥ 0, then another solution involves opening two monetary shops. In either case all





then the unique solution involves opening a single barter shop (Partial Coverage) and if(
1− 2(1− x)2
)
(1− ε) > κ, no shop will be opened (No Coverage).
Proof. Case 1: x < 12 . We will use a proof by contradiction. Suppose the optimal solution
to the planner’s problem involves opening at least one barter shop. We will show that by
opening only monetary shops (b 1xcmonetary shops or d
1





(1− ε)) the objective function of the planner can be improved.
Denote the number of barter and monetary shops in period t respectively by nb(t) and
nm(t). We will provide an upper bound for the planner’s objective function in terms of








. Finally we show that if households are patient enough, the upper






can be attained (and hence is a solution to
(2.1) subject to (2.2)-(2.7)).
We have introduced an upper bound for the set of households who produce at a





















Therefore at most 2x2nb(t) households produce at the nb(t) barter shops in period t. We
have also introduced an upper bound for the set of households who produce at a monetary




















Hence at most xnm(t) households produce at the nm(t) monetary shops in period t. More-
over, since there is a unit measure of households in the economy, then at most a unit mea-
sure of households can produce in a period. The upper bound for the number of households
producing in period t is given by:
max
{
1, xnm(t) + 2x2nb(t)
}
Using the manipulated objective function of the planner, (2.8), the upper bound for the
















If κ ≥ x(1 − ε), then the cost of opening a shop (monetary or barter) exceeds its
benefits:
κ ≥ x(1− ε) > 2x2(1− ε)
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where the second inequality follows from x < 12 . Hence if κ ≥ x(1− ε), then no shop will
be opened. In the rest of the proof we assume κ < x(1− ε).
Since x < 12 , replacing barter shops with monetary ones will not reduce the objec-
tive function. That is
max
{









where the equality holds only if xnm(t) + 2x2nb(t) ≥ 1. If the inequality is strict, then
by replacing all the barter shops with monetary shops the planner can increase the objec-
tive function, hence contradicting the optimality of the solution. If the equality holds (i.e.
xnm(t) + 2x2nb(t) ≥ 1), and x
(
nm(t) + nb(t)− 1
)
≥ 1 then the planner can close all
the barter shops and increase the number of monetary shops to nm(t) + nb(t) − 1, that
is the total number of shops drops by one. By doing so the value of objective function in






nm(t) + nb(t)− 1
)
κ.
Therefore the only remaining case is
xnm(t) + 2x2nb(t) ≥ 1 > x
(









, and can only hold if nb(t) ≤ 3.
If nb(t) = 3, then (2.17) holds only if nm(t) = 0 and 13 ≤ x <
1
2 . If x ≥
1
3 , then
3 monetary shops are enough to cover the taste space and induce all workers to produce
provided they are patient enough (we will provide the complete proof below). Although
three times the area covered by a barter shop with 12 > x ≥
1
3 is not necessarily smaller
than one (that is 3 · 2x2 ≥ 1), because of the overlap of the area covered by these three
shops, we show they cannot cover the taste space.
Suppose the three barter shops cover the taste space. Denote the pairs of goods












. The shops must cover the diagonal
of the taste space {(τc, τp) | τc = τp ∈ ν} as well. The diagonal can be divided into three
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segments such that each segment is covered completely by at least one of the barter shops.






2a3. By definition a1 +
a2 + a3 = 1. Without loss of generality we assume the first, second and third barter
shops cover the first, second and third segments respectively. In order to cover
√
2a1 of








has an area greater than or equal to
(a1)
2. Similarly the area of the overlap of pairs of the S sets associated with the second











cover the first and second segments the area of overlap between
them will be at least as large as (x− a1) (x− a2). Similarly there will be overlap between




















= 1 + 6x2 − 4x. (2.18)
Since the area covered by the six S sets is at most 6x2 minus the lower bound of the overlap
area given in (2.18), the total area covered by the three barter shops is not greater than
4x − 1 < 1, where the inequality follows from x < 12 . Therefore the three barter shop
cannot cover the taste space, while three monetary shops do cover the taste space.
If nb(t) = 2 and (2.17) holds we have
(nm + 2)x > 1 > (nm + 1)x
where the first inequality follows from x < 12 which implies 2n
bx2 < 2x. Therefore,





= 14 . Hence, n
m(t)
can only take the values of 2 (for 13 < x <
1
2 ) and 1 (for
1
4 < x <
1
3 ). For n
m = 2, the
area covered by the monetary shops will be two horizontal strips each of width at most x.
Therefore the remaining area should be covered by two barter shops. Since by definition
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the areas covered by the exchange neighborhoods generated by the two barter shops are
symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the type space, the size of the area solely covered
by the monetary shops cannot exceed 4x2, and the rest of the two strips overlap with the
area covered by the barter shops. The area covered by the two barter shops is at most 4x2,
so in order to cover the type space by the two barter shops and the two monetary shops
we should have 8x2 ≥ 1 which violates x ≤ 3. For nm = 1, similarly we can show the
area covered solely by the monetary shop cannot exceed a square of size x2 located on the
diagonal of the taste space. But then if the type space can be covered by two barter shops
and a square of size x2 on the diagonal, it can also be covered by three barter shops, which
contradicts what we showed above.
If nb(t) = 1 and (2.17) holds, then we have nm(t) = b 1xc. In this case there is a
horizontal strip of the type space which is not covered by the exchange neighborhoods of
the monetary shops. The exchange neighborhoods of the barter shop should cover this strip.
But since the width of each of them is x < 12 , they cannot cover an strip which with the
width of 1.
In summary we have shown for x < 12 , it is optimal to cover the type space with
monetary exchange neighborhoods without opening any barter shop. That is the solution for
(2.16) is attained by setting nb(t) = 0. Next we characterize the optimal number of mon-
etary shops, nm(t) and show the optimal solution satisfies the feasibility and participation
constraints of the planner’s problem (i.e. (2.2)-(2.7)).
At most x workers can produce at a monetary shop. Hence if x(1 − ε) ≤ κ, an
operating monetary shop can at most compensate the cost of its operation and the disutility
incurred by the workers and does not generate any value added. In this case the optimal
solution for the planner’s problem is not to open a monetary shop.
If x(1− ε) > κ, then as long as (nm +1)x < 1 by adding one more monetary shop,
the upper bound for the planner’s objective, (2.16), increases, and the maximum is attained
either by nm = b 1xc or n
m = d 1xe. The first one yields the value of b
1
xc (x(1− ε)− κ),
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(1− ε) < κ
then the benefit of adding one more monetary shop to b 1xc of them does not compensate for
the increase in the cost, and the upper bound (2.16) is maximized by setting nm = b 1xc.
Otherwise nm = d 1xe maximizes the upper bound. Next we show provided households are





(1 − ε) ≥ κ. Hence the upper bound is maximized by
nm = d 1xe with full coverage. Suppose every period the planner opens d
1
xe monetary shops




/d 1xe for i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , d 1xe
}
, covering the whole















for m(t) units of money, and m(t) units of money




/d 1xe. The workers and shoppers are directed to the
closest shops for production and consumption if they havem(t), otherwise they should stay
at home. That is, a type τp ∈
(




worker is directed to shop i to produce




/d 1xe, in exchange for δp = m(t) units of money, and a type
τc ∈
(




worker is directed to shop j to exchange δc = m(t) units of




d 1xe. Every period at each shop
1/d 1xe units of goods is produced from which κ units is consumed by the shopkeeper, and
the remaining 1/d 1xe − κ units is consumed by the 1/d
1
xe shoppers who consume at the
shop. The shopkeepers do not accumulate money and their participation constraint (2.5)
is satisfied since they consume κ every period they are open. On the equilibrium path
households start and end period t with m(t) units of money. Finally by producing one
unit in period t, a household incurs disutility −ε and receives money which can be used to




















c = 1− d1
x
eκ > ε.
Now if β is sufficiently high we also have c = 1− d 1xeκ >
ε
β , and household participation
constraint (2.6) holds.




(1 − ε), hence the upper bound is maximized by
nm = b 1xc with partial coverage. Suppose, starting from period t = 0 every even period






2 for i ∈{
1, 2, . . . , b 1xc
}
, and every odd period the planner opens b 1xc monetary shops exchanging




2 for i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , b 1xc
}
.
Households are endowed with η(0) = m(0) units of money. The supply of money
grows at rate γ by a type independent lump sum money transfer of η(t) = γ(1−γ)t−1m(0)
for t ≥ 1. Every period t there will be b 1xcx of workers who produce and receive δ̄p(t)
units of money. Planner’s proposals to the households in the even periods are summarized































































` = 0 ` = 0 ` = 0
c = 1− κx c = 1−
κ
x c = 0
δp = 0 δp = 0 δp = 0
δc = δ̄p(−1) δc = δ̄p(−1) δc = 0















c = 1− κx c = 0
δp = δ̄p δp = δ̄p δp = δ̄p











` = 1 ` = 1 ` = 1
c = 1− κx c = 0 c = 0
δp = δ̄p δp = δ̄p δp = δ̄p
δc = δ̄p(−2) δc = 0 δc = 0
+η + η(−1)
where z(−1) denotes z(t− 1) (e.g. η(−1) denotes η(t− 1)).










































` = 1 ` = 1 ` = 1
c = 0 c = 0 c = 1− κx
δp = δ̄p δp = δ̄p δp = δ̄p
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` = 0 ` = 0 ` = 0
c = 0 c = 1− κx c = 1−
κ
x
δp = 0 δp = 0 δp = 0
δc = 0 δc = δ̄p(−1) δc = δ̄p(−1)
+η + η(−1) +η + η(−1)




























Therefore, the shopkeepers do not accumulate money along the equilibrium path.
Household participation constraints (2.6) can be summarized for each region of the







































































































≥ ε), then the household participation constraint will hold for all regions of
the taste space. In summary, with partial coverage, x units of workers will produce at each
monetary shop every period. From this x units of goods produced at each monetary shop, κ
units of them will be consumed by the shopkeeper satisfying the shopkeeper participation








shoppers visiting the shop, from which x−2
(











units after having produced only since their last con-
sumption and
(












having produced twice since their last consumption. Figure (2.4) illustrates the location of
monetary shops over time and the set of shoppers and workers who consume and produce
when b 1xc = 2.
Case 2: 12 ≤ x <
2
3 . With a single monetary shop at most x units of workers can
produce. Two monetary shops provide production opportunities for all of the workers, fully
covering the type space.
A single barter shop can cover 1−2(1−x)2 units of the type space. For example if a







then the households with type (τc, τp) ∈ [0, x]× [1−x, 1]
can produce good 1 − x2 in exchange for good
x
2 , and the households with type (τc, τp) ∈
[1−x, 1]× [0, x] can produce good x2 in exchange for good 1−
x
2 , provided the participation
constraint holds. Notice that a single barter shop has two exchange neighborhoods each
covering x2 units of the type space. But for x ≥ 12 , the two neighborhoods will have an
overlap with the minimum size of (2x − 1)2. Hence the area of type space covered by a
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Figure 2.4: Moving Monetary Exchange Neighborhoods
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single barter shop will have the maximum size of
2x2 − (2x− 1)2 = 1− 2(1− x)2.
We show for x < 23 two barter shops cannot cover the type space using a proof by
contradiction. Suppose the type space is covered by the exchange neighborhoods of the two
barter shops. Since x < 23 one barter shop cannot cover more than
2
3 of the diagonal of
the type space. Hence each barter shop should at least cover 13 of the diagonal. Without
loss of generality we can assume the first barter shop is trading the pair
(
ν1, ν̂1 = 1− ν1
)
of goods29. The exchange neighborhood of this shop has to cover the middle 13 of the type














should be covered by







1| ≤ x2 <
1
3 , which also imply
1
3 ≤ ν
























uncovered by the first shop’s exchange neighborhoods, so they should be covered by the







































, 1] ∪ [5
6
, 1]× (0, 1
6
]










cannot be directed to the second barter
shop for production and consumption since x < 23 , thereby yielding the contradiction (See
Figure (2.3)c for the areas on the border which are not covered).







with a single barter shop, is equal to 1(1−β) {x(1− ε)− κ}
with one monetary shop, and is equal to 1(1−β) {(1− ε)− 2κ} with two monetary shops.
29This can be shown by transforming the coordinates of the type space along the diagonal.
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ε) > κ > 2(1 − x)2(1 − ε), then the upper bound is given by a single barter shop and for













of goods, 1− 2(1−x)2 workers produce 1− 2(1−x)2 units of
good from which κ unit will be consumed by the shopkeeper, satisfying the shopkeeper’s
participation constraint (2.5), and the remaining 1−2(1−x)2−κ units will be consumed by
the 1− 2(1− x)2 shoppers visiting the shop. If the utility from consumption compensates








(1 − ε) ≥ κ, then the household participation constraint
(2.6) is satisfied.
If κ < 2(1− x)2(1− ε) with two monetary shops exchanging money with goods 14




2 ] are directed to
the monetary shop i ∈ {1, 2} to trade 1 unit of good i−12 +
1
4 withm(t) units of money. The
shoppers of type τc ∈ ( i−12 ,
i
2 ] are directed to the monetary shop i ∈ {1, 2} to trade m(t)
units of money with 1−2κ unit of good i−12 +
1
4 . From the
1
2 units of good produced at each
shop, κ units are consumed by the shopkeepers, satisfying the participation constraint of the
shopkeeper (2.5), and the remaining will be consumed by the visiting shoppers. Feasibility
constraints (2.2)-(2.3) hold and shopkeepers do not accumulate money. Since x ≥ 12 , the
condition κ < 2(1 − x)2(1 − ε) implies 1 − 2κ > ε. Finally, if households are patient
enough (i.e. such that 1− 2κ > εβ ), the household participation constraint (2.6) holds.
Case 3: 23 ≤ x. This case is similar to the previous one, except that two barter














can also cover the whole type space. Hence
if κ < 2(1− x)2(1− ε) and households are sufficiently patient, the solution is not unique;
the planner can choose to open two barter shops or two monetary shops to cover the type
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space. If households are not patient enough, then the unique solution involves opening two
barter shops.







, the size of the overlap area among the exchange neighborhoods
of two barter shops is greater than or equal to (3x− 1)2.









as before we have ν1 ≤ ν̂1, ν2 ≤ ν̂2 and we also assume ν1 ≤ ν2 and |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1 ≤
|ν̂1 − ν1|mod1, without loss of generality. Changing the coordinates of the type space using
(mod1) arithmetic, without loss of generality, we can assume ν̂2 = 1 − ν2 and ν2 ≥
1
4 , so that |ν̂
2 − ν2|mod1 = 1 − 2ν2.30 Notice that despite the coordinates change and







1− ν̂1, 1− ν1
)
will not affect the size of the overlap area.
For the two barter shops the exchange neighborhoods generate 4 squares. Denote
















respectively by S1, S1′ , S2 and S2′ . These squares can have 6 areas of overlap among them.
The size of the overlap area is given by:
max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1)2 + max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1)2
+2max(0, x− |ν2 − ν1|mod1) max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν̂1|mod1)
+2max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν1|mod1) max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν2|mod1). (2.20)
If x − |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1 ≥ (3x − 1) or x − |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1 ≥ (3x − 1), we are done.
Hence in the remaining cases we have
1− 2x < ν̂1 − ν1 < 2x (2.21)
1
2
− x < ν2 < x (2.22)
30This can be done by adding or subtracting 1
2
 
1− ν̂2 − ν2

to all coordinates in (mod1).
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where the second set of inequalities follows from ν̂2 = 1− ν2.
If S1 does not overlap with S2′ , then ν1 + ν2 ≥ x. 31 Hence
(
x− ν̂2 + ν̂1
)
=(
x− (1− ν2) + ν̂1
)
≥ 2x − 1 + ν̂1 − ν1 > 0, where the third inequality follows from
(2.21). Moreover, (2.22) implies
(
x− ν2 + ν1
)
> 0, thereby implying S1 and S2 overlap.
The size of the overlap area (2.20) in this case is given by:
max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1)2 + max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1)2
+2
(
x− 1 + ν2 + ν̂1
) (
x− ν2 + ν1
)
for ν̂2 = 1− ν2. From ν1 + ν2 ≥ x it follows that
(3x− 1) ≤ (x− (ν̂1 − ν1)) +
(
x− (1− ν2) + ν̂1
)
≤ max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1) +
(
x− (1− ν2) + ν̂1
)
and
(3x− 1) ≤ (x− ((1− ν2)− ν2)) +
(
x− ν2 + ν1
)
≤ max(0, x− |(1− ν2)− ν2|mod1) +
(






x− 1 + ν2 + ν̂1
) (
x− ν2 + ν1
)
≥ max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1)2 + max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1)2
+2((3x− 1)−max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1))
31If S1 does not overlap with S2′ , alternatively, we might have ν1 + ν2 < x and instead ν̂1 > ν2 + x
would guarantee the separation of S1 and S2′ . But these two conditions together imply ν̂2 − ν2 = 1− 2ν2 >
1− ν̂1 + ν1, which contradicts |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1 ≤ |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1.
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×((3x− 1)−max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1)) ≥ (3x− 1)2.
If S1 does not overlap with S2, since ν2 − ν1 < x from (2.22), we have ν̂2 − ν̂1 =
1−ν2− ν̂1 ≥ x. 32 Hence we have 1−ν2− ν̂1 > ν2−ν1and therefore 1−2ν2 > ν̂1−ν1,
which contradicts |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1 ≤ |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1.
The only remaining case is when S1 overlaps with both S2 and S2′ . In this case the
size of the overlap area (2.20) is given by:
max(0, x− |ν̂1 − ν1|mod1)2 + max(0, x− |ν̂2 − ν2|mod1)2
+2
(
x− ν̂2 + ν̂1
) (




x− (1 + ν1) + ν̂2
) (
x− ν̂1 + ν2
)
(2.23)
Since x− ν̂1 +ν2 > x−ν2 +ν1 follows from 1−2ν2 > 1− ν̂1 +ν1 ≥ 1− ν̂1−ν1,
as long as ν̂2 − ν2 > x the overlap area (2.23) can be reduced by decreasing ν̂2. Therefore
in order to prove the size of the overlap area is at least (3x − 1)2, it is sufficient to show it
when ν̂2 − ν2 ≤ x or equivalently 1− 2ν2 ≤ x. Similarly it is sufficient to show (2.23) is
greater than or equal to (3x− 1)2, for ν̂1 − ν1 ≤ x. Given 1− 2ν2 ≤ x and ν̂1 − ν1 ≤ x,
the size of the overlap area (2.23) can be written as:
(x− (ν̂1 − ν1))2 + (x− (1− 2ν2))2
+2
(
x− 1 + ν2 + ν̂1
) (




x− ν1 − ν2
) (
x− ν̂1 + ν2
)
. (2.24)
32Notice that since ν2 < x, we cannot have ν̂1 − ν̂2 ≥ x.
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Now the following four equalities and two inequalities
(x− (ν̂1 − ν1)) +
(




x− ν1 − ν2
)
= (3x− 1), (2.25)
(x− (1− 2ν2)) +
(




x− ν1 − ν2
)
= (3x− 1), (2.26)(




x− ν2 + ν1
)
− (x− (ν̂1 − ν1)) = x > (3x− 1), (2.27)(




x− 1 + ν2 + ν̂1
)
− (x− (1− 2ν2)) = x > (3x− 1), (2.28)
guarantee that (2.24) is greater than or equal to (3x−1)2. That is by substituting (x−(ν̂1−
ν1)) from (2.25), and
(
x− ν2 + ν1
)
from (2.26) into (2.24) and rearranging it, the size of




x− ν1 − ν2
)]2 +[
(x− 1 + ν2 + ν̂1)− (x− (1− 2ν2))
]2 +
2(x− ν1 − ν2)(x− ν̂1 + ν2)




x− ν1 − ν2
)]2 + [(3x− 1)− (x− ν̂1 + ν2)]2
+2
(
x− ν1 − ν2
) (





A Dynamic Duopoly with
Endogenous Horizontal and Vertical
Differentiation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is a study of a dynamic duopoly in which firms may be differentiated in two di-
mensions: vertical and horizontal. This differentiation is endogenous, in the sense that firms
may invest in improving their quality and in adjusting their location over time. Differences
between firms’ qualities determine vertical differentiation, differences between locations
determined horizontal differentiation. We set up an infinite-horizon dynamic model which
allows firms to choose investment in both dimensions. After solving for the Markov-perfect
equilibrium investment choices we study the effects of various parameter changes on equi-
librium outcomes.
Examples of this type of competition may be found in various industries. Man-
ufacturers of personal computers, for example, may differentiate their products from the
competition in two ways. First, they invest in improving quality, represented by speed,
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memory, etc. Second, on occasions a manufacturer may change the architecture of a com-
puter’s processor, either by moving it closer to the architecture of its rival, in order to steal
the rival’s business, or by moving it further away in order to develop local market power.
These differentiation choices are of course interdependent – shifts in relative qualities in-
duce changes in architecture, and vice versa. The aim of this paper is to examine the
fundamental factors underlying these dynamic linkages between quality and architecture.1
In the computer industry major shifts in processor architecture are relatively infre-
quent. Similarly in industries such as retailing it could be expensive for a chain to change
the locations of all its stores. However in other industries and other dimensions firms’ repo-
sitioning of their products could be more frequent. For example a retail clothing chain can
adjust its location in the space of consumer tastes by re-stocking with different fashions.
At the same time it can invest in quality upgrades, not just in the clothing sold, but also in
terms of staffing, store amenities, training, and so on. Or consider radio stations choosing
formats for their broadcasting content. The different options – talk, country music, hip-hop,
etc. – represent horizontal differentiation; switches in these formats are not uncommon in
radio markets. Simultaneously a station may consider upgrading aspects of its overall qual-
ity such as local news and traffic, websites, broadcast technology, etc. In turn the station’s
(or clothing store’s) choices in these dimensions will induce responses from its rivals. Over
time the pattern of changes in product positioning and quality among competing firms will
play out in complicated ways that may not be obvious at first glance.
A particular question of interest here concerns the relationship between competi-
tion and the amount of innovation in an industry. Research on the determinants and conse-
quences of innovation has a long heritage in economics, extending back at least to the work
of Schumpeter, and encompassing for example the study of patent races (e.g., Reinganum
1In 2005 Apple Computer announced the migration of its Macintosh product line from PowerPC proces-
sors to the Intel x86 architecture that is the standard platform for Microsoft Windows. With this change
Macintosh users will for the first time be able to boot Windows directly on their machines (rather than
in slower emulation mode), and hence will have much better access to Windows-compatible software.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple Intel Transition , accessed 4 April 2006.) See Bresnahan and Greenstein
(1999) for more on the relationship between quality and horizontal differentiation in the computer industry.
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(1982)) and innovation and growth (Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt
(1992)).2 In recent work Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) and Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) have focused on the role of innovation in oligopoly,
taking up a question previously addressed in the literature on patent races, and in, e.g.,
Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993).3 Aghion et al. (2001), for example, embed a dynamic
‘quality-ladder’ model of innovation into a duopoly in which the competitiveness of the
industry is parameterized by the elasticity of substitution between the two firms’ products.4
Their results suggest an ‘inverse-U shaped’ relationship between competition and innova-
tion. Starting from a situation of dual monopolies (i.e., a high degree of market power for
each firm), as the elasticity of substitution increases the average amount of steady-state in-
novation (i.e., investment in quality) initially rises, as firms respond to the new competition
by attempting to get ahead in the quality race. Eventually however this increase in intensity
of investment creates a countervailing effect: the industry spends more and more time in
states of asymmetric qualities (where aggregate innovative activity is relatively low) than in
states of neck-and-neck competition (where innovative activity is intense). As a result if the
degree of competition increases far enough then the long-run average innovation rate may
start to fall.
This picture of an ‘inverse-U’ relationship is borne out by a variant of this duopolis-
tic quality-ladder model employed in Aghion et al. (2005), and supported there by empirical
evidence on patent activity in the United Kingdom. In the present paper we take the view
that oligopolistic competition has horizontal as well as vertical dimensions and that it is
worth studying innovation in a context which makes firms’ locations in both these dimen-
sions explicit. That is, the degree of competition in an industry is itself an endogenous
variable, reflecting particular features of the environment such as costs of entry, costs of
differentiation, and the heterogeneity in consumer tastes. It would be desirable to study
2See also Scotchmer (2004), Jaffe and Lerner (2004), etc.
3See also Doraszelski (2003).
4Here we interpret their model as one of quality improvement, although in their framework firms actually
invest in cost reduction. There should be a one-to-one mapping of results from one interpretation to the other.
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innovation in a model of oligopoly which allowed for all these features and for a variable
number of firms with dynamic entry and exit. For tractability we deal here with the simpler
duopoly case, leaving a more general model for future work.
To address the dynamic links between innovation and the two dimensions of differ-
entiation we set up a discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic Hotelling model in which firms
may invest in each period both in changing architecture (location) and in improving quality.
Investment outcomes are stochastic, there is no entry or exit, and for simplicity firms may
only locate at the endpoints of the Hotelling line. Competition in quality upgrades takes the
form of a quality ladder in which firms’ innovative successes produce limited spillovers for
their rivals. These spillovers ensure that the ‘quality lag’ suffered by any such rival remains
bounded over time – this gives any laggard a reason to stay in the market. We seek symmet-
ric Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE’s) in pure strategies for the game in which firms selling
a perishable good compete in prices in each period, taking as given their current configura-
tion of qualities and locations. The general model is too complicated to solve for the MPE’s
analytically. Hence we start by solving a simpler version of the model with deterministic
investment outcomes and fixed quality differences. Solving for the MPE of this simpler
model is a non-trivial task, one that is of interest in its own right as a natural extension of
the Hotelling model. As far as we are aware the analytical solution of this model appears
for the first time here.
The simplified deterministic model provides valuable insights when it comes to
analyzing the full model with stochastic outcomes and multidimensional investment. For
simplicity we work with a model that has just three quality states: a firm can have higher,
equal, or lower quality relative to its rival. After demonstrating existence we use the nu-
merical algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) to find and
analyze the set of MPE’s for this full model. Multiple equilibria are present – we draw on
our earlier analytic results to characterize the region of the parameter space in which they
occur, and argue for uniqueness in other regions. Within this region of uniqueness we ex-
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amine the effects on innovation of changes in two parameters that help determine industry
‘competitiveness’: ‘transport costs’ (i.e., the degree of heterogeneity in consumer tastes)
and a ‘switching cost’, which measures a firm’s cost of moving locations from one end of
the Hotelling line to the other.
As a benchmark case we initially consider situations where the costs of differentia-
tion are so high that firms in equilibrium do not switch locations at all – they just invest in
improving quality. Since this case is a discrete-time analogue to the type of quality-ladder
dynamic duopoly studied in Aghion et al. (2001, 2005) and Budd et al. (1993), an initial
contribution of the paper is thus to study how changing the time frame for firms’ invest-
ment decisions affects the innovation-competition relationship. We introduce changes in
the degree of market power by allowing consumers’ transport costs to vary. In contrast
with the pattern suggested by Aghion et al. (2001, 2005), we find that with discrete time
the innovation-competition relationship can be U-shaped rather than inverse-U shaped. The
explanation for the difference rests in part on the response of quality leaders to lower trans-
port costs. With discrete time this response may be positive, whereas in the continuous-time
version of the model it would be zero. A positive investment response from quality leaders
helps offset any tendency for an industry to spend more time in asymmetric-quality states
as the degree of competition increases.
We next move to cases where switching costs are low enough to encourage firms to
engage in some shifting of locations. In such cases a quality laggard may seek to increase
horizontal differentiation by ‘running away from’ the leader, while the leader may or may
not seek to ‘give chase’, depending on the size of its quality advantage. For some parameter
values there will be an absorbing location state (or states), where the firms in the long run
end up permanently co-located or permanently separated, while for other parameter values
there will be no absorbing location state and the equilibrium will see continual shifting
between locations in the long run. All else equal, the latter type of outcome is likely to
be observed when consumers’ taste heterogeneity (transport costs) is at intermediate levels.
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For if preferences are very heterogeneous, then firms prefer to exploit their potential market
power by choosing separate locations. If there is low taste heterogeneity then a quality
laggard has little incentive for horizontal differentiation, and in the long run the firms end
up co-located (i.e., selling the same product).
With respect to the industry’s long-run innovation rate, we again find that the prob-
ability of an advance in the technological frontier is not necessarily inverse-U shaped in
consumer transport costs. In fact this relationship may be quasi-convex rather than quasi-
concave. The intuition is fairly straightforward. With fixed locations average quality in-
vestment is higher when firms are co-located than when they are separated. When transport
costs are high firms are permanently separated in the long run; when transport costs are low
the firms are permanently co-located. Hence as transport costs fall from high to low (i.e.,
as the industry becomes ‘more competitive’) average quality investment must eventually
rise from the low level associated with permanent separation to the high level associated
with permanent co-location. Furthermore in the permanent-separation region average in-
dustry investment may initially decrease as transport costs fall – an overall U-shape for the
innovation relationship would then result.
A different pattern emerges w.r.t. the effect of changes in the switching cost. The
key here is the industry’s initial long-run equilibrium position for high levels of switch-
ing cost. This could be permanent co-location or permanent separation, depending on the
relative size of the profits accruing to the leader of the quality race. With fixed locations
the long-run average rate of innovation is again lower under permanent separation than un-
der permanent co-location. As switching costs fall, the industry moves into situations of
continual location switching. Starting from, for example, an initial position of permanent
separation, this means that the industry starts to visit the ‘other’ state of co-location more
often, and overall average investment therefore rises. The opposite is true if the initial po-
sition is one of permanent co-location. Thus lower switching costs could cause innovation
to either rise or fall overall, depending on taste heterogeneity and on the profits accruing
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to the leader in the quality race. All else equal, when these profits are relatively high the
industry will initially be in a state of permanent co-location, and low switching costs would
then cause average quality investment to fall.
Our discrete-time framework is a contrast with the continuous-time approach used
in, e.g., Aghion et al. (2001, 2005) and Budd (1993). A continuous-time model may be
simpler to analyze in some respects. Certain cases of such models imply asynchronous in-
vestment by quality laggards and leaders. That is, in states of asymmetric quality only one
firm (the laggard) invests at any given instant in equilibrium. This property considerably
simplifies the equilibrium analysis. However in practice there are no doubt many indus-
tries where firms continue to invest in innovation, even when leading the quality race. In
part this may reflect firms’ uncertainty about the status of rivals’ R&D efforts, or standard
cycles for the introduction of new products (e.g., annual industry conventions). Both such
explanations call for a model where firms operate under conditions of discrete time.
The structure of our model is closely related to that used in Langohr (2003). How-
ever the questions of interest are quite different. Langohr also applies the computational
methodology of Pakes and McGuire (1994) to analyze a dynamic duopoly. In her model
each firm may in any period sell a high-end product, a low-end product, or both. Each firm
may also in each period invest in a single-dimensional quantity called ‘capability’, increases
in which raise average consumer tastes for its product range. To guarantee smoothness there
is also a firm- and product-specific logit error in consumer tastes for the available goods.
Langohr’s aim is to find conditions under which the firms’ product ranges exhibit
‘convergence’, in the sense of similar product ranges, i.e., both firms offer both types of
good, rather than respectively specializing into high- and low-end products. Hence her fo-
cus is rather different to ours, which is on the interaction between the dynamics of horizontal
and vertical differentiation for single-product firms. In Langohr’s model there is no explicit
measure of horizontal differentiation, so it would not be possible to infer from her results
any of our conclusions about firms’ strategic shifts in architecture, and their interactions
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with quality investment.
The next section analyzes the model with a fixed quality differential and determin-
istic location transitions. Section 3.3 introduces the stochastic model. The computation of
equilibria in this stochastic model is discussed in section 3.4, and its equilibrium value func-
tions are examined in section 3.5. In section 3.6 we consider innovation in the stochastic
model with fixed locations, and then move on to consider innovation in the full model with
both vertical and horizontal differentiation in section 3.7. Section ?? contains concluding
remarks and suggestions for extensions.
Our analysis currently focuses on the impacts of parameter changes on the innova-
tion rate, or on the industry’s average investment in quality improvement. Implicit in this
focus is the assumption that our duopoly model could be embedded in a growth model (as
in, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991)), in which case there
would be a monotonic mapping from innovation rates to growth rates. Note that our in-
troduction of horizontal differentiation would add an extra dimension to a full analysis of
welfare effects in this model, a task which we leave for future work.
3.2 A deterministic model
Consider a standard Hotelling duopoly where the two firms 1 and 2 may locate at either end
(possibly the same end) of the unit line. Let ai ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, denote a firm’s location,
or product architecture. Consumers are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and have
unit demands and quadratic transport costs with parameter α. Each firm i produces a single
non-durable good at constant marginal cost of ci. For simplicity let ci = 0.
The firms’ goods each have an idiosyncratic quality qi. A consumer located at
τ ∈ [0, 1] who purchases a good of quality q at price p from a firm located at a ∈ {0, 1}
realizes net utility of:
u = − α(a− τ)2 + q − p .
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Consumers are fully informed about prices and qualities in the current period and purchase
from the firm offering the highest net utility. We will assume throughout that qi > 3α for
both firms i = 1, 2. This ensures that the market is always covered in equilibrium.5
Denote the difference between the qualities of the firms as δ ≡ q2−q1. Consider the
Nash equilibrium of the one-shot simultaneous price-setting game in which firms’ locations
and product qualities are treated as exogenous. Let πi denote the equilibrium profits of firm
i = 1, 2. If the firms are located apart, with, e.g., a1 = 0, a2 = 1, we have:
a. if δ > 3α, π1 = 0, π2 = δ − α.













c. if δ < -3α, π1 = − δ − α, π2 = 0.
These are also the equilibrium payoffs when a1 = 1, a2 = 0. Cases (a) and (c) here
represent situations where one firm’s quality advantage is sufficient to allow it to sell to the
whole market in equilibrium.
When firms are located together (a1 = a2 = 0 or a1 = a2 = 1) we have the
Bertrand outcome for homogeneous goods. Then non-zero equilibrium profits are only
realized when a firm has a strict quality superiority over its rival:
a. if δ > 0, π1 = 0, π2 = δ.
b. if δ = 0, π1 = π2 = 0.
c. if δ < 0, π1 = − δ, π2 = 0.
A key observation here is that, whether firms’ locations are separate or coincident, equilib-
rium profits depend only on the difference in product qualities δ, not directly on the quality
5We assume that any consumer who is indifferent between purchasing from either firm randomizes 50-50
between the two.
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levels themselves. This observation holds because the market is by assumption covered in
equilibrium, and it allows us to adopt a ‘quality ladder’ approach in what follows. Fur-
thermore it can be seen that firm 2 (resp. firm 1) gets a higher payoff in the ‘co-located’
equilibrium than in the ‘separate’ equilibrium if and only if δ > 3α(2 −
√
3) ≈ 0.804α
(resp. δ < − 3α(2−
√
3)).
Note also that a firm which advances its quality differential from δ < 0 to δ = 0 in
states where s = 1 receives incremental profits of:
KL =





if |δ| ≤ 3α.
A firm which advances its quality differential from δ = 0 to δ > 0 receives incremental
profits of:
KH =





if |δ| ≤ 3α.
For all α and δ the incremental profits of the quality leader are decreasing in α, while those
of the quality laggard are increasing in α, i.e., dKH/dα < 0 and dKL/dα > 0. These
signs will help determine the effect on quality investment of changes in α in the full model
to be analyzed below. (If s = 0 then stage-game profits are independent of α.)
Turn then to dynamic extensions of this Hotelling game in which firms may invest
to switch locations and improve their future qualities. Time is discrete and the horizon
is infinite. To represent firm i’s location, quality, etc. in period t we write ai(t), qi(t),
t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Initial values are given by ai(0), qi(0). We initially define the state of the in-
dustry at the beginning of any period t to be a vector ω(t) = ((a1(t), a2(t)), (q1(t), q2(t)))
showing the current configuration of firms’ respective locations and quality levels. Let
πi(ω(t)) denote firm i’s stage-game payoffs when the state is ω(t).
We start with a model of deterministic transitions, in which firms’ qualities are
exogenously fixed throughout, and their investment decisions only affect their locations.
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Future profits are discounted at the rate β. The sequence of moves within each period is as
follows:
a. Firms observe the current state ω(t) and simultaneously decide whether or not to
‘switch’, i.e., to move to the other location.
b. The switching decisions are implemented and any costs of these decisions are in-
curred.
c. Conditional on their new locations firms play the Hotelling stage game and receive
their profits.
d. Play moves on to the next period, with state ω(t + 1) determined by the location
choices implemented in (b).
A firm incurs a fixed cost of T > 0 each time that it switches location.
We restrict attention to Markov-perfect equilibria, in which firms’ strategies depend
only on the current state of the industry, and in which the state only contains ‘payoff-
relevant’ information. A firm’s strategy comprises an investment decision, i.e., a state-
conditional choice of whether or not to switch locations. Firms’ quality levels may be
dropped from the state vector ω(t) since they are held fixed in the present model – let
their difference be δ(t) = δ for all t. Furthermore it will be apparent from the preceding
discussion of the stage game that, since the distribution of consumers along the real line
is symmetric, the difference between the location configurations (a1 = 0, a2 = 0) and
(a1 = 1, a2 = 1) is merely one of labelling: both yield the same stage-game payoffs.
The same is true of the configurations (a1 = 0, a2 = 1) and (a1 = 1, a2 = 0). In
keeping with the ‘payoff-relevant’ restriction on state variables in the MPE concept (Maskin
and Tirole (1988a,b)), we therefore ignore the distinction between these pairs of location
configurations. A state ω(t) is now redefined to be an element of the set S = {0, 1}, where
ω(t) = 0 represents ‘firms are together’ and ω(t) = 1 represents ‘firms are apart’.
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Firm i’s strategy is then a function hi : S → {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, where hi(ω) = 0
means ‘stay’ and hi(ω) = 1 means ‘switch’. We restrict attention to MPE’s in pure strate-
gies, ruling out randomizations between switching and not switching. Where convenient
we will use ω to denote the current state and ω′ to denote next-period states. Given a rival’s





− Thi(ω) + πi(ω′) + βVi(ω′)
)
, (3.1)
where, with ⊕ representing binary addition, ω′ ≡ ω ⊕ hi(ω) ⊕ hj(ω). An equilibrium
may be represented as a pair of value functions (V1(.), V2(.)) and a pair of policy functions
(h1(.), h2(.)) such that for i = 1, 2, Vi(.) solves (3.1) given hj(.), j 6= i, and such that
hi(ω) ∈ arg max
hi∈{0,1}
{ − Thi + πi(ω′) + βVi(ω′)} , (3.2)
for all ω, given hj(.), where ω′ ≡ ω ⊕ hi ⊕ hj(ω).
For any given parameter values it is possible to solve for a pure-strategy equilibrium
of this game analytically (if one exists). Suppose for example that δ ≥ 3α. Then firm 1
earns zero profits no matter what the state, and any MPE must have h1(0) = h1(1) = 0,
V1(0) = V1(1) = 0. Any other strategy would have firm 1 incurring some switching costs
without any benefit. Firm 2’s best response then depends on the parameters (δ, α, T, β): if
α < T (1−β) we have h2(0) = h2(1) = 0, V2(0) = δ/(1−β), and V2(1) = (δ−α)/(1−β)
in equilibrium, while if α > T (1− β) we have h2(0) = 0, h2(1) = 1, V2(0) = δ/(1− β),
and V2(1) = − T + (δ/(1− β)). The intuition for these best responses is straightforward:
given that firm 1 is not going anywhere, firm 2 finds it optimal to switch in the ‘apart’ state
(ω = 1) if and only if the NPV of the extra stage-game profit, α/(1 − β), exceeds the
one-off switching cost T . (Recall that with δ ≥ 3α firm 2 earns a stage-game profit of δ
when ω = 0 and profit of δ − α when ω = 1.)
Deriving the pure-strategy equilibria of this game for all possible parameter values
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is a laborious task. For brevity we therefore omit the details and summarize the results of
this effort in figure 1, which characterizes the type of equilibrium outcome according to the
location inR2+ of the point (δ/α, T/α). (Note that the figure restricts attention to δ ≥ 0: by
symmetry a mirror-image picture would apply in the case of δ < 0.) The figure divides this
space up into four areas. Three of these represent different types of ‘steady states’, while
the fourth represents the case of no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Take firstly the case of switching costs T that are high relative to α. Area I in
the figure indicates that if T exceeds α/(1 − β) then there will be no movement at all
in equilibrium, regardless of the difference in product qualities, i.e., h1(0) = h2(0) =
h1(1) = h2(1) = 0. Clearly the equilibrium steady-state location then just depends on
the industry’s initial state ω(0). The same type of outcome also obtains for moderately
high levels of switching cost, as long as the difference in product qualities is not too high.
When δ is larger and T is at these moderate levels we move into area III, where the only
equilibrium steady state is ω(t) = 0: the firms end up together. In this region, for given
values of T and α, the higher value of δ makes it worthwhile for firm 2 to switch locations
to join firm 1 when the state is ω = 1. As long as T/α is not too low, the low-quality
producer, firm 1, will not respond to this move by itself switching locations (i.e., it will not
‘run away’).
If δ ≥ 3α then firm 1 will in fact stay put no matter what the values of T and α,
since in those cases it earns zero profit in all states. But if δ < 3α then firm 1 can make
some profit in the apart states. Whether it finds it optimal to run away then depends on T
and α – it will set h1(0) = 1 if switching costs T are small enough, or if the consumer
transport cost α is high enough (which would give firm 1 more local monopoly power).
These cases are represented in the figure by areas II and IV.
In area IV there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Firm 1 always finds it optimal
to switch when ω = 0 and firm 2 is not switching. But for the parameter values in this area





in this region.) Furthermore since T is not too high firm 2 is willing to pay the cost of
‘following’ firm 1, i.e., if ω = 0 and firm 1 is switching then firm 2 also wants to switch, in
which case it would be better for firm 1 to stay put and we have a contradiction. Although
there is no pure-strategy MPE in this region there would be a mixed-strategy MPE where
both firms randomize between switching and not switching.
Finally in area II we have the case of low switching costs (or high α) and a low
quality differential. Except where it overlaps area III, the equilibrium steady-state outcome
in this area is always ω = 1: the firms stay apart. The reasoning is simple: for obvious
reasons the low-quality firm always prefers to be apart, and since δ is relatively low this is
also true of the high-quality producer. Furthermore since switching costs are relatively low
one or other of the firms will always be willing to shift away when ω = 0.
A twist in this case is that this steady-state outcome can be arrived at via multi-
ple equilibria. Two obvious such equilibria have: (i) (h1(0) = 0, h1(1) = 0, h2(0) =
1, h2(1) = 0), and (ii) (h1(0) = 1, h1(1) = 0, h2(0) = 0, h2(1) = 0). That is, an equi-
librium involves only one firm moving away, but either firm may be the mover. There are
also two other Pareto-dominated equilibria, in which firms needlessly swap places when
they are already apart; these have: (iii) (h1(0) = 0, h1(1) = 1, h2(0) = 1, h2(1) = 1), and
(h1(0) = 1, h1(1) = 1, h2(0) = 0, h2(1) = 1). In both cases firms could improve their
payoffs by agreeing to stay put when they are already apart, but given that my rival fails to
do this, it will be optimal for me to respond by also switching, in order to stay away from
him.6
Area II is the only region of multiple equilibria – outside this area the MPE is unique
if it exists. In the region where areas II and III overlap we have not just multiple equilibria,
but also multiple steady states (from a given initial state). In particular the equilibrium
steady state could be either ω = 0 or ω = 1. The latter arises with the strategies (h1(0) =
6Note that multiple equilibria of this type do not exist throughout area II. Close to the origin all four equi-
libria exist. But in part of the area marked IIa (in particular, the part where δ is highest), the unique equilibrium
has (h1(0) = 1, h1(1) = 0, h2(0) = 0, h2(1) = 0).
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1, h1(1) = 0, h2(0) = 0, h2(1) = 0): firm 1 moves away when the firms are together, and
(since δ is not high enough relative to T/α) firm 2 does not find it optimal to follow him.
The former arises with the strategies (h1(0) = 0, h1(1) = 0, h2(0) = 0, h2(1) = 1). Here
firm 1 no longer finds it optimal to move away because his time apart would only last one
period before his rival moved to join him. And since firm 1 is not moving when the firms
are together it is optimal for firm 2 to switch when they are apart. Note the potential role of
commitment in resolving the multiplicity of steady states here – if firm 1 could commit to
always switching in co-located states he could deter firm 2 from ever attempting to join him.
Similarly if firm 2 had the commitment power he could deter firm 1 from ever attempting
to move away.
We have dwelt in some detail on the equilibrium outcomes in this deterministic
model for two reasons. First, it is analytically tractable and we can therefore be certain of
which types of equilibria occur where. Second, the intuition behind this case carries over to
the model with stochastic transitions, where we will see a similar pattern of equilibrium out-
comes to that apparent from figure 1. For reasons of tractability that model must be solved
numerically, however the intuitions drawn from figure 1 will help reinforce our confidence
in the thoroughness of our computational approach.
3.3 A stochastic model
We now allow firms to invest not just in changes in their architecture, but also in quality
improvements. Firms’ potential locations are still restricted to the endpoints of [0, 1]. Their
quality improvements will be subject to a form of interdependence that reflects the possi-
bility of spillovers arising from firms’ investment successes. Moreover we will allow the
results of investment (in either architecture changes or quality improvements) to have sto-
chastic outcomes. Since these complications render the model analytically intractable we
turn to the computational algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (1994) in order to solve for the
MPE.
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As previously let s(t) ∈ S = {0, 1} denote the industry’s differentiation state at
the start of period t. Once again we abstract away from the payoff-irrelevant labels of the
two possible locations, and just focus on whether firms are together (s(t) = 0) or apart
(s(t) = 1). Let ∆ be a finite subset of the real line representing the set of possible quality
differences δ(t) ≡ q2(t) − q1(t). For simplicity we will henceforth restrict ∆ to just three
elements: ∆ ≡ {−k, 0,+k} for some k > 0. The value k represents the size of a single step
in the transitions of the quality differential δ. At the beginning of any period t the industry’s
quality differential can be in any one of three states: firm 1 is one step ahead (δ(t) = −k),
the firms are of equal quality (δ(t) = 0), or firm 2 is one step ahead (δ(t) = k). By varying
k we can vary the value of success in the firms’ quality-investment competition.
Let the vector ω(t) ≡ (s(t), δ(t)) ⊂ S × ∆ denote the state of the industry at the
beginning of period t. Firms’ absolute quality levels qi(t) are omitted from this vector,
since only the difference in qualities matters for the stage-game payoffs. We simply assume
that each firm’s quality starts at qi(0) > 3α: since there is no depreciation of quality the
market will then be covered in any equilibrium of the Hotelling stage game.
Within each period the sequence of moves is as follows:
a. at the beginning of period t firms observe the current state ω(t) and simultaneously
choose levels of investment in architecture shifts and quality improvement.
b. stage-game payoffs are realized given the current state.
c. the investment plans chosen in (a) are implemented, their outcomes are realized, and
the costs of the plans are incurred.
d. play moves on to the next period, with the new state ω(t + 1) determined by the
realizations of the investment plans implemented in (c).
Note that the order of moves here is slightly different to that in the deterministic model of the
previous section. Previously investment plans (changes in architecture) were implemented
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prior to the stage-game play in each period. Here they are implemented after the stage
game.
State transitions in this model will be stochastic, because the outcome of each firm’s
investment activity is subject to some uncertainty. Consider first investment in architecture
changes (i.e., location changes), which we will sometimes term ‘switching’ investment for






the investment is successful, where γ is a cost parameter. Success in switching investment
means that the firm changes its location from ai(t) = 0 to ai(t+1) = 1, or vice versa. As γ
increases the dollar cost hi(t) of implementing any given probability of switching success
also increases. The function A(.) is strictly concave. Of course a firm that does not wish to
change locations can ensure this outcome by setting hi(t) = 0.
Whether switching success translates into a change in the industry’s differentiation
state s(t) depends on the outcome of the other firm’s switching investment. If both succeed
in switching then there is no change in s; if one switches and the other does not then s
changes from 0 to 1, or vice versa. Since all investments are chosen simultaneously each
firm thus chooses its own hi(t) taking as given the switching probability A(hj(t)) implied
by the rival’s investment. We assume that the stochastic outcomes of each firm’s switching
investments are independent. Where the differentiation state is represented s for this period
and s′ for next period, we thus have:
• s′ = s with probability θ(h1,h2)(s, s′) ≡ (1−A(h1))(1−A(h2)) +A(h1)A(h2).
• s′ = 1−s with probability θ(h1,h2)(s, s′) ≡ A(h1)(1−A(h2))+(1−A(h1))A(h2).
With respect to investment in quality improvements we allow firms to condition
their respective investment levels on the outcome of their switching efforts. That is, we
imagine that each firm simultaneously develops two plans for quality investment – one to
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be implemented in the event that the firm switches locations, and one to be implemented if
the firm does not switch. Represent the dollar values of these two conditional investment
levels as vsi (t) and v
f
i (t), respectively. The firm need only incur one of these investment
costs, depending on whether or not its switching investment is successful.7 Note also that
these investments may only be conditioned on the own-firm’s switching success. Since
the outcome of the rival’s switching efforts is not observed until after all investment plans
have been determined, quality investments may not be conditioned on any current-period
(deterministic or stochastic) choice of the rival. This automatically precludes conditioning
quality investment on this period’s realized change in the differentiation state, i.e., on s(t+
1).
We make the stochastic outcomes of firms’ quality investments interdependent by
placing an upper bound on the absolute value |δ| of the inter-firm quality differential. Think-
ing of a firm’s quality improvement as occurring in discrete steps of k units per step, we
restrict the quality differential to never exceed one step: thus |δ| = 0 or k. It is assumed that
a firm whose quality advantage has reached the upper bound k cannot realize any further
quality improvements without automatically conferring the same increment on the quality
of its rival. Our motivation for this restriction is that the low-quality firm can reverse engi-
neer the products of the high-quality firm, and thus avoid falling too far behind. However
there are limits to the speed and usefulness of this reverse engineering, and therefore quality
differences do not evaporate instantaneously and may persist over time.
When a firm has achieved a quality advantage of δ = k it may nevertheless con-
tinue to invest in quality improvements, not to extend its advantage, but to prevent its lower-
quality rival from catching up.8 Formally, let q̃i(t) be a random variable representing po-
7Thus for example a firm might establish two separate teams of quality planners, each of which prepares
the contracts (with suppliers etc.) that will be needed in the event of a particular switching outcome. The firm
only actually incurs the costs of quality investment when it sees its switching outcome, after which it signs the
contracts produced by one of the teams of planners.
8This is an important difference with continuous-time models. If successful quality improvement depends
only on current investment outlays (and not on an accumulated stock of ‘know-how’) then in a continuous-time
model a firm which has achieved the maximum permissible quality advantage will not invest anything further
until the laggard starts to catch up.
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tential increments in firm i’s quality at time t arising from its own investment efforts. For a
firm that has invested an amount vi(t) ≥ 0 in quality improvement this increment is equal





and is equal to zero otherwise. Here φ parameterizes the cost of implementing any given
probability of success in quality improvement. We assume that, conditional on firms’ actual
quality investments vi(t) and vj(t), the random variables q̃i(t) and q̃j(t) are independent
(and also i.i.d. over time).
If a firm i is not a quality laggard, i.e., if qi(t) ≥ qj(t), then its realized quality
increment in period t conditional on vi(t) will be qi(t + 1) − qi(t) = q̃i(t). However
if the firm is a low-quality producer, qi(t) < qj(t), then its quality can be improved not
just by its own efforts but, alternatively, by spillovers from the innovations of its rival.
That is, qi(t + 1) − qi(t) = q̃i(t) + 1(q̃i(t) = 0)[q̃j(t)], i 6= j, where 1 represents the
indicator function. Note that this specification allows the laggard i to benefit from positive
realizations of either q̃i or q̃j , but not both.
This specification of the evolution of firms’ quality levels results in the following
transition probabilities for the state variable δ(t). Let θ(v1,v2)(δ, δ
′) denote the probability
of transition from δ to δ′, given quality investments v1 and v2. We then have
θ(v1,v2)(k, k) = 1−Q(v1)(1−Q(v2))
θ(v1,v2)(k, 0) = Q(v1)(1−Q(v2)) ,
and
θ(v1,v2)(0, k) = Q(v2)(1−Q(v1))
θ(v1,v2)(0,−k) = Q(v1)(1−Q(v2))
θ(v1,v2)(0, 0) = 1− θ(v1,v2)(0, k)− θ(v1,v2)(0,−k) ,
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and
θ(v1,v2)(−k, 0) = Q(v2)(1−Q(v1))
θ(v1,v2)(−k,−k) = 1−Q(v2)(1−Q(v1)) ,
and θ(v1,v2)(k,−k) = θ(v1,v2)(−k, k) = 0, because firms cannot improve their quality by
more than one step per period.
A firm’s strategy is now a vector ui(ω) ≡ (hi(ω), vfi (ω), vsi (ω)) of (non-negative)
real-valued functions of the payoff-relevant state ω(t) ≡ (s(t), δ(t)). Firm i’s best re-









πi(ω)− hi −A(hi)vsi − (1−A(hi))v
f
i + βEω′ [Vi(ω




Using the transition probabilities developed above the expectation on the RHS of (3.5) can
be written as:
Eω′ [Vi(ω′) | ω, ui, uj ] =∑
δ′∈{−k,0,+k}
{
Vi(1− s, δ′)[A(h1)(1−A(h2))θ(vs1,vf2 )(δ, δ
′) + (1−A(h1))A(h2)θ(vf1 ,vs2)(δ, δ
′)]
+Vi(s, δ′)[A(h1)A(h2)θ(vs1,vs2)(δ, δ




where ω = (s, δ).
We seek an MPE in symmetric pure strategies. That is, we are looking for a pair
of policy functions (u1(ω), u2(ω)) and a pair of value functions (V1(ω), V2(ω)) such that,
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j: (i) Vi(ω) solves (3.5) given uj(ω), (ii) given Vi(ω) and uj(ω), the
function ui(ω) solves the RHS of (3.5) for all ω, and (iii) for all ω = (s, δ), u2(s, δ) =
u1(s,−δ). This latter condition is the symmetry requirement: firm 2’s chosen action when
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the differentiation state is s and his quality advantage is δ = q2 − q1, should be the same as
firm 1’s chosen action given s and the same quality advantage −δ = q1 − q2.
Existence of MPE’s in dynamic oligopoly models is extensively discussed in Do-
raszelski and Satterthwaite (2005). These authors exploit the arguments of Whitt (1980) to
show the existence of an equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies in the framework intro-
duced by Ericson and Pakes (1995). Their existence proof has two key steps. First, it is
necessary to show that the fixed point V ∗i that solves the Bellman equation (3.5) is continu-
ous in the rival’s strategy uj . Second, for any given rival’s strategy uj , firm i’s best response
u∗i needs to satisfy a unique investment choice (UIC) criterion, i.e., it needs to be single val-
ued. Without policy functions satisfying UIC we cannot be sure that the equilibrium will
be in pure strategies, and hence that it will be computationally tractable.
For completeness we include below an abbreviated version of the Whitt-Doraszelski-
Satterthwaite existence argument that is tailored to our simple framework. In this proof the
first step mentioned above is handled by showing that the contraction operating on Vi in
(3.5) preserves continuity in uj . To see the second step – that any policy function generated
by V ∗i satisfies UIC – take for example the case where the current state ω = (s, δ) has s = 0
and δ = 0. Define dVi(s, δ) ≡ Vi(s, δ) − Vi(s, δ − k) for δ = 0 or +k, and for brevity let




i ), for i = 1, 2. It can then be seen that for i = 2 the









′, δ′) | s = 0, δ = 0, a′2 6= a2, q̃2 = k, u1]
}
+R , (3.7)
where R represents terms that are all linear in A2, with coefficients on A2 that depend





first expectation in (3.7), for example, represents firm 2’s expected gain from an investment
success (q̃2 = k) next period given that ω = (0, 0), that firm 2 does not switch locations, and




2 ) represents firm
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2’s probability of success in raising its own quality, given that it does not switch locations.)
This expectation is taken over the rival’s stochastic switching and quality outcomes (a′1, q̃
′
1).
Similarly the second expectation in (3.7) represents the expected next-period gain from a
quality improvement conditional on firm 2 changing its location.
While (3.7) (when multiplied by the discount factor) shows the unconditional ex-
pected benefits from raising the probabilities of quality improvement, the unconditional
expected costs of this effort will be E[v2 | u2] ≡ A2vs2 + (1 − A2)v
f
2 (see (3.5)). Since
the quality investments can be conditioned on the firm’s switching outcome, their optimal
levels vs∗2 and v
f∗
2 will in fact be independent ofA2, the firm’s chosen switching probability,
given a value function V ∗2 that solves (3.5). Instead they will depend only on the current
state, the rival’s strategy, and the exogenous factors. Furthermore by the strict concavity of























xf2(ω, u1, V2) = Ea′1,q̃′1 [dV2(s
′, δ′) | ω, a′2 = a2, q̃2 = k, u1]
and
xs2(ω, u1, V2) = Ea′1,q̃′1 [dV2(s
′, δ′) | ω, a′2 6= a2, q̃2 = k, u1] .
A caveat here is that vs∗2 , the quality investment conditional on switching, need not be
unique if A2 = 0. For then there is no positive probability of firm 2 switching and so any
level of vs2 could be optimal. We will impose uniqueness in this case by assuming that
the optimal vs2 is still equal to the level that would be optimal if A2 were to be strictly
positive. Following Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2005) we justify this assumption by
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imagining that there may be some small probability that players make errors in their choices
of switching investment.
Given the optimal quality investments vf∗2 and v
s∗
2 we can derive the implied opti-
mized success probabilities Qf∗2 and Q
s∗
2 and substitute these into (3.7). Substituting the




























The maximand here is linear inA(h2), with a coefficient onA(h2) that represents the firm’s
expected net benefit from changing locations, and which may be either positive or negative.
If it is positive then the optimal switching investment h∗2 is unique by the strict concavity
of A(.). If it is negative then the optimal switching investment h∗2 is zero. It follows that at




i ) generated for firm 2 from V
∗
2 is unique.
We can repeat essentially the same arguments at any other state to show that the policy
function generated by V ∗2 must satisfy the UIC criterion. Clearly the symmetry in the two
firm’s problems implies that the same can be said about firm 1.
Given that any solution to (3.5) must generate a single-valued policy function, we
can proceed to our existence result.
Proposition 1 (Whitt (1980), Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2005)) An MPE in symmetric
pure strategies exists for all γ, φ and all k, β > 0.
As will be seen below, in our model uniqueness of equilibrium need not hold at all
parameter values, although we will use our numerical results to argue that it holds at some
parameter values.
It will be apparent from the preceding discussion that one of our motivations for
conditioning quality investment on the outcome of a firm’s switching investment is to en-




i = vi regardless of their switching outcome it would be considerably harder to
determine analytically whether the policy function for (3.5) is single valued. In partic-
ular this fixed amount would now depend on the switching probability A(h2) (since we
would have Qf2 = Q
s
2 in (3.7)). The maximand on the RHS of (3.5) will then in general
no longer be strictly quasiconcave in h2. Langohr (2003) encounters this problem and re-
sorts to numerical techniques (a grid search) in order to verify UIC. Since such numerical
tests represent a considerable computational complication the practical advantages of our
specification should be apparent.
An alternative approach would be an incomplete-information model in which a
firm’s chosen location in any period is a response to a privately observed draw from an
idiosyncratic distribution of location-specific fixed costs. This would be a variation on
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite’s (2005) incomplete-information specification of the Ericson
and Pakes (1995) model of dynamic oligopoly with endogenous entry and exit. To see
how such approaches could be applied here, suppose that at the beginning of each period
each firm i, i = 1, 2, privately observes the value of a random variable εli for each loca-
tion l = 0, 1. These errors, or ‘types’, represent the firm’s fixed costs of operating at l in
that period and are i.i.d. across firms, locations and periods. Strategies for each firm are
then simultaneous state- and type-conditional deterministic choices of location and quality
investment in each period. Since neither firm observes the other’s type the rival’s choice
of investment in any period becomes a random variable from the point of view of the own
firm.
Existence of equilibrium in this model can be demonstrated using the arguments
of Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, and the approach to computation of equilibrium would
be similar to that explained below. For present purposes we stick with our complete-
information approach since it provides somewhat clearer distinctions between the different
types of equilibria. In particular when the distribution of the errors in the incomplete-
information approach has infinite support each location will be chosen with strictly positive
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probability by each firm in every state in every period. As will be seen below this is not
true in our preferred approach, where zeroes often appear in firms’ equilibrium switching
probabilties. Insofar as they provide a clear indication of firms’ differentiation strategies,
such zero probabilities make the interpretation of equilibrium outcomes easier, and facilitate
comparisons with the deterministic model discussed in section 3.2.
3.4 Computation of equilibria
We rely on the algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (1994) to solve for the symmetric pure-
strategy MPE in our model numerically. Starting with initial guesses V 02 and u
0
2 for the
equilibrium value and policy functions for firm 2, at the k-th iteration of the algorithm we:
a. Convert uk2 into its symmetric analogue for firm 1, u
k
1 .
b. Plug V k2 and u
k





2) at each state ω.
c. Evaluate the maximand at the optimal investments to get V k+12 (ω) at each ω, set u
k+1
2
equal to the optimal investments, and return to (a).
Iteration is terminated when max(‖uk+12 − uk2‖, ‖V
k+1
2 − V k2 ‖) falls below some prespec-
ified tolerance, where ‖.‖ represents the sup norm over states ω.9
Given the small numbers of firms and states in our model the computational burden
of this algorithm is usually not excessive. When coded in Matlab 7 the algorithm typically
takes around 45 seconds to calculate an equilibrium to a tolerance of 10−9 on a PC with a
2.7GHz processor. If an MA(4) dampening procedure is used (see Judd (1998)) the algo-
rithm is fairly stable and does not often fail to converge. An exception is when switching
costs are extremely low and taste heterogeneity is high. In such cases the algorithm often
9Note that, as discussed in Pakes and McGuire, the algorithm does not completely solve firm 2’s Bellman
equation before updating the rival’s strategy. Instead iteration through the operator defined in (3.5) and updating
of the rival’s strategy proceed together.
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has difficulty converging and we were not always able to find an equilibrium. Our numer-
ical analysis therefore avoids this region of the parameter space, effectively assuming that
firms’ switching costs exceed some (very low) minimal level.
Figure 3.2 shows the various types of ergodic set that arise in equilibrium at dif-
ferent parameter values. In this figure the parameter determining the difficulty of quality
investment is fixed at φ = 0 and taste heterogeneity α is set at 1. Shown on the horizontal
axis are different values for k, the size of the step up when quality investment is successful.
The parameter γ determining the difficulty of switching investment is on the vertical axis.
Higher values of this parameter correspond to more costly switching investment.
Recall that in drawing figure 1 we were able to normalize the quantities on the hor-
izontal and vertical axes by α. That figure showed steady-state outcomes for different com-
binations of δ/α, the quality differential per unit of transport costs, and T/α, the switching
cost per unit of transport cost. Whether a similar normalization is possible in the present
more general framework is an open question. In other words we do not yet know whether
α has direct effects on equilibrium outcomes other than through its effects on simple in-
dices such as (for example) γ/ log(α) and k/α. Nevertheless, for ease of comparison with
figure 1, in figure 3.2 we ‘normalize’ k by α on the horizontal axis. Figure 3.3 shows an
equivalent picture with − log(α) on the vertical axes (and γ set to zero). Since the patterns
of equilibrium outcomes are identical between the two figures it would appear that some
type of normalization may be possible. The effects of ceteris paribus changes in α are still
a valid object of study, regardless of whether or not such a normalization is possible. All
else equal, when α rises the industry passes along a path such as that indicated by the curve
superimposed onto figure 3.3 (moving from the northeast to the southwest).
The ergodic sets arising from the equilibrium transition probabilities are classified
into four types according to the nature of the absorbing differentiation state (or states).
For example if hi(.) = 0 at all ω s.t. s = 0 then co-location of firms is an absorbing
differentiation state – once together, firms will never separate along the equilibrium path.
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium outcomes in the model with endogenous δ and stochastic transitions
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium outcomes in the model with endogenous δ and stochastic transitions
– effects of changes in α
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If in addition hi(.) = 0 at all ω s.t. s = 1 then there is no switching at all in equilibrium,
in which case separate locations is also an absorbing differentiation state. On the other
hand we take cases where hi(.) 6= 0 for some state ω̂ s.t. s = d, where d = 0 or 1, to
imply that d is not an absorbing differentiation state. Strictly speaking for this to be true
we should also require that in equilibrium there be a positive probability of reaching the
state ω̂ from any other state ω̃ where s = d and hi(.) = 0 (so that the industry doesn’t get
‘stuck’ at ω̃). In practice this extra condition is almost always satisfied over the parameter
ranges considered below, because at least one firm invests in quality improvement in each
state. We will explicitly point out any cases where the extra condition fails due to zeroes in
quality investment.10
Figure 3.2 shows a pattern of equilibrium types consistent with that of figure 1.
At the top of the figure is a region of no movement in equilibrium (area I – indicated by
bold dots). This arises because of the high value of γ in this region: switching locations
is expensive, so no-one ever moves. On the right-hand side of the figure, crosses (area
III) represent equilibria where co-location is the only absorbing differentiation state. Here
switching costs are moderate and k, the ‘prize’ in terms of quality differentials, is relatively
large. Moderate switching costs and a high k encourage a firm that is a quality leader to
move close to the laggard when s = 1. On the other hand when k is high the laggard has
less to gain from moving away – therefore he does not respond in kind by switching, and as
a result the firms will always end up together.
If switching costs fall to a low enough level then the industry moves from the co-
location outcome into area IV, represented by the squares, where there is no absorbing
differentiation state. That is, conditional on s = 0 or 1, along any equilibrium path there
is always a strictly positive probability of reaching the other differentiation state 1 − s.
For example when s = 1 the quality leader wants to switch so as to join the laggard and
10The condition may not be satisfied if quality investment is very costly, i.e., φ is high. Then we may find
both firms setting vfi = 0 and hi(.) = 0 in some state ω̃, in which case ω̃ is an absorbing state in itself. Such
values of φ generally fall outside the parameter ranges considered below.
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increase its stage-game payoffs. But if he succeeds in doing this, thereby changing the
differentiation state to s = 0, the laggard may then want to move away. The result (once
shifts in the quality differential are also factored in) is endless cycling through all possible
states. Finally when the quality differential k is low enough a quality leader will lose his
incentive to co-locate with his rival, since his stage-game payoffs are higher when they are
separate. Then both players want to differentiate, regardless of the state, and s = 1 is
the only absorbing differentiation state. In the figure such outcomes are represented by x
symbols – area II.
It will be apparent that for each of these four regions there is a corresponding re-
gion in figure 1 with a similar intuition. Furthermore in both figures we observe cases of
‘multiple steady states’, i.e., multiple types of equilibrium outcome for a given set of para-
meters. In figure 2 these are represented by the superposition of two of the aforementioned
symbols. For example when k = 2, γ = 0 there are two types of outcome – one in which
co-location is the only absorbing state and one in which separation is the only absorbing
state. Note the analogy with the overlap between areas II and III in figure 1. Moreover in
figure 2 we see new areas of overlap not observed in figure 1. When k = 2.2 and γ = 0.5,
for example, there is an equilibrium with no switching at all and an equilibrium where the
firms will always end up together. Similarly there is also an overlap between the area of ‘no
movement’ and the area ‘end up apart’.
By analogy with figure 1 we should also expect to observe some cases of multiple
equilibria of the same type, particularly in area II. In that region both firms want to locate
apart. There are two ways of achieving this: either the quality leader can move away, or the
laggard can move away. Both behaviors may be consistent with equilibrium (but not with
the same equilibrium). Such cases of multiple equilibria are in fact observed for parameters
in this area of figure 3.2 (although these multiples are not indicated on the figure for brevity).
The model of figure 3.2 also brings with it a new instance of multiple equilibria
associated with coordination failures in quality investment. Consider for example the case
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of equal-quality firms located apart (ω = (1, 0)). Suppose for simplicity that they do not
invest in switching. One equilibrium may be for neither firm to invest in quality improve-
ment, in which case ω = (1, 0) is an absorbing state – both firms ‘cruise’, incurring no
investment costs and earning stage-game payoffs of α/2 per period. There may also be an
equilibrium where both firms invest in quality improvement in this state – given that one’s
rival invests something it will be optimal for the own firm to do likewise. Such cases of
multiple equilibria in quality investment are frequently observed in the present model when
k is low and φ, the difficulty of quality improvement, is high. A low value of k means
that a firm’s payoff to (temporarily) winning the quality investment race is low – then firms
will be willing to settle for the ‘cruise’ outcome of no quality investment. Similarly this
outcome is also relatively attractive when quality upgrades are expensive – as φ falls this
equilibrium will disappear because firms start to ‘defect’ from the zero-investment strategy
profile.
In summary, we find cases of multiple equilibria for one of three reasons:
a. near a boundary between regions representing two different classes of ergodic sets.
b. in area II, because k is low, the firms want to separate, and either the leader or the
laggard may be the one to shift away.
c. where k is low and φ is high, because of failures in the coordination of investment
between firms of equal quality.
As long as we are restricted by the complexity of the problem to numerical techniques we
can never claim with 100% certainty to have found all equilibria at given parameter values
without a priori information on the number of such equilibria to be found. Since we had
difficulty computing equilibria at high α and low switching costs, we restrict α < exp(2),
γ > −3 in our subsequent analysis. Although lacking a fully analytic characterization of
equilibria in our model, we believe it likely, given these restrictions, that the above three
classifications cover all multiple equilibria in this model. Our confidence stems from a
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numerical search over a grid of 12,675 points in (k, γ, φ, α) space, using eleven different
starting values per point. This search did not throw up any instances of multiple equilibria
other than those covered by (a), (b) and (c).
In view of the above comments we henceforth focus on parameter values such that:
the quality step k is not too small relative to α (k/α > 2.2) and the cost of quality invest-
ment is not too high (φ ≤ 1). For γ ∈ (−3, 3] and log(α) ∈ [−3, 2) the numerical searches
found no instances of multiple equilibria over (k/α, φ) in this range. When for illustrative
purposes our analysis strays outside this region of the parameter space we will explicitly
note that fact. To get an idea of the range of environments covered by these parameters,
note that if α = 1, k = 2.2, and φ ≤ 1 then the cost to a firm of inducing a 50% probability
of success in quality improvement (i.e., Pr(q̃i = k) = 0.5) would be no more than 1.24
times the firm’s maximum stage-game payoff. For the same parameters a value of γ in
(−3, 3] means that the cost to the firm of inducing a 50% probability of switching success
is between 0.02 and 9.1 times the maximum stage-game payoff.
3.5 Equilibrium value functions
Figure 3.4 shows the equilibrium value function V ∗2 for various parameter values. This is
represented by two curves, each of which shows V ∗2 for the three possible quality differ-
entials δ ∈ {−k, 0,+k}. One curve represents states where the firms are apart and the
other represents states where they are together. The plots in the top, middle and bottom
rows respectively show the effects of a higher payoff to a quality leader (raising k), of more
costly switching investment (raising γ), and of more costly quality investment (raising φ).
In each row the centre panel shows the value functions for the parameters k = 3.2, γ = −1,
φ = −1, α = 1.
Increasing the differential k clearly raises the expected profits of a quality leader,
through its effect on the leader’s stage-game payoffs. In the figure this change also has a
positive effect on the value function at states of equal or inferior quality (δ = 0 or −k).
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium value functions, conditional on the horizontal differentiation state
s, as functions of the quality differential δ, for α = 1
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Since raising k does not directly increase the stage-game payoffs of firms in these states
(e.g., if ω = (0, 0) then π1 = π2 = 0 always), this is an indirect effect. Since investment
outcomes are stochastic, quality leadership is impermanent – eventually firms’ present qual-
ity rankings will be reversed and the erstwhile laggard will become the leader. The expec-
tation of this eventual ranking reversal causes payoffs in all states to increase in k, at least
for the parameters shown in the diagram.
The middle row of figure 3.4 shows how more costly switching drives a wedge
between payoffs in the co-located and separate states. Note in particular that while the
value for a firm in the ‘best’ state of ω = (0,+k) rises with γ, the value for a firm in the
second-best state of ω = (1,+k) ends up lower at γ = 1 than at γ = −3. For a firm in
the former state the reason for the rise in V ∗2 is fairly clear: as switching becomes more
expensive it is harder for the firm’s lower-quality rival to ‘escape’ from co-location. Hence
the firm can expect to enjoy the high profits from its current position for longer (barring any
reversal in quality rankings).
For a firm in the state (1,+k) there are (at least) two effects working in opposite
directions. All else equal, the rise in V ∗2 (0,+k) referred to above should also pull up
V ∗2 (1,+k), since a firm at s = 1 has some possibility of switching in the next period.
On the other hand as γ increases such a switch becomes more costly, which will tend to
reduce V ∗2 (1,+k). The figure indicates that over some parameter ranges the latter effect
can dominate the former.
Relative to the deterministic model discussed earlier, this divergence between the
value functions in separate and co-located states can lead to reversals in firms’ preferences
among locations. Consider in particular the states (0,0) and (1,0). In the deterministic model
(with δ fixed) both firms prefer to be in the latter state – in state (0,0) they earn zero stage
profits until one of them moves away. With stochastic quality upgrades the opposite ranking
of states may hold. This can be seen in the rightmost panel of the middle row in figure 3.4,
where it is seen that for relatively high switching costs we have V ∗2 (0, 0) > V
∗
2 (1, 0), i.e.,
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equal-quality firms have higher expected profits when they are together than when they are
apart. The reason is that with costly switching the gains from winning the quality investment
race are considerably higher at s = 0 than at s = 1 – the possibility of realizing these gains
induces a preference for co-location. (Note here that the value functions are convex in δ,
i.e., firms are risk lovers with respect to quality improvements.)
Effects of more costly quality investment are shown in the bottom row of figure
3.4. Firms in the equal- or lower-quality states (δ = 0 or −k) see expected profits fall as
φ rises. This is intuitively reasonable: in those states the cost of winning the quality race
is increasing without any compensating increase in stage-game payoffs. For firms in the
high-quality states (δ = +k), the effect is non-monotonic. Expected profits may initially
decline in φ – compare φ = −3 with φ = −1 – and later rise. The reason for this is that the
dominant position of a quality leader is most at risk when the cost of quality investment φ
is at intermediate levels. When φ is high it is costly for either firm to raise its own quality;
when φ is low it is easy for both firms to raise quality – in either case it will be difficult for
the laggard to catch up. Hence a quality leader enjoys a relatively protected position when
φ is either high or low.
3.6 Innovation with fixed locations
As an application of our framework we study the effects of changes in the competitive en-
vironment on the industry’s investment in innovation. In our model innovation can affect
welfare in two dimensions – through the horizontal differentiation of products and through
improvements in their quality. For the present we focus on investment in that latter, vertical,
dimension of product improvement, in order to compare the predictions of our framework
with those of, e.g., Aghion et al. (2001, 2005). Those authors studied the effects of com-
petition in dynamic duopolies where firms invest in cost reduction. Under certain specifi-
cations of demand and the investment technology, firms’ instantaneous equilibrium payoffs
in those models depend only on the gap between firms’ costs, not on the absolute levels of
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costs. Similarly in our model firms’ stage-game payoffs depend only on the gap between
firms’ qualities, not on their absolute levels – in that sense the comparative statics and dy-
namics of any cost-reduction model should map into those of the same model reformulated
as one of quality improvement.
In this section we study quality investment with fixed locations, i.e., when switching
is so expensive that in equilibrium a firm’s switching investment hi(ω) is set at zero for all
states ω. We vary α, consumers’ transport costs, to see how changes in the heterogeneity of
consumer tastes affect innovation in the quality dimension. Note that the sign of the effect
of α on the levels of stage-game profits depends on whether a firm gets to make all the
sales when it is the quality leader.11 However for the determination of quality investment
it is the profit increments from successful innovation that ultimately matter. These are
the quantities KL and KH defined in section 3.2 (for states where s = 1), and they are
respectively monotonic increasing and decreasing in α, for all δ/α. That is, when firms
are separated, a laggard benefits more from quality improvement when α is higher, and a
leader benefits less. This fact plays a central role in determining the response of innovation
to changes in the heterogeneity of consumer preferences.
Figure 3.5 shows Q(vf∗i ), a firm’s equilibrium state-conditional probability of suc-
cess in quality investment, given s = 1. In this figure the quality investment cost φ is set
equal to -1.5; figure 3.6 shows the same curves for the higher level of investment cost φ = 1.
Three curves are shown in each figure, for the three states (s = 1, δ = −k), (s = 1, δ =
0), (s = 1, δ = +k)), as functions of α, at four different values of the innovation size k.
Setting the switching cost γ equal to five means that there is no switching in equilibrium:
if the firms start out separated they stay separated forever. Thus in calculating the prob-
ability of investment success for these figures we do not need to take account of a firm’s
switching-conditional investment vs∗i .
11That is, from the profit expression in section 3.2 we see that, if |δ/α| < 3 then both firms make positive
sales in any state where s = 1, and in such states we have ∂πi/∂α > 0 for i = 1, 2. On the other hand if
|δ/α| > 3 then in such states the high-quality firm makes all the sales and its profit decreases in α.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium state-conditional probabilities of success in quality investment with
fixed locations, as functions of α, given s = 1, for φ = −1.5
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium state-conditional probabilities of success in quality investment with
fixed locations, as functions of α, given s = 1, for φ = 1
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Both figures show that the average level of quality investment by firms in the ‘neck-
and-neck’ equal-quality state (to use the terminology of Aghion et al. (2001)) is higher than
average investment by firms in asymmetric-quality states. (Compare the height of the solid
curve with the average height of the two other curves.) This pattern is consistent with results
from continuous-time models in the existing literature. It may not be immediately obvious
that the pattern should carry over to the discrete-time model considered here, because in
the present case equilibrium quality investment by a firm which has achieved the maximum
quality advantage may be non-zero, in contrast with continuous-time models. Furthermore
it is clear from figure 3.4 that in this model a quality leader has fairly strong incentives
to maintain that standing, since the value functions are convex in the quality differential,
being steepest when a firm moves from δ = 0 to δ = +k or vice versa. Nevertheless
average industry quality investment is still seen to be lower in the asymmetric-quality states,
because of the low investment by the laggard. In turn this allows the leader to slacken his
investment somewhat, leading to a lower average overall.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that a leader’s quality investment declines with rises in
α, the heterogeneity in tastes. To see the reason for this consider the effects of α on the
profit increments KH and KL defined in section 3.2. Any firm bases its quality investment
decisions in part on some weighted sum of these increments. The weights will depend on
the discount rate, and on the future likelihood of experiencing a transition from δ = −k
to δ = 0, or from δ = 0 to δ = +k, given the rival’s investment strategy. Each transition
is accompanied by a change in the stage-game profit of KL, for the former kind, or KH ,
for the latter. Naturally a firm that is currently a leader will be relatively more likely to
experience ‘equal-to-high’ transitions in future.12
To see that in equilibrium a high-quality firm is more likely to experience equal-to-
12Here we need not distinguish between transitions up and transitions down, because moves in either direc-
tion still involve the same change in π, i.e., the same change KH . That is, an equal-to-high transition arises
from state δ = 0 only if my rival’s quality investment fails, in which case the payoff to my own success is KH .
A high-to-equal transition arises from state δ = +k only if my rival’s quality investment succeeds, in which
case the payoff to my own success is again KH .
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high transitions in future (whether up or down) use a one-stage deviation argument. From
δ = +k this period the state next period will either be unchanged or will go to δ = 0.
Symmetric equilibrium behavior from the latter state must imply that the probabilities of
going back up to +k or down to −k are equal. Viewed from the present period the overall
probability of an equal-to-high transition in future must therefore exceed the probability of
low-to-equal transitions, regardless of this period’s quality investment.
Consider then the situation of a firm that bases its quality investment decisions on


















= 0 if k/α < 3 . (3.9)
Hence a firm which based its investment decisions on the unweighted average profit incre-
ment would have vfi non-increasing in α. In practice a quality leader will put relatively
more weight on the increments KH , since they are more likely to be experienced in future.
It would then follow that in deciding its optimal quality investment the leader (in part) uses
a weighted average of KL and KH that is strictly decreasing in α. Therefore its quality
investment strictly decreases in α: the intuition is that more consumer heterogeneity al-
ways reduces the equal-to-high profit increment KH , and these increments are relatively
over-weighted in the leader’s objective function.
Next consider quality investment by firms in quality states δ = 0 or δ = −k. In
contrast with investment by a leader, figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that investment by these firms
is not monotonic in α. Investment by the laggard ‘usually’ rises in α, but may decrease in
α for low α, low k and a high cost φ – see the first panel of figure 3.6. And investment by a
neck-and-neck firm usually falls in α, but may rise in α for high α, high k and low φ – see
the fourth panel of figure 3.5. Note that the break point where the slopes change is always
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near the value of α such that k/α = 3. (In the third panel of figure 3.5, for example, it is
around exp(0.55) = 1.733 ≈ 5.2/3.) That is, the kinks in these figures are triggered by α
rising above k/3, i.e., out of the region where consumer tastes are so homogeneous that the
quality leader gets all the sales.
For the quality laggard, it would seem that in the region of high α (α > k/3), quality
investment should always be increasing in α. The reason is the opposite of the explanation
just advanced for the case of quality leaders. A laggard will relatively overweight low-to-
equal moves among its future possible transitions. These are all accompanied by a change
of KL in stage-game profits, and (3.9) then suggests that if α > k/3 the laggard will be
basing quality investment on a weighted sum that is strictly increasing in α(i.e., on a sum
which has derivative in α of the form µ1(δ2/{18α2})+µ2(−δ2/{18α2}), where µ1 > µ2.
Thus the probability of investment success should rise in α for α > k/3, a prediction which
is borne out in the figures.
Note however that changes in α may affect not just the profit increments but also
their weights (relative frequencies) in a firm’s objective function. Changes in these weights
could in some cases have countervailing effects on firms’ quality investments. Consider for
example the case of low α, low k and high φ represented in the first panel of figure 3.6. As
noted above, the laggard’s quality investment here declines in α. To see the reason for this
note that at these parameter values the discounted sum of future industry profits is heavily
concentrated in the hands of the current quality leader. Stage-game profits for anyone else
are either zero (for a laggard) or very low (α/2, for neck-and-neck firms), because α is low.
Furthermore in equilibrium the industry has a low tendency to leave asymmetric-quality
states, because of the laggard’s low quality investment (yielding a success probability of
less than 0.1).
As a consequence the main impact of a rise in α on the laggard’s objective function
at these parameter values is its effect on the expected time it takes to usurp the leader’s
position in the quality race. This effect is negative for any given level of quality investment
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by the laggard, because of its effect on investment by equal-quality firms. If his investment
succeeds this period, the laggard reaches the neck-and-neck state next period (since the
leader invested nothing, as is clear from the figure). From there his chances of achieving
quality leadership in the subsequent period would be maximized by a success probability
in the neck-and-neck state of Q(vf∗i ) = 0.5. (That is, the probability Q(1 − Q) of a firm
advancing to quality leadership from the neck-and-neck state is quasi-concave in Q and
maximized at Q = 0.5.) The figure indicates that rises in α actually take the equilibrium
success probability in the neck-and-neck state further away from this ‘ideal’ value, reducing
it below 0.4. Hence with higher α a laggard who caught up one step with the leader would
have to wait longer before making it all the way to the top. Thus (again applying the one-
stage deviation principle), a laggard may find that its expected current-period benefit from
quality investment falls somewhat as α rises.
For equal-quality firms the next transition could be either equal-to-high or equal-
to-low. To determine the effect of α on investment by a firm i in this state, we should
consider which of these transitions is most likely, given the rival’s strategy and given the
cost φ, representing the (inverse of the) ease of quality improvement. If φ is low then
quality improvement is easy and it is relatively more likely that the rival will succeed in
improving its quality this period. In that case firm i is investing in quality not so much to
get ahead, but just to keep up. That is, its choice of quality investment will be based on a
greater likelihood of changes KL in stage-game profits. Since KL is increasing in α, we
should expect that investment by equal-quality firms may sometimes rise in α if φ is low.
Figure 3.5 shows this to be true, e.g., for k/α < 3 and k = 6.7. (Fourth panel – the rise
is slight but noticeable.) Note that for α < k/3 quality investment still falls in α – the
reason is that dKH/dα jumps up in absolute value when α goes from above k/3 to below
k/3. That is, increases in consumer heterogeneity α have their most negative effects on the
leader’s incremental profits when he is getting all the sales in the market, and for such α
that negative effect is the dominant influence on investment by neck-and-neck firms.
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Whereas figures 3.5 and 3.6 show firms’ state-conditional success probabilities, fig-
ures 3.7 and 3.8 represent the industry’s innovation rate under the invariant distribution.
That is, they show the equilibrium long-run average probability of an improvement in the
industry’s frontier technology. This means the probability of an improvement by the leader,
in states where δ = −k or +k, or by either firm in states where δ = 0. The invariant
distribution weights these probabilities by the amount of time the industry spends in each
state over the long run. Because the cost parameter γ is still set high enough to discourage
any switching in equilibrium, there are in fact two ergodic sets at these parameter values,
one for s = 0 and one for s = 1. Shown in the figure is the innovation rate for s = 1, as
a function of α – note that the equivalent figure for s = 0 would show no variation in α,
because when firms are co-located their stage-game payoffs are independent of α.
The results of Aghion et al. (2001, 2005) are a relevant point of comparison here.
Those authors examined the effect of competition on innovation rates in duopoly, measur-
ing competition by an exogenous elasticity of substitution between the products of the two
firms. They found that as competition increases (i.e., as the elasticity of substitution rises
from zero), the industry’s long-run average innovation rate first increases. This is because
both firms invest nothing in innovation when there is no competition (i.e., when the elas-
ticity is zero). An increase in competition initially spurs some positive levels of innovation
by both firms, leading to an increase in the industry innovation rate. This is the ‘escape-
competition’ effect.
When competition becomes sufficiently intense Aghion et al. find that a countervail-
ing effect sets in. Because innovative activity is most intense when firms are in neck-and-
neck competition (as in the present model), the industry tends to leave the neck-and-neck
states rather quickly, and over the long run spends more time in states of asymmetric qual-
ity (or asymmetric technologies).13 Therefore the long-run average rate of innovation in the
industry starts to decline. This is referred to as a ‘composition effect’. The overall picture
13Innovation in Aghion et al. is an investment in cost reduction rather than quality improvement. As noted
above, it should be possible to recast their models as games of quality improvement.
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Figure 3.7: Probability of an advance in the frontier technology under the equilibrium in-
variant distribution, given s = 1 and φ = −1.5
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Figure 3.8: Probability of an advance in the frontier technology under the equilibrium in-
variant distribution, given s = 1 and φ = 1
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suggested is one of an ‘inverse-U’ relationship between competition and innovation.
The principal differences between our model and those of Aghion et al. (2001,
2005) are that: (a) we work in discrete time rather than continuous time; and (b) the degree
of competition in our model is a function of primitives: the heterogeneity in consumer tastes
(α) and the costs of changing locations (γ). Also, Aghion et al. (2001) allow multiple steps
in the technological differentiation between firms, i.e., firms can be separated by more than
one quality step. As a special case they consider a version of their model in which the leader
can be at most one step ahead – this case of their model most closely corresponds to our
framework.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 respectively show innovation rates for cost parameters φ =
−1.5 and φ = 1, corresponding to the parameter values in figures 3.5 and 3.6. They
reveal a quite different pattern to the inverse U reported by Aghion et al. – if anything
quasi-convexity in α seems to hold, rather than quasi-concavity. Note however that quasi-
convexity does not hold everywhere. In particular the fourth panel of figure 3.8 indi-
cates that, after first falling then rising in α, the average innovation rate is thereafter again
(slightly) declining in α, for high φ and high k. To highlight the differences with Aghion
et al. we will focus on explaining the clear U-shape indicated in the other panels of that
figure.
When consumer transport costs fall from a high level, the innovation rate may
decline before rising again. This initial decline reflects the composition effect noted by
Aghion et al. As α falls, innovation by laggards decreases – see figures 3.5 and 3.6. Si-
multaneously innovation by leaders rises. Innovation by neck-and-neck firms may go either
way – recall, e.g., the fourth panel of figure 3.5 – but if it falls it does not decline as fast as
innovation by laggards. The upshot is that as α falls the industry over the long run spends
relatively more time in asymmetric-quality states. In those states the probability of an ad-
vance in the frontier technology (i.e., the probability of successful investment by the leader)
is relatively low, and as a consequence the overall innovation rate falls as α falls.
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Eventually α falls below the threshold level k/3, beyond which the firms are com-
peting for (temporary) control of the whole market. Recall that at this point the slope in
α of the incremental stage-game profits for an equal-to-high transition jumps up (in ab-
solute value), from 1/2 (for α > k/3) to 3/2 (for α < k/3). Therefore quality investment
by neck-and-neck firms begins to rise more strongly, and the same will be true for quality
leaders if they are investing positive quantities. Simultaneously quality investment by lag-
gards levels out somewhat, and may begin to increase. This ameliorates the composition
effect of lower α, since it tends to send the industry back to the neck-and-neck state sooner.
The figures indicate that as a result higher investment by neck-and-neck firms (and possibly
also by quality leaders) tends to dominate the weakened composition effect, and the average
innovation rate rises overall.
Taken separately an initial decline, and subsequent rise, in the innovation rate as
α falls may be interpreted in the terms put forward by Aghion et al. The former, arising
from the industry spending less time in neck-and-neck states, is a composition effect, and
the latter, arising from an upswing in investment by neck-and-neck firms, is an escape-
competition effect. It is striking that in our framework these effects appear in the opposite
order to that seen in Aghion et al. That is, as a measure of ’market power’ (α) falls, the
composition effect dominates first, then the escape-competition effect, rather than the other
way around. In summary it would seem that care needs to be exercised in translating the
competition effects of Aghion et al. into the effects of primitives such as consumer taste
heterogeneity.14
14Figure 3.7 indicates that the composition effect may be so weak as to be dominated everywhere by the
escape-competition effect. Here we are simply discussing one possible pattern in the innovation-competition
relationship. Note also that the escape-competition effect may be reinforced by increased investment by quality
leaders, although the first and second panels in figure 3.6 indicate that this is not necessary for the effect to
dominate.
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3.7 Innovation with endogenous locations
Turn now to the effects of parameter changes in situations where switching costs are low
enough to induce some movement between locations in equilibrium. We continue to fo-
cus on the effects on firms’ investment in quality improvement. Figure 3.9 shows state-
conditional probabilities of success in quality investment, conditional on s = 1, for various
values of γ. The top, middle, and bottom panels respectively show success probabilities for
the three states δ = +k, 0,−k, as functions of α. Note that the success probabilities are
now expectations of the switching-conditional probabilities Q(vf∗i ) and Q(v
s∗
i ), weighted
by A(h∗i ), the probability of success in switching.
The key point of this figure is that the endogeneity of location choices only ‘matters’
when consumer taste heterogeneity is at intermediate levels. In all three panels the solid line
shows the probability of investment success when γ = 5, at which value firms never change
locations in equilibrium. At lower levels of γ there may be some movement in equilibrium,
depending on the values of the other parameters. Nevertheless the figure shows that for high
and low values of α the firms’ success probabilities (for states where s = 1) all converge,
for all quality differentials, and regardless of the value of γ.
To see the reason for this, recall the path indicated for changes in α in figure 3.3.
At low α there is effectively little differentiation between locations, and hence there is little
reason for firms to seek competitive advantage through horizontal differentiation. In par-
ticular quality laggards have little incentive to run away from the leader, and the absorbing
state sees both firms co-located. That is, we are in region III in the figure. The low level of α
means that a firm’s stage-game payoff will be approximately equal across the location states
s = 0 and s = 1, i.e., it is (approximately or exactly) zero for all but the quality leader,
who gets (approximately or exactly) δ in each stage. Therefore firms’ quality investments
conditional on s = 1 all converge in γ, for small α.
On the other hand for high α firms have substantial potential market power if they
locate separately. That is, when α is high enough we will have 3α(2−
√
3) ≈ 0.804α > δ,
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Figure 3.9: Equilibrium state-conditional probabilities of success in quality investment with
endogenous locations, as functions of α, given s = 1
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and therefore firms always prefer separation regardless of their quality advantage. Then the
absorbing state sees firms permanently separated. In figure 3.3 we would be in region II. As
soon as firms reach this state s = 1 they cease all further location switching – hence quality
investments conditional on s = 1 do not depend on γ.15 For any γ the value of α at which
this situation of permanent separation is reached can be read from figure 3.9 – it is that α at
which the probability-of-success curve merges with the solid curve.
For intermediate levels of α there may be no absorbing location state in equilibrium
– the industry may pass through region IV in figure 3.3. In this region there is enough
heterogeneity in consumer tastes to make it worthwhile for a laggard to run away from a
co-located leader. At the same time there is not so much heterogeneity that the leader does
not want to give chase. Figure 3.9 indicates that, conditional on separation (s = 1), firms’
quality investments will then depend on the level of the switching cost. Leaders and neck-
and-neck firms seem to invest more when separated than they would if locations were fixed
(i.e., compared to investment for γ = 5), while laggards may invest more or less. Whatever
the sign of the effect, figure 3.9 suggests that a model that predicts quality investment by
conditioning on α, but without taking into account the endogeneity of firms’ locations in the
product space, is most likely to ‘miss’ when consumer taste heterogeneity is at intermediate
levels.
Figure 3.10 shows firms’ state-conditional probabilities of success in quality invest-
ment, as functions of the switching cost γ, given s = 1 and at various values of α. Note
that at the parameter values shown in this figure we always have k > 0.804α, so that loca-
tion states s = 0 maximize the stage-game payoff of a quality leader. A change in γ can
then affect these equilibrium success probabilities through two avenues. One is the effect
on the proportion of time that the industry spends in the location states s = 0 in the long
run. Since co-location maximizes the leader’s stage-game profits, all else equal he prefers
15This statement presumes that the industry does not fall into a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, where firms
always prefer separation but in which they continue to engage in needless switching simply because their rival
keeps on switching.
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longer durations in states s = 0. The second avenue is the effect of γ on the probability of
the industry moving to co-location from states s = 1. As γ rises such moves become more
costly.
The overall impact of a change in γ on firms’ quality investments depends on the
signs of these two types of effect, and on their relative magnitudes. Ex ante we cannot say
whether an increase in γ will raise or lower the long-run proportion of time that the industry
spends in states s = 0. On the other hand a large enough such increase must eventually
lower the probability of getting to s = 0 from states s = 1. Hence it would lower the
probability with which a quality leader reaches its best state (s = 0, δ = +k), and thus
would tend to reduce quality investment by such firms.16
Consider then raising γ from low values to high values at each set of parameter
values represented in figure 3.10. When γ is low the industry in equilibrium sees continual
shifting between locations – there is no absorbing location state. This is true for low γ in
all but the first panel shown in figure 3.10. (In that first panel the initial equilibrium has
co-location as the absorbing state, i.e., the equilibrium is in region III in figure 3.2.) If on
the other hand γ is high then there will be no switching at all in equilibrium, and changes
in γ will have no effect on equilibrium investments. Accordingly we see in all four panels
that the curves level out for high γ.
Between these two extremes the industry may pass through one of two unique ab-
sorbing location states. In the first three panels of figure 3.10 that state is co-location.
Referring to figure 3.2, note that co-location (area III) can be the unique absorbing state if
k/α is large enough, i.e., if α is not too high. We see in those panels that, as γ increases,
investment by leaders and neck-and-neck firms initially also rises. This reflects the influ-
ence of the first type of effect noted above – since the industry is headed for permanent
co-location, the long-run probability of being in states s = 0 rises in γ, and leaders and
16In an earlier version of this paper we presented results indicating that firms’ equilibrium switching proba-
bilities are in fact not everywhere monotonically decreasing in γ, but they will decrease for large enough rises
in γ.
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Figure 3.10: Equilibrium state-conditional probabilities of success in quality investment
with endogenous locations, as functions of γ, given s = 1
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neck-and-neck firms invest more in quality improvement. (Laggards also invest more, but
the effect seems weaker than for the other firms.) Quality investment by these firms peaks
when the absorbing state is reached – thereafter it declines because of the second type of
effect noted above: higher γ makes it harder for quality leaders to reach the ‘good’ state
s = 0 from s = 1.
In the fourth panel a quite different effect is in operation. There k/α is relatively
low, and as γ rises the industry is headed for separation as the unique absorbing state (i.e.,
region II in figure 3.2). As γ rises the long-run probability of co-location then initially
decreases, exerting a negative influence on investment by leaders and neck-and-neck firms.
This effect is reinforced by the fact that higher γ makes it harder for such firms to get to
s = 0 from s = 1. Thus in the fourth panel we see quality investment by these firms falling
up until the point where s = 1 is the unique absorbing location state, after which changes in
γ have no further influence on quality investment. Investment by laggards is seen to move
in the opposite direction (although not monotonically), because as γ rises they are more
protected from the possibility of losing all their sales to a co-located quality leader.17
It will be apparent from the preceding discussion that the industry’s long-run prob-
abilities of co-location and separation play key roles in determining the effects of parameter
changes. Note that this effect is not explicitly visible in models such as Aghion et al. (2001)
which measure the degree of competition by an exogenous elasticity of substitution. Re-
sults in that literature emphasize the role of the composition effect discussed previously –
that is, the effect of a parameter change on the proportion of time that an industry spends
in neck-and-neck competition. While this effect is also in operation in the present model,
it turns out that the ‘co-location effect’ (or perhaps ‘horizontal composition effect’) intro-
duced here can be the dominant influence in the determination of an industry’s long-run
innovation rate.
17There is some possibility of multiple equilibria arising at the parameter values in the fourth panel of figure
3.10. The discussion here should thus be taken as a particular example of equilibrium behavior consistent with
these parameter values.
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To see this consider first figures 3.11 and 3.12, which respectively show for various
values of α the industry’s long-run probability of co-location, and its long-run innovation
rate, as functions of γ. The parameter values under consideration are the same as in figure
3.10. As previously, the long-run innovation rate is defined as the probability of an advance
in the technology frontier under the equilibrium invariant distribution.
There is an obvious correspondence between the slopes of the two figures. That
is, whether the rate of innovation increases or decreases as γ rises depends on the effect
on firms’ long-run propensity to be co-located. For relatively low levels of heterogeneity
– e.g., log(α) = 0.25 and log(α) = 0.75, corresponding to the second and third panels in
figure 3.10 – the industry is headed for zero horizontal differentiation as an absorbing state.
Long-run average quality investment by firms that are permanently co-located is higher than
in equilibria where they continually shift locations. This is because of the very convex value
functions faced by such firms. They receive zero profits in states δ = −k and δ = 0, but
their maximum stage-game profits in states δ = +k. Hence the escape-competition effect
is particularly strong for such firms. If increases in γ put the industry into states s = 0 with
greater and greater frequency, then the long-run innovation rate also rises.18
The dotted curves in figures 3.11 and 3.12 – corresponding to the fourth panel of
figure 3.10 – show that the opposite is true when consumer heterogeneity is high. Then
increases in the switching cost push the industry toward s = 1 as an absorbing location
state. Firms that are permanently separated have relatively less convex value functions,
since if α is high stage-game profits are non-zero for laggards, and non-negligible for neck-
and-neck firms. As a consequence long-run average quality investment is lower than in
equilibria where they continually shift locations. By taking the industry toward permanent
separation (in the long run), rises in γ therefore reduce the innovation rate.
The distinction between these two cases is striking. It suggests that the long-run
18Somewhat confusingly, it is not true that long-run average investment by co-located firms exceeds that
by separated firms in equilibria with continual switching. If anything it seems that the opposite is true: in
the invariant distribution of any such equilibrium long-run average quality investment may be higher in states
s = 1 than in states s = 0. But with fixed locations co-located firms will invest more.
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Figure 3.11: Probability that firms are co-located under the equilibrium invariant distribu-
tion, as functions of γ
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Figure 3.12: Probability of an advance in the frontier technology under the equilibrium
invariant distribution, as a function of γ
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effects of policies designed to enhance firm mobility depend on, among other factors, the
heterogeneity in consumer tastes. Such policies might, for example, include measures de-
signed to lower the costs of entry or adjustment, to facilitate planning of new stores, and
so on. The impacts of such ‘γ-reducing’ measures depends on the degree of heterogeneity
in consumer tastes. If heterogeneity is low, then time-averaged horizontal differentiation
falls as γ falls, and the innovation rate rises, and vice versa. A full welfare analysis of such
policies would also need to take into account the impact of changes in firms’ horizontal
differentiation on consumers, an interesting question which we leave for future work.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 respectively show the probabilities of co-location, and of
an advance in the technological frontier, in the invariant distribution (or distributions), as
functions of α. Note that if the switching cost γ is high (=5), then there is no movement at
all in equilibrium, in which case there are two invariant distributions, one for the absorbing
state s = 0 and one for the absorbing state s = 1. These distributions correspond to the
dotted curves in each figure. For the other values of γ shown there is in equilibrium one
ergodic set with a unique invariant distribution.
In figure 3.13 we see the industry transitions alluded to previously in the discus-
sion of figure 3.9. For low α firms see little advantage in horizontal differentiation, and
co-location is the unique absorbing location state. At high α firms exploit local market
power by operating separately, regardless of their quality differential, and the unique ab-
sorbing location state is s = 1. As taste heterogeneity rises from the former extreme to the
latter, firms enter a region of continual switching – region IV in figure 3.3. They spend less
and less time co-located in the long run as the industry passes through this region, eventu-
ally exiting into a state of permanent separation. The ‘speed’ at which the industry passes
through region IV is determined by the switching cost γ. When switching is easy a quality
laggard starts running away – i.e., investing in horizontal differentiation – even at low levels
of taste heterogeneity. Continual switching persists as equilibrium behavior for a relatively
broad span of α. On the other hand when switching is costly the industry spends relatively
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Figure 3.13: Probability that firms are co-located under the equilibrium invariant distribu-
tion, as functions of α
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Figure 3.14: Probability of an advance in the frontier technology under the equilibrium
invariant distribution(s), as a function of α
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little time in continual switching, moving quickly from permanent co-location to permanent
separation as α rises.
Effects of α on the industry’s long-run innovation rate are shown in figure 3.14. The
correspondence between these curves and those for the long-run probability of co-location
is again immediately clear. Long-run innovation rates are highest for low levels of taste het-
erogeneity, because firms are then permanently co-located. As α rises the long-run proba-
bilities of technological advancement and of co-location fall in tandem, eventually levelling
off in a state of high taste heterogeneity, permanent separation, and a low innovation rate.
To the extent that α represents firms’ degree of market power, figure 3.14 suggests
that more competition (lower α) ultimately exerts a positive effect on innovation rates.
For small changes in α this need not necessarily be true – recall from figure 3.8 that for
some values of φ a reduction in α from high levels can cause the rate of innovation to fall
initially. However a large enough reduction will eventually set off a transition from more to
less differentiation, and firms’ long-run average quality investment will accordingly rise.
It is interesting to note that this effect arises in spite of an opposing tendency for
firms to spend less time in neck-and-neck competition as α falls. To see this consider figure
3.15, which shows the long-run probability of equal-quality states under the invariant dis-
tribution, as a function of α. The effect of more competition (lower α) is negative, because
as firms ramp up quality investments they leave the neck-and-neck states sooner. In Aghion
et al. (2001) this composition effect allows the industry innovation rate to eventually fall as
competition increases. Our model suggests that the countervailing influence of endogenous
horizontal differentiation is also important, and in fact may be the dominant effect.
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Figure 3.15: Probability that firms are of equal quality under the equilibrium invariant
distribution(s), as functions of α
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